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In this dissertation, I offer a new explanation for the fact that we can’t, as a result of 
reasoning, come to believe something simply because we want to, i.e. the fact that we 
can’t believe at will. On my view, reasoning is the inferential process necessarily guided 
by the aim of arriving at a conclusion (e.g. forming a belief) sufficiently supported by 
normative reasons. I also defend the view that believing a proposition is tantamount to 
being disposed to use it as a default premise in reasoning. These two claims combined 
show that the impossibility of believing at will is the result of our capacity to reason. The 
limited power we have over our beliefs is thus a condition of possibility for being the 
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Suppose a demon offers you eternal happiness if you believe that Napoleon lived 
and died in New York City. Unfortunately, since you have no evidence to support it, you 
can’t form this belief—at least not consciously and as a direct result of deliberation. The 
goal of my dissertation is to account for this puzzling fact, namely that our beliefs are not 
subject to the will as our actions are (at times this phenomenon is called doxastic 
involuntarism, transparency, exclusivity or, more simply, the fact that we can’t believe at 
will – pick your favorite). My solution comes in three steps. First, I defend the claim that 
believing means being disposed to use a proposition as a default premise in reasoning. 
Second, I focus on reasoning and define reasoning as the inferential process guided by 
the constitutive aim of coming to a conclusion supported by sufficient normative reasons. 
Because it plays the role of a default premise in reasoning, belief is also generally 
expected to play the role of a normative reason. Arguably, normative reasons are either 
true or at least epistemically supported propositions (or mental attitudes). Hence, as a 
result of the constitutive aim we have when reasoning in general and the unique role 
belief has in reasoning, when forming beliefs through reasoning we are forced to (try to) 
form beliefs that are epistemically supported, i.e. beliefs that we are willing to use in 
further reasoning. And this is why, through reasoning, we can’t come to believe what we 
want, but only that for which we take to have sufficient evidence. I conclude that the 
limited power we have over our beliefs is actually a condition of possibility for reasoning 
at all.  
It is important to point out that this dissertation does not deal directly with issues 




normative relation between truth and belief. Here I don’t deal with epistemic norms or 
epistemic normativity in general. I don’t openly advocate for nor argue against 
evidentialism or pragmatism. I don’t claim that we should form our beliefs in this or that 
way.  
Contrary to what happens in the rest of the dissertation, though, this introduction 
will be devoted to norms, epistemic normativity, and what theorists believe we should 
care about when we form beliefs and direct our inquiry. In the initial pages here, I will 
explore the allegedly special relation many believe there is between truth and belief, and 
why this relation is seen as the source of epistemic normativity. In fact, my larger goal is 
to undermine this picture by offering a view of belief and reasoning that is substantially 
different from the widespread thesis that truth is the defining, constitutive, or essential 
aim or standard for belief. My goal, that is, is to eventually undermine a multifaceted 
truth-centered view of belief, reasoning and epistemic normativity. That might in turn 
have an influence on the debate between evidentialists and pragmatists possibly favoring 
the latter. Indeed, the claim that only evidential considerations can function as normative 
reasons to believe, is usually linked to the idea that belief’s very nature is normatively 
directed at truth. And since I offer reasons to be skeptical of that claim, this may take 
away some of the support evidentialism enjoys.  
Perhaps this will also open the door for those promoting a weak notion of truth. 
Lynch (2009), for example, has argued that its normative or teleological relation with 
belief is what defines our concept of truth. The deflationist theory of truth, he then adds, 




Lynch’s first premise, the result of my dissertation may turn out to be congenial to 
deflationist views of truth.  
However, important as they are, I won’t fully explore those issues here, and I will 
limit my scope to providing a new picture of belief, reasoning, and epistemic rationality 
that is independent of the notion of truth.  
 
THAT SPECIAL RELATION BETWEEN TRUTH AND BELIEF 1 
It all starts with Bernard Williams’ saying that “belief aims at truth” (1973: 136), 
an expression introduced in his analysis of the impossibility of believing at will. Many 
interpret it as a metaphor for the claim that truth is the standard of correctness of belief. 
As Gibbard writes, “[f]or belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief. My 
belief that snow is white is correct just in case the belief is true, just in case snow is 
white.” (2005: 338) If so, then belief is governed by the following truth norm: 
TN) it is correct to believe that p (if and) only if p is true.  
This standard of correctness is, for many, a distinctive, individuating feature of 
belief: belief is the attitude that has truth as its standard of correctness, and belief’s 
relation with truth distinguishes it from other attitudes (e.g. intention, supposition).  
In philosophy and cognitive science, mental attitude types (e.g. beliefs, desires) 
are often defined in terms of how they are connected to other mental states. This relation 
is explained by looking at attitudes’ input (or upstream) and output (or downstream) 
roles, namely the sort of inputs they are sensitive to and the sort of consequences they 
tend to have (Fodor, 1985; Nichols and Stich, 2003). When applied to belief, it has been 
                                                      
1 I leave aside any reference to the normativity of content, and how that can be used to argue for the 




often argued that beliefs are individuated by their output role in causing action and the 
formation of other attitudes. Recently, however, it has been argued that belief’s role in 
the mind is not enough to account for the uniqueness of belief unless such a role is 
framed in a way that mirrors beliefs’ special relation with truth (see chapter 2 for an 
argument against this claim). And this has in part motivated the strong support Williams’ 
phrase about belief’s aim has lately enjoyed. 
There are two, non-necessarily opposing, interpretations of belief’s aim, though: a 
normative and a non-normative. I will spend the next few pages delving into the 
normativist reading, explaining its strengths while also pointing out the worries it has 
raised. After that, I will say a few things about the non-normativist, aim-focused, 
interpretation of the aim of belief.  
 
NORMATIVISM 
Recently, Gibbard (2005) pointed out that ‘correctness’ is normative: 
“Correctness, now, seems normative. More precisely, as we should put it, the concept of 
correctness seems to be a normative concept.” I will follow Wedgewood in explaining 
what it means for TN to be normative. TN is normative in the sense that it is a 
constitutive feature of TN that it plays a regulative role in certain practices: if one 
engages in one of those practices, and “makes judgments about which moves” conform or 
do not conform to TN, “one is thereby committed to regulating one’s moves within the 
practice by those judgments”. That means, again following Wedgwood on this, that it is 
“irrational” for one to engage in this practice, while simultaneously making the judgment 




involves mental states that “intuitively conflict with each other” (Wedgewood, 2002: 
268). Thus, TN has – according to the Normativist – a constitutive regulative role in the 
practice of belief-formation. On this view, TN is normative with respect to belief-
formation: engaging in belief formation commits one to conforming to it (I will come 
back to this below). 
Before delving into the specifics of Normativism about belief, it is worth 
mentioning that this account of belief may be connected to the broader view – called 
Intentional Normativism – that all our primary mental states (e.g. emotions, intentions, 
desires) are constitutively normative, in the sense that those mental attitudes are 
individuated based on their respective constitutive norms (Velleman, 2000; Lynch, 
2009).2 More specifically, Intentional Normativism is a complex view usually seen as 
subscribing to a cluster of different claims. The first of these claims is that a norm N is 
constitutive of an attitude only if it is part of what a belief, desire, intention, or emotion is 
that it is an attitude governed by N. I will have more to say about what that means later, 
but for now let me point out that Intentional Normativism can be a metaphysical thesis 
concerning the nature of intentional states. Or, it can take the form of a conceptual thesis 
                                                      
2 All Normativists understand normativity as non-reducible to the descriptive. Intentional Normativism 
itself, though, can be understood as a reductivist thesis: the intentional is actually reducible to the 
normative. The reductive normativist claims that there is a correct reductive account of the nature of 
intentional states, and any such reduction must refer to normative properties and relations which are 
themselves non-reducible. Brandom (1994), for instance, argues that intentional states must be explained in 
terms of normative moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Intentional states are thus 
explained as deontic statuses (e.g. commitments, entitlements) which are then explained in terms of 
interpretative attitudes (e.g. attributing a commitment, scorekeeping). There is also a non-reductionist form 
of Normativism. Such an account may claim merely that the normative and the intentional are essentially 
interdependent. In other words, on this view any adequate account of the intentional requires that one also 




about what is built into our concepts of intentional states 3. That means that if N is 
constitutive of, say, belief, then N can either be constitutive of the concept of belief or 
part of the essence or nature of the attitude if belief.  
Relatedly, N is a sui generis norm: it does not derive from the application of a 
more general normative standard. It is, in contrast, a standard that is unique, namely it 
only governs a specific mental state. In addition, it is a common assumption that N has an 
inescapable authority that silences any other non-constitutive, non-sui generis norm that 
may apply to mental attitudes, and determines a decisive reason for having or not having 
that attitude (Wedgwood, 2002: 268).  
It is also important to notice that, although Normativism as such is not committed 
to any specific claim about what norm N has to be, it is often the case that constitutive 
norms are linked to the correctness conditions usually attributed to different attitudes (e.g. 
truth for belief, good for intention, dangerousness for fear). This, however, can be 
explained in various ways depending on how you interpret the normative force of those 
norms and the term ‘correctness’. There are two main camps, at least for the norm of 
belief: deontic and axiological Normativism. Before looking at the deontic reading of 
belief’s correctness condition, let me briefly present axiological Normativism.  
The axiological account explains correctness in terms of ‘good’, in the sense that 
for any S, p: if S believes p, then that belief is good if p is true, and that belief is bad if p 
is false. This version of TN makes room for the intuition that there is a value in having 
true beliefs whereas having false beliefs is, in some sense, bad. As we will see below, this 
approach squares nicely with the teleological view of belief, namely that by its very 
                                                      
3 Alternatively, it can be a semantic thesis concerning the meaning of intentional terms. I take this from 
Wedgwood (2009) who also argues that the semantic and conceptual theses could be true even if the 




essence beliefs aim at truth, and that such a goal is a valuable one. One worry, though, is 
that correctness and good seem to be very different properties, and it is doubtful they can 
be easily compared. We talk about ‘good’ students, not ‘correct’ ones: the two terms 
don’t seem to match that well. In addition, the axiological reading leaves it unclear how 
the value of truth individuates beliefs exclusively, and how it competes with other 
valuable goals one may have. Guesses may be valuable when true as much as beliefs, so 
it seems that interpreting TN in axiological terms fails to make is a unique, distinctive 
feature of belief. In addition, it is unclear how TN now competes with other values: 
beliefs that make me happy are also good as they satisfy my goals. So how can we 
distinguish the various senses of “goodness” of belief (Owen, 2003; McHugh, 2014; see 
also chapter 5)? As a result, this interpretation of TN does not seem to account for two 
key Normativist claims: that belief’s correctness is unique to it and is not comparable to 
other values or normative properties of belief.4 
 
DEONTIC NORMATIVISM 
TN is formulated by employing the term ‘correct’. But what kind of normative 
property is correctness? According to the deontic reading TN should read as follows 
(Wedgewood 2002, Boghossian 2003, Engel 2002, Shah 2003): 
TN) One ought to believe that p (if and) only if p is true  
                                                      
4 To address some of these worries, Wedgwood (2002) defends the claim that correctness is a basic 
normative concept in its own right. On this reading, TN is distinct from and irreducible to either deontic or 




That is, for any S, p : if p is true then S ought to believe p, and if p is false then S 
ought not believe p. 5  
It is a natural claim to make that TN is part of the concept of belief (Velleman, 
2000: 16; Boghossian, 2003; Adler, 2002; Gibbard, 2003; Shah, 2003; Shah and 
Velleman, 2005; Engel, 2013). As Boghossian (and others) puts it, “it’s a condition on 
understanding what it is for S to believe that p that one understand that S ought to believe 
that p only if p” (Boghossian, 2003: 40). Or: “Marco could not be said to understand what 
it is for Ebenezer to believe that Mallory reached the summit unless he understands that 
[…]  Ebenezer ought to believe that Mallory reached the summit only if he did” 
(Boghossian, 2003: 38). That is, if Marco denies that having a belief entails being under a 
specific obligation that has to do with truth, either he is making a conceptual mistake, or 
he doesn’t know how to use the term ‘belief’. 
I believe there are a few reasons why TN may seem very attractive. First, it is in 
the line with our practice to say that we ought to believe only true propositions, or that we 
have a duty to keep our beliefs in line with the truth. Not only do we blame people for 
their false beliefs, and usually praise true beliefs, but we also believe that that evaluation 
seems to have an effect on how people regulate their beliefs. As Nolfi (2013: 98) puts it, 
“the fact that a believer is capable of changing the way she regulates her beliefs in 
                                                      
5 Daniel Whiting (2010) employs the weaker notion of permissibility, defending the following version of 
TN: 
TN) One is permitted to believe that p only if p is true  
Engel (2013:208) argues that such a norm “is an ideal of reason, in the sense that it tells you what you 
ought to ideally believe […] and thus it belongs to the category of the ought-to-be rather than to the 
category of the ought-to-do.” According to Sellars, “one ought to feel gratitude for benefits received, 
though feeling grateful is not something which one does. […] One ought, however, to criticize (an action 
proper) oneself for not feeling gratitude and to take steps (again an action proper) to improve one's 
character.” (SM, 76) The feeling of gratitude is a state in which one ought to be in such and such 
circumstances. If I have reasons to believe I am not feeling the appropriate gratitude in such and such 




response to and in a way that is guided by epistemic praise or criticism explains (at least 
in part) why she is an appropriate target of prescriptive evaluation for believing as she 
does.” 
If that is so, then it is should not come as a surprise, as Adler points out (2006), 
that we find the following Moorean claims problematic (see also Littlejohn, 2010): 
1) p, but I don’t believe that p 
2) I believe that p, but I have evidence p is false 
 
1&2 flout – and explicitly so – the biconditional truth norm of belief. Since such a 
norm is part of the concept of belief and we are committed to it, 1&2 are bound to strike 
us as odd, if not flat out absurd. 
Second, TN may be able to explain how we are motivated to deliberate about 
beliefs. I will bring up this issue again in chapter 5, so now I will offer a brief description 
of it. Doxastic deliberation is a form of reasoning directed at deliberating about whether 
to believe p. Recently, Shah (2001; 2003; 2006; and Shah and Velleman, 2005) has 
argued that in doxastic deliberation the question whether to believe that p is transparent6 
to the question whether p is true. This is how Shah puts it: “when asking oneself whether 
to believe that p, [one] must ... immediately recognize that this question is settled by the 
answer to the question whether p is true” (Shah 2003: 447). 
For Shah, that means that truth immediately rules out all other (non-epistemic) 
considerations from having a motivating role in doxastic deliberation. As he puts it, “only 
                                                      
6 There are two distinct meanings of ‘transparency’. Among others, Evans and Moran (2001) talk about 
transparency, but use the term ‘transparency’ in relation to the first personal access we have to our own 
mental states. In contrast, Shah (2003) sees it as a feature of doxastic deliberation that has nothing to do 
with how we access our mental states. Therefore, the two meanings of ‘transparency’ should not be 




truth-regarding considerations move an agent in such [doxastic] deliberation” (2003: 
468). The point here is that, even if non-epistemic considerations may at times appear in 
deliberation, at least as a matter of psychological of impossibility, they can’t move us to 
form the belief in question as a result of deliberation. Only epistemic considerations, i.e. 
considerations that serve to answer the question whether p is true, can motivate one to 
form the belief that p. In addition, doxastic deliberation doesn’t always result in forming 
an actual belief but can, at times, conclude in suspension of judgment (or withholding of 
belief). And non-epistemic considerations don’t seem able to motivate us even to 
withhold beliefs as a result of deliberation either. 7  That means that, when you ask 
yourself whether to believe that p, and you reach the conclusion that you have strong 
evidence that p is true, non-epistemic considerations cannot make it the case that you 
suspend judgment about p. All considerations that have nothing to do with the truth of p 
(i.e. pragmatic considerations) cannot motivate us in deliberation about whether to 
believe that p. This phenomenon is called, by Shah, the transparency of doxastic 
deliberation: in doxastic deliberation pragmatic considerations cannot motivate us, qua 
reasons, to form or withhold a belief that p. (But there are many other labels for it: 
doxastic involuntarism, exclusivity or, more simply, the fact that we can’t believe at will. 
In chapter 5 I will address it directly and call it, for simplicity, the “Explanandum”.)  
It is, of course, possible that non-epistemic (i.e. pragmatic) considerations may 
cause the formation of a belief in non-deliberative contexts. What is special about the 
motivational role of epistemic considerations, though, is that in deliberation they can 
function as the reasons for which one forms a belief. It is notoriously hard to explain 
                                                      
7 Withholding of belief (or suspension of judgment) involves or implies the absence of the belief that p and 




what reasons for which are, and I won’t attempt at a definition here. Here Shah’s own 
formulation: “R is a reason for which X φs only if R is capable of disposing X towards 
φing through R’s role in X’s deliberation whether to φ” (2006:485). Another way to put 
this is to say that R is a reason for which X φs only if R is capable of consciously and 
directly motivating R to φ when X deliberates on whether to φ and uses R as a premise in 
such deliberation. Thus, pragmatic considerations can play a role in motivating you to 
form an intention to engage in all the necessary actions that could make it the case that 
you end up forming a belief; but in deliberation there is no direct motivational link 
between consciously entertaining a pragmatic consideration as a premise and the 
formation (or suspension) of a belief.  
Theorists usually appeal to intuitions which, they claim, strongly indicate that any 
consideration that appears to us as having nothing to do with the truth of a given 
proposition ‘p’ is incapable of playing the role of motivating us to form/withhold the 
belief that p as a result of deliberation.8 Shah (2003: 2006, and Velleman, 2005) offers an 
inference to the best explanation for transparency. He argues that the best explanation for 
transparency is that belief is a normative concept. A “normative concept” is a concept 
that contains/expresses/entails a norm/evaluation. 9  In any deliberative belief-forming 
process we apply the concept of belief. The concept of belief is a normative concept 
which contains the norm TN. Now, Shah has a specific view about what is required to 
                                                      
8 For defenders of transparency (or exclusivity) see, for instance, Archer (2015), Kelly (2002), Steglich-
Petersen (2009). Also Bernard Williams points out that we don’t seem to be able to believe something “just 
like that” and as a result of the fact that we want to believe it (1970: 108). For worries about the claim that 
transparency is a genuine phenomenon see McHugh (2013a), Sharadin (2016), and Zalabardo (2010). 
9 We need to distinguish between thin and thick normative concepts. Thin concepts are concepts like GOOD 
and RIGHT which only express or contain evaluations.  Paradigmatic examples of thick concepts are various 
quality-concepts such as COURAGE, CRUELTY, TRUTHFULNESS, KINDNESS and many others. But also 
MURDER is a thick concept: it has both a descriptive content and a normative component. BELIEF is also a 




have a normative concept, such as, BELIEF. He says that having a normative concept 
means understanding and accepting its normative component. For Shah accepting a norm 
means that one is necessarily motivated by that norm. 10   Not only that: for Shah 
acceptance is a dispositional state to conform to a norm N, not follow norms 
incompatible with N, or assess others’ and one’s own performances based on whether 
they conform or not to that norm (Shah, 2003: 467). Thus, in the case of belief, accepting 
the truth norm means having a disposition to conform to it, not following norms 
incompatible with it, and assessing others’ and your beliefs in relation to such a norm.  
On this view, the conceptual nature of TN explains the fact that when we apply 
the concept belief in deliberation, we also necessarily apply only belief’s truth norm to 
our belief-forming process. That is, any time we deliberately form a belief, we ask 
ourselves whether we should believe that p. As a result, we necessarily employ the 
concept of belief and thus, since we accept TN, we are motivated to apply TN and no 
other norm incompatible with that. 11  As transparency does not occur outside the 
deliberative context when one does not apply the concept of belief (Shah, 2003: 467), it 
follows that transparency is  “something that is demanded by the nature of first-personal 
                                                      
10 This is an expressivist understanding of normative concepts based, I believe, on Gibbard’s account 
(1992; 2003). Take the concept/term LEWD. On Gibbard’s proposal, when someone uses the term “lewd” 
referred to x she means that a certain attitude (called it L-censoriousness) toward x is warranted because x 
passed the limits of sexual display. So applying the concept/term LEWD has some motivational implication: 
when you apply it you accept some norm. Gibbard says: “I myself am not a licensed user of the term [lewd] 
because I do not find it reasonable to elaborate standards of warrant for feelings of L-censoriousness 
toward sexual displays. I understand the feeling, but I do not think that standards of warrant apply to it” 
(Gibbard, 1992: 281).  
11 I take it that, roughly, fact E is evidence for hypothesis H if E is a sign or reliable indicator that H is true 
even though it can be defeated by evidence to the contrary. Shah is careful to point out that, to get 
transparency in deliberation, we also need to have some understanding of what type of consideration counts 
as evidence for the truth of some proposition. If someone were totally confused about what sort of thing 
counts as evidence, that confusion could undermine transparency. Clearly, this is compatible with the 




doxastic deliberation” (Shah, 2003: 447). That means that if there were an agent for 
which the deliberative question about belief was not transparent to truth, that agent would 
be applying a different norm rather than the truth norm, and thus she would not be 
deliberating about belief but about some other attitude. The ability of TN to explain 
transparency is one of the key strengths of Normativism about belief.  
There is a third reason why TN enjoys so much support: the fact that TN is the 
constitutive, conceptual norm of belief purportedly explains why epistemic norms apply 
to belief. More specifically, TN is used to explain the source of epistemic normativity and 
the necessary or inescapable authority of epistemic norms, such as:  
EN) One ought to believe that p if and only if one has sufficient evidence that p. 
EN) If one believes that p and believes that if p then q, then one ought to believe that q. 
If the Normativist is right, beliefs are subject to those and other epistemic norms 
simply by virtue of being the sorts of mental states that they are, namely mental states 
constituted by the truth norm. In addition, the Normativist argues that, because of the role 
such a norm has vis-à-vis any other non-constitutive norm that may apply to belief, the 
inescapable authority of epistemic norms follows from the inescapable authority of TN 
(Wedgwood, 2002).  
The advantages of endorsing Normativism do not stop here. To be sure 
Intentional Normativism is distinct from Content Normativism, namely the claim that the 
content of a mental state is normative. The relation between the two views is indeed a 
matter of debate. However, at least according to Boghossian, the normativity of content 
derives from the fact that belief is normative (Boghossian 2003). That means that 




the Intentional Normativist: not only it would account for belief and its relation with 
truth, but it would also offer an explanation for the normativity of content, leading to a 
full blown normative picture of the mind. 
Finally, one may wonder what the link is between the debate on the aim of belief 
and the question about (normative) reasons for belief. One may argue that strict 
evidentialism, i.e. the normative claim that only evidence can be a reason for belief, 
seems to follow from the normative nature of belief. Indeed, it may seem reasonable to 
say that if belief aims at truth and TN is constitutive of belief, then a consideration counts 
as a reason to believe only if it an epistemic consideration. As a reply, pragmatists will 
either try to deny that belief aims at truth or insist that, even if TN is the constitutive 
norm of belief, it is not immediately clear why it would exclude non-epistemic reasons, 
i.e. reasons that depend on belief’s relation to the agent’s ends, whether cognitive or not. 
The Normativist has a ready reply to that last point, though. In a recent paper Shah draws 
the consequences of his position on transparency and the concept of belief, and argues 
that from that, we can derive the strict evidentialist claim that only evidence can be 
reason for belief (for a skeptical look at this see Steglich-Petersen, 2008).12 In a nutshell 
his argument is that if we cannot but be motivated by and only by evidence concerning 
the truth of p, then pragmatic considerations can never play the role of motivating 
reasons. Now, if we combine this observation with the argument concerning the 
‘deliberative constraint of reasons’ – the claim that a consideration can be a reason for 
                                                      
12 A different tack is to argue for evidentialism independently of the aim of belief. In his “The Ethics of 
Belief”, Clifford presents an argument for the claim that “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone 
to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” In his view, it seems that we have an epistemic obligation to 
have beliefs that are sufficiently supported. In turn, we have a moral requirement to satisfy our epistemic 




someone to F only if it is capable of being a reason for which she Fs13 – we get that only 
evidence can be reason to believe. Hence evidentialism. If right, all that would add even 
more grist to the Normativist’s mill.   
 
PROBLEMS WITH DEONTIC NORMATIVISM 
In the literature on this topic, Shah’s explanation of belief’s transparency has been 
shown to be quite problematic for various reasons. Recall that Shah maintains that in 
deliberation, only truth-related considerations can function as reasons for which one 
believes. Nevertheless does the application of a concept in deliberation imply that I 
necessarily commit myself only to the norm that it contains? Shah thinks so. However, 
the controversial point here is that to deliberate about belief is not just to ask whether to 
believe that p would be correct (i.e. true), but whether I have most reasons to believe that 
p. Now, it seems that the mere fact that a norm N is constitutive of a concept of Φ does 
not mean that in deliberating whether to Φ I can’t take into account considerations that 
are in contrast with N. Consider that when I deliberate whether to assert or promise 
something, I apply the relevant concepts and thus acknowledge their constitutive norms. I 
acknowledge that my promise to Φ is correct only if I intend to Φ. However, when 
deliberating whether to promise I might also take into account considerations opposed to 
the constitutive norm of promising. Similarly, for assertion, I can deliberate to assert 
something I know to be false – and thus contrary to assertion’s constitutive requirement – 
for moral or prudential reasons (Steglich-Petersen, 2006). Why is that not the case for 
belief? 
                                                      
13  Shah (2006) attributes the deliberative constraint to Bernard Williams (1981) and argues for its 




To explain why this happens, an analogy between belief and chess is often 
invoked. It is constitutive of being a chess-player that one tries to win over one’s 
opponent. Similarly, it is constitutive of being a believer that one cares, above all, about 
the truth of one’s beliefs. This is because there is a norm that governs respectively chess 
and belief; for chess, it is the norm that says that correct, good, or successful chess-
playing means checkmating your opponent. Likewise, a belief is correct only when true. 
Intentionally flouting these norms and thus no longer caring about what makes chess or 
belief correct, means failing to be a believer or chess player. This is why chess-players 
must care about checkmating their opponent if they want to count as chess-players to 
begin with, and so each time they make a move, they have such a goal at the forefront of 
their mind. Analogously, we – believers – care about truth when we form a belief. It is 
constitutive of being a believer to do so. Unfortunately, though, the fact that I care about 
the truth of my beliefs in deliberating about them does not solve the question of whether I 
ought to care. Indeed, why should we care about being believers in the first place? Why 
should we make ourselves subject to TN and form beliefs rather than smeliefs (Enoch, 
2006)? The Normativist story does not offer an answer to this question.    
A second, unrelated worry against TN is: explaining transparency by referring to 
TN requires subscribing to a form of motivational internalism in which accepting the 
truth norm means being necessarily motivated by it. However, this already commits Shah 
to assuming an internalist position not everyone may be comfortable with. In addition, his 
view requires that to explain transparency the truth norm is able to silence any norm that 
opposes it when applied in deliberation. That is, Shah does not deny that other norms 




committed to saying that when those norms are in opposition to the truth norm, they will 
be trumped by it. Again, though, it is unclear why we should accept that the truth norm 
has such a strong role (McHugh, 2013). Finally, as Steglich-Petersen (2006: 507) puts it, 
“[i]t is doubtful whether a consideration which necessitates motivation should be 
considered a normative consideration at all.” If deliberation about belief exhibiting 
transparency is a result of applying the norm of truth, then necessarily such a norm 
cannot be violated. However, it seems a requirement of following a norm that one has the 
freedom to violate it. Thus, the inescapability of transparency casts doubts on the very 
existence of the truth norm (for a reply to this see Engel, 2013). 14 
A different kind of objection against dentological TN has to do with the 
impossibility of being guided by it (Glüer & Wikforss, 2009: 44-45). According to this 
objection, TN can’t really guide agents in the formation and revision of their beliefs 
because, in forming a belief about p, one can conform to TN only by first forming beliefs 
about whether p is true. That means that the formation or revision of the belief that p does 
not come because of the norm TN has been followed, but actually arrives prior to 
following that very norm. Thus, TN does not provide guidance, and its existence does not 
make any difference vis-à-vis belief’s creation, maintenance, or revision. That threatens 
one of the assumptions for adopting TN: namely, that it does provide guidance and 
regulate beliefs.   
A common Normativist reply to this is that even if TN does not provide any direct 
guidance, it can still guide belief regulation indirectly via some subjective norm of 
rationality, either logical or epistemic (Boghossian, 2003; Wedgwood, 2002). The 
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subjective oughts are grounded in the objective ought of TN. Glüer & Wikforss (2013: 
87-89) reply that that particular route opens the following dilemma for the Normativist: 
either these subjective norms are derived from TN because they are reliable indicators of 
truth but then they are contingent norms; or they are not contingent, but then they do not 
derive from TN. If those norms are contingent, then it is possible that in a different world, 
other norms may apply to belief. They become purely instrumental norms. Still, many 
Normativists are wary of saying that rationality is purely instrumental. However, if 
epistemic norms are constitutive and not instrumental, then they can’t derive from or 
depend on the truth-norm because there are situations in which these norms diverge. For 
instance, in evil demon scenarios the truth norm and epistemic norms would give rise to 
contradictory oughts (for a reply see Wedgwood, 2013).  
It gets worse for the Normativist. The claim that TN is a norm that can guide 
belief-regulation also faces the following concern: no formulation of TN seems to offer a 
plausible description of our belief-revising practice. In particular, Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi (2007) argue that of the several possible formulations of TN, none of them 
seems to be a plausible candidate for the truth norm of belief. For simplicity, I will 
consider the most common one:  
TN: For any S, p: S ought to believe that p if and only if p 
Notoriously, the problem with this formulation is that it requires that one believes 
every truth there is, even those truths that are trivial or uninteresting. In addition, Bykvist 
and Hattiangadi raise the worry that TN forces you to believe blindspot propositions 
because they are true, and yet if you believe them they will become necessarily false. As 




2010). Things don’t get better if we eliminate the injunctive half of TN because now, on 
this formulation, if something is true one is under no requirement to believe it, even if 
one has evidence for it.15 On top of this, TN faces “ought-implies-can” worries. The jury 
is still out on whether one has voluntary control over one’s beliefs. If one does not have 
voluntary control over one’s beliefs, though, it is plausibly said that belief is not subject 
to deontic evaluation. Consequently, any deontic formulation of TN is simply false 
(Alston, 1988; against this argument see, for instance, Steup, 2000).  
Finally, Bykvist and Hattiangadi  (2013: 103-4) present an objection to any 
Normativist formulation of the truth norm. They argue that it is unclear why ‘correctness’ 
need be understood as a normative term at all. As they claim, “to view ‘correct’ as an 
essentially normative term does not square well with common usage. For example, it 
does not fit well with the fact that ‘correct’ is standardly used to mean either ‘in 
accordance with acknowledged or conventional.” Mozart’s C major sonata just is a piece 
of music that is correct only if certain notes are played in a certain order (Rosen, 2001: 
619). Here ‘correct’ means that there is a certain standard that is individuating this 
particular piece of music, and yet ‘correct’ here is not a normative term. That means that 
standards of correctness can be constitutive of a practice without being normative: they 
give rise to no requirements to conform to them. In the context of belief, Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi  (2013: 4) suggest, “it seems natural to assume that […] ‘correct’ just means 
‘in accordance with truth’ or, simply, ‘true’.” That is true for guesses as well: we say that 
they are correct when true. And yet we do not require them to be true. This seems to 
                                                      




undermine the Normativist story that, in the case of beliefs, we should understand 
‘correct’ as a normative term (see also Dretske, 2001: 247).   
 
CONSTITUTIVISM 
Normativism argues that belief is a mental attitude constituted by a norm. 
Although, as we just saw, the standard view is that the norm of belief is the truth norm, 
other norms are possible: the knowledge norm (Engel 2004), an evidential norm (Adler 
2006), norms of rationality (Zangwill 2005), and norm of justification (Gibbons, 2013). 
Each of these norms, though, is seen as a constitutive norm of belief. Unfortunately, we 
are rarely told what that is supposed to mean. 
Non-constitutive norms are norms for a type of action, or practice, that exists 
independently of the norms itself. Rules of etiquette are a clear example of that: they 
regulate some practice which, however, exists independently of them. 16  In contrast, 
constitutive norms “create” the very practices, or activities, they regulate. In the 
literature, games are the primary examples with which the notion of constitutive norm is 
used. Games are activities with explicitly defined rules concerning the permissible moves 
within the game itself (Dummett 1959, Searle 1969, Williamson 2000). To bring this into 
focus, we need also to distinguish two different ways in which the label ‘constitutive 
norm’ has been used in the literature. It starts with the distinction between constitutive 
norms and regulative norms. Regulative standards prescribe conducts within a certain 
game, whereas constitutive ones explain how to engage in those games. Consider the 
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[…], I shall maintain that all such prescriptions arise from considerations of moral value, or personal value, 




following example. I am playing basketball and at one point while throwing the ball I 
commit a foul. My act was improper because it violated a rule of basketball. However, 
my act still counted as playing basketball. Let’s take an example with speech acts. I 
promised to wash the dishes, but haven’t the least intention of keeping the promise. Here 
I have promised all right, but the act is improper because it is not sincere. My act breaks a 
regulative rule, i.e. the rule of sincerity. In such cases, even though I did perform a 
speech act (i.e. a promise), I did it improperly: I violated a regulation.  
Turning now to constitutive norms, we said that there are two senses in which a 
norm can be constitutive. According to Searle a constitutive rule/norm for an activity A is 
a rule/norm you must obey in order to partake in activity A. This is the first conception of 
“constitutive” that we see in the literature. Similarly, for Rawls the notion of constitutive 
norms makes sense of the idea that for a practice nothing counts as part of the practice if 
it is “outside the stage-setting” set by the constitutive norms of that practice (Rawls, 
1995: 25). 
There is also a second conception of constitutive norm which is the notion of 
‘constitutivity’ that is most important to us here. On this view a constitutive norm of, say, 
a game is a regulative standard that defines that game. As such, it can be violated without 
automatically failing to play that game. And yet if players repeatedly (and overtly) violate 
constitutive norms of a game, that plausibly means that they actually stopped playing that 
game, and that they are now playing a different game. Regulative, constitutive norms can 
thus be violated, but only up to a certain point. 17    
                                                      
17 Importantly, there is a difference between intentionally and overtly failing to conform to norm N and 
being a deceiver/ cheater. Someone who intentionally wants to deceive others represents herself as being 
correctly applying N. The deceiver thus intentionally and covertly breaks N while representing herself as 




All this is, unfortunately, quite vague. The most pressing question for us is: what 
distinguishes a constitutive regulative norm from a simply regulative norm? Here is a 
first pass definition: it is usually said that a constitutive norm governs an activity 
necessarily. Going back to belief then, TN is a constitutive norm of belief only if it is a 
necessary norm of belief. However, being a necessary norm is not enough for being a 
constitutive norm. An important feature of any constitutive norm is that it is non-
derivative: constitutive norms, so to speak, derive from the nature of an attitude or an 
activity φ, they don’t come from some general principles. A constitutive norm of φ is 
thus a norm that is part of the nature or essence of φ. Still and all, not all necessary 
properties are also essential properties: a property may be necessary of φ without itself 
being an essential property of φ. Famously, Aristotle thought that being able to laugh is a 
necessary property of human beings, but not an essential one. Similarly, one may worry 
that the truth norm, although it applies to belief necessarily, it does so as a result of a 
more general principle (e.g. a moral requirement). So if Normativism is right and the 
norm TN is an essential property of belief then it seems that TN can’t just be a necessary 
norm of belief: it must be part of its essence (Steglich-Petersen, 2008: 277-278).  
It is notoriously hard to say what essential properties are, though. A way to try to 
solve this is to require that TN is the only necessary norm of belief. The thought here is 
that a necessary norm is constitutive/ essential of φ only if it is the only necessary norm 
of φ. Value monism seems indeed to be a widespread assumption when talking about 
constitutive norms.  
The problem with this tack, though, is that it is too restrictive as it does not apply 




is commonly thought that knowledge is the constitutive normative requirement of proper 
assertion. This has been formulated in terms of the Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KR): 
“one must: assert p only if one knows that p” (Williamson, 2000: 243). Now, assuming 
that knowing entails believing, then also believing that p is a normative requirement for 
properly asserting that p. Accordingly, we can formulate a belief norm for assertion: (B) 
You must: assert that p only of you believe that p. In that KR is a constitutive norm of 
assertion, then it governs assertion necessarily. It follows that if KR entails B, then also B 
is a necessary rule of assertion. Then, however, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, KR is 
not unique and – according to the suggested restriction – non-constitutive.  
To address this, we can try adding the following element to the definition: in 
order for a necessary norm N to be constitutive, N has to be basic. N is a basic norm of φ 
only if any other necessary norm of φ is reducible to it. Therefore, TN is constitutive of 
belief only if it is a basic, necessary norm of belief.  This works well for the Normativist: 
indeed it seems plausible that the truth norm is basic with respect to other necessary 
norms of belief such as the norms of rationality and evidential norms (Wedgwood, 2013; 
for worries about this strategy see Glüer & Wikforss, 2013: 87-8). Finally, a constitutive 
norm of φ is also individuating when it governs only φ as its constitutive norm. As a 
result, TN is not individuating unless it is the constitutive norm only of belief.18  
Is this a good definition of constitutivity? Can it explain in what sense TN is 
essential or part of the nature of belief? Here is a worry: the fact that TN is a basic, 
individuating, necessary norm doesn’t per se establish that TN is essential to belief, i.e. 
it’s part of its nature/essence. As Paul Horwich writes (1998: 188-193): 
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[A] property may have normative implications without itself being 
normative. […] It might be possible for our most basic normative 
principles to have the form – (x) (Dx → Nx) – where “D” describes some 
state of the world and “N” specifies what ought or ought not to be done in 
that situation. Thus the normative implications […] leave it entirely open 
that its nature is completely non-normative. 
 
The ‘essence’ of killing isn’t normative because we can explain it in entirely non-
normative terms; and yet killing has necessary normative implications that derive only 
because of some extrinsic normative principles that apply to it.  
This worries the Normativist. Assume one could offer a description of belief in 
non-normative terms. Assume such a description could specify some state D of belief that 
has some normative implications TN such that TN would be necessary and basic while 
applying only to belief. To make this possibility more concrete, imagine that TN (or any 
other basic and necessary norm of belief) could be the result of the role of belief in 
reasoning (which may be described as a purely descriptive property of belief) and the 
goal or norm of reasoning. In this case, TN would not be part of the essence or nature of 
belief, and this is a real threat for the Normativist project.  
As a reply to this worry, the Normativist could try to argue that TN is a 
conceptual truth: it is part of the concept of belief that TN governs it. However, as I 
mentioned above, this strategy has raised serious worries.  And even if we think of beliefs 
as states that we ought or ought not to be in under such-and-such circumstances, the 
nature or essence of those states may not depend on their conceptual status. So even if 
BELIEF is a normative concept, the nature of belief itself may not be normative at all.  
Alternatively, the Normativist could simply deny that we can offer an account of 




what belief is (Velleman, 2000; Shah and Velleman, 2005). 19 I will, however, argue 
against this reply in chapter 2 and again in chapter 5. Though I will not go as far as 
arguing that belief’s role in reasoning is purely descriptive and has normative 
implications, it is also true that the Normativist does not posses any convincing positive 
argument for why TN should be regarded as the constitutive norm of belief. 
 
TELEOLOGY: WHEN THE AIM OF BELIEF IS AN ACTUAL AIM 
Some theorists don’t read Williams’s claim that belief aims at truth as a metaphor. 
They actually believe that beliefs or believers want the truth, and this is because of the 
nature of belief. Still, the teleological and normative views of belief and its aim are fully 
compatible, and hybrid views have been offered. Some theorists maintain that the 
teleological nature of belief explains its constitutive norm: belief is correct iff when true 
because only true beliefs satisfy the constitutive aim of belief (Vellaman, 2000). This 
view is associated with an axiological reading of the norm of belief, and here ‘correct’ 
means good (Steglich-Petersen, 2006). Alternatively, one may defend both the 
teleological and normative approach as to belief but deny that the norm of belief derives 
from its constitutive aim (Shah and Velleman, 2005).  
The hybrid view notwithstanding, however, the most interesting position to adopt, 
dialectically speaking, is to see the teleology in opposition to the normative view. In this 
dissertation, ergo, I will treat teleology as an alternative to the normative view. An 
attractive feature of the teleological approach, when detached from the normative, is that 
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are considered the “paradigmatic normative terms” (Wedgwood, 2009b).  Whether or not he is right about 
that, it remains to be seen whether this is really an argument for Normativism: as Rey points out, one can 




it fits well with a naturalistic account of belief because goals and functions can be 
accounted for in naturalistic terms. This also leads to an instrumentalist (and thus 
naturalistically accepted) view of epistemic normativity and epistemic rationality. That is, 
belief aims at truth, and does so by its very nature. Epistemic rationality, or having the 
support of epistemic reasons, is what secures that goal, is the means to the end-goal of 
truth. That being the case, we care for epistemic rationality because of our quest for 
truth.20  
There are two compatible ways to explain belief’s aim for the teleologist. Some 
teleologists take that belief’s aim is a goal or function of the system that produces beliefs. 
This function could be a biological one, emerging out of the survival benefits of having 
true beliefs (Millikan, 1984; Sullivan-Bissett, 2017). Others see belief’s aim to be a 
personal goal of the believer, akin to an intention to have only true beliefs and, possibly, 
to believe what’s true (similarly Sosa, 2011 has argued belief is a kind of performance, 
directed at a certain aim).  
David Velleman combines both these views arguing that the essential feature of 
belief is the function of the mechanism that regulates it. And so to be a belief is to be 
brought about by a mechanism whose function is to track the truth. This ‘mechanism’ 
could be either some sub-personal feature of the mind or a conscious intention of the 
believer. This intention emerges especially when the believer engages in doxastic 
deliberation. Thus, belief aims (subpersonally) at truth in the sense that belief is 
necessarily influenced, formed, and caused by some truth-tracking mechanism. Also, 
belief aims at truth in the sense that, in forming a belief, the believer always has the goal 
                                                      




to form a belief that is true (Steglich-Petersen, 2006). As it happens, a belief-producing 
mechanism – whether it’s an intention or a subdoxastic mechanism – may fail and create 
a belief that is false and irresponsive to evidence. In this case, such a belief-producing 
mechanism has failed to fulfill its function (Velleman, 2000:254-255). 
I believe it is very intuitive to say that truth is by and large desirable and that our 
cognitive systems may have evolved or have the function to track it. As I will mention in 
chapter 1, though, there is now a strong body of evidence that shows that humans often 
do not conform to principles of reasoning and don’t evaluate arguments based on those 
principles (Rey, 2007: 75). That is, people don’t seem to be very good at spotting bad 
reasoning and generally their reasoning seems to be defective. This constant deviation 
from the norm is, according to some, not merely a problem of performance but the result 
of an underlying competence-problem (Stein, 1996). This has led some to become 
skeptical of the idea that we are truly after truth after all (Stich, 1990).  
Perhaps less controversial is the claim that agents generally aim at having true 
beliefs. We want truth, it seems, and our deliberative processes of belief formation are 
guided by this goal and intention. On the face of it, this seems to square nicely with the 
fact that we are not in full control of our beliefs, and only evidence really motivates us in 
doxastic deliberation. And yet I am skeptical that we aim at truth. Of course, by and large 
we do think that truth is a good thing, and we definitively expect our beliefs to be true 
because of their role as premises in reasoning. However, I doubt that we necessarily aim 
at truth when deliberatively forming beliefs. Thus, as I argue in Chapter 5, the teleologist 
account of belief is severely misguided (see also Owen, 2003), and we need a better story 





THE DISSERTATION: RETHINKING THE AIM OF BELIEF 
In the dissertation, I argue that belief has a necessary aim. I interpret that aim as a 
goal of the believer (not necessary an intention, but a desire that may be unconscious). I 
argue that the believers’ goal is epistemic justification. Such a goal is not part of the 
nature of belief, but is still necessary to form beliefs in deliberation. The nature of belief, 
in my view, is to play a specific role in reasoning. From that, and from the necessary goal 
of reasoning, I derive that in doxastic deliberation we aim at forming sufficiently justified 
beliefs. This positive thesis has some negative upshots for both the Normativist and the 
Teleologist view: although it is possible that various normative requirements govern 
beliefs, they are not necessarily linked to truth, and they are not constitutive of belief. As 
I argue in chapter 2, there is no need to define belief based on its constitutive goal or 
norm of truth. In addition, in chapter 5, I show that the Teleologist’s attempt to explain 
what happens in doxastic deliberation is doomed to fail. Combining this with the other 
worries the normativist and teleologist views face, I conclude that Williams’ claim that 
belief aims at truth needs to be now seriously reconsidered.  
Here is a summary of all the chapters: 
(Chapter 1) Defending Full Belief. Here I defend the claim that we use full 
beliefs in reasoning against those who think that full beliefs should be reduced to partial 
beliefs (or eliminated all together) and that full beliefs cannot rationalize action. In 
contrast, I offer reasons to believe that we do reason using full beliefs, and that belief-




reasoning with partial beliefs. I also show that, even though full belief-based reasoning 
may at times deliver sub-optimal choices, it still has the power to rationalize action. 
(Chapter 2) Belief and its Consequences. In this chapter, I argue for the claim 
that belief has a unique role in our mental lives. To do so I attack the recent claim that the 
output role of belief, its ability to influence action and other attitudes, is shared by other 
cognitive attitudes such as (propositional) imagination, acceptance and supposition. My 
argument comes in various steps. Initially, I defend the claim that only belief (and desire) 
can motivate action. Second, even assuming that other cognitive attitudes can motivate 
action, that is not enough to show that their consequences are the same as belief’s. Belief 
is an ‘unqualified’ cognitive attitude, whereas all these other attitudes must come with 
some kind of constraint on their use that limits the type of inferences or reasoning 
patterns they can enter into. This has two main upshots: for belief, the possibility to be 
defined in terms of its unique role in inference and reasoning is still open. And we do not 
need to refer to belief’s relation with truth to uniquely individuate belief. 
(Chapter 3) The Aim of Reasoning. Proposed here is a new constitutive account 
of reasoning. Reasoning is an inferential process that usually starts with some mental 
attitudes (e.g. beliefs, emotions, and desires) as premises and ends with dropping, 
forming, or withholding another mental attitude. On my view, reasoning is also a process 
guided by the aim of arriving at a conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons. This 
aim is constitutive of reasoning in the sense that it is necessary for reasoning, and makes 
reasoning into a unique type of inferential process. I show that the strongest proposal 
currently on the market, i.e. the rule-following view, is insufficient to make sense of 




(Chapter 4) Reasons vs. Correctness: When is Reasoning Good? In this 
second to last chapter I argue again for the Reason View: reasoning is the process of 
attitudes revision that aims at conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons. Here I 
argue for the Reason View by expanding on some of the arguments presented in the 
previous chapter. In particular, I will show that the Reason View can make sense of what 
we mean by ‘good reasoning’ and that the Reason View is more plausible than its 
immediate competitor, i.e. the Correctness View: the view that purports that reasoning 
aims at forming attitudes that are correct.  
(Chapter 5) What Guides Belief. Finally, I take up the puzzling phenomenon 
often called ‘Doxastic Involuntarism’, i.e. the fact that, psychologically, we can’t believe 
at will. First, I clarify what that exactly means, and then I demonstrate that what guides 
belief-formation is the constitutive aim of having beliefs supported by sufficient 
epistemic reasons, and this is the result of the general aim we have when reasoning 
toward attitudes as well as the unique role belief has in securing that goal. In other words, 
it is metaphysically impossible to come to believe what we want by means of reasoning: 
doing so is simply contrary to the very existence of reasoning. Hence, the limited power 
we have over our beliefs is actually a condition of possibility for being the type of 










DEFENDING FULL BELIEF  
Chapter 1  
 
The goal of this chapter is to argue for the following cluster of claims: (1) at times 
we do reason as if the propositions we use as premises were true (even if we are not 
certain they are true); (2) this way of reasoning can produce rational outputs (given 
certain conditions), and (3) this is our default way of reasoning; it follows that, (4) 
believing is a default disposition to use a premise as 1 (true) in reasoning. In the next 
chapter, I will offer more arguments for the claim that belief is a default premise by 
distinguishing belief from other (full) attitudes that present their content as true (e.g. 
assumption, supposition, imagination). 
 
This is the plan: first, I present a non-reductionist picture according to which full 
beliefs are metaphysically different from partial beliefs (or credences). Then, I focus on 
reasoning and support the view that full belief is a disposition to use a proposition as true 
in reasoning. My next step is then to show that that full belief-based reasoning is a 
heuristic reasoning method that is less cognitively demanding and possibly more efficient 
than reasoning with credence. Now, since generally our mind uses systems of reasoning 
that are fast and frugal as default, and it also rational to use the more efficient and cost 
effective means to reach our goals, the natural hypothesis that arises is that belief-based 
reasoning is our default strategy of reasoning, i.e. a strategy of reasoning we use in 
normal conditions.   
 
CLAIM 




CLAIM: part of the functional role of full belief is to be a default disposition to treat a 
proposition p as true in reasoning.21 
It is common in philosophy to describe full beliefs by at least referring to the role 
they are disposed to play in reasoning. As Scanlon puts it, to believe that p “involves 
recognizing it as having the status of something that is to be relied on in further 
theoretical reasoning […], and to be relied on as a premise in practical reasoning.” 
(Scanlon, 2007: 104) Littlejohn maintains that “what beliefs are supposed to do is 
represent how things are so that we might rely on them for the purpose of deliberation.” 
(2012: 238) Similarly, Williamson claims that “one believes p outright when one is 
prepared to use p as a premise in practical reasoning.” (2000: 99). Fantl and McGrath 
claim that if you believe that p “then you are prepared to put p to work as a basis for what 
you do, believe, etc.” (2010: 143). Weatherson adopts “the functionalist idea that to 
believe that p is to treat p as true for the purposes of practical reasoning” (2005: 421). 
Accordingly, “[…] if a person consistently refused to rely on p as a premise, and rejected 
arguments relying on it, then it would be plausible to say that he did not really believe 
that p.” (Scanlon, 2007: 91)  
Relatedly, it is often said that believing that p entails being disposed to use ‘p’ as a 
premise in one’s reasoning while assigning value 1 to ‘p’. When we treat a proposition as 
true, we exclude, in our reasoning, the possibility that it is false. We don’t use it, that is, 
as probably true: we are simply not interested in what would happen if the proposition in 
question were false. At times, we do that because we are in fact certain of the truth of that 
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that position. The way I do that is by combining views on the nature of belief offered by Frankish (2004), 
Ross and Schroeder (2014) and Wedgwood (2012).  However, what I say in this chapter represents a new 
take on the issue because, first, it can’t be reduced to any of those views in particular, and second, it is 




proposition. Most of the time, though, we believe propositions of which we are not 
certain.  
Despite being very popular, CLAIM has been recently criticized in various ways. In 
particular, some have argued that full beliefs should be reduced to credences, or that 
beliefs don’t play a role in reasoning and, if they do, they can’t rationalize it anyway. In 
contrast, I plan to argue for the plausibility of CLAIM22. Before doing that, though, I need 
to make some preliminary remarks.  
For starters, note that belief’s disposition to show up in reasoning means that, if a 
belief were explicitly represented and its content available to the subject then it would, 
other things being equal, take part in reasoning. So the mere fact that a proposition is 
implicitly believed does not make it ready to motivate and enter in reasoning. Implicit 
beliefs are disposed to become part of reasoning only if they become explicit. Here a 
rough formulation of the implicit/ explicit distinction: explicit beliefs are propositions 
that are contained in the so-called “belief box”. In contrast, implicit beliefs are beliefs 
whose content is not contained in the belief box but that is easily or swiftly derivable 
from the other explicit beliefs the agent has (See Dennett, 1978). Explicit belief is a state 
with such and such representational content and the functional role constitutive of beliefs. 
Presumably then, with implicit beliefs, there is no such state one is in. Rather, one could 
easily or swiftly come to be in such a state.23 
I talk of ‘dispositions’ so it is important to briefly clarify what I mean. I intend 
dispositions to be functional states of the cognitive system. Thus, beliefs are states of the 
                                                      
22 In the next chapter I take up a different objection to CLAIM that says that full belief is not the only 
attitude that can be defined as a default disposition to treat a proposition p as true in reasoning. 
23 Pinning down exactly what explicit/implicit means proves to be quite difficult (see Field, 2000). In 
particular, there is an intuitive distinction to be made between implicit beliefs and beliefs one might quickly 




mind which, when occurrent, play a causal role in the processes leading to action (and to 
the formation of other mental states), and action provides at best good but defeasible 
evidence for their existence. Dispositions here are ceteris paribus: dispositions may not 
manifest and when so it is because the situation is in some way abnormal. For belief, in 
this chapter I argue that belief is a disposition to use a proposition as true premise in 
reasoning by default, i.e. in normal contexts unless some additional information shows 
up. 
Now reasoning. I will have a lot to say about reasoning later in the dissertation but 
here is a rough explanation of it. I intend reasoning to be a process. By “reasoning 
process” I mean a process of thinking that proceeds from premises to conclusions (or the 
other way around) and in which the subject takes that there is a rational link between the 
premises and the conclusions. Thus, on this view a reasoning process occurs only when 
the subject is aware of the premises and the conclusion and takes the conclusion to 
rationally follow from the premises. I assume ‘rationality’ to apply fairly broadly as to 
include the possibility that what is rational to do is determined by a calculation of 
expected utilities, or that what is rationally to (partly) believe is determined by axioms of 
probability. And by ‘aware’ I mean that their content is available for action and report.  
By this I don’t mean that when going from premises to conclusion, the subject is 
actively and intentionally employing some rule of reasoning (e.g. modus ponens, 
inference to the best explanation). Also, I don’t intend to say that the subject needs to 
form a belief that there is a rational link between premises and conclusion. I mean 
something much weaker, namely that, if asked or challenged, the subject is in a position 




I can grant that those reasons may not actually be what caused that particular conclusion. 
Here is what I mean. In the famous ‘Linda test’, after reading a personality sketch about a 
woman called Linda, subjects were asked to assess the probabilities that Linda was a 
feminist activist and a bank teller vs. only a bank teller. In this case, it is said that most of 
the subjects reach their answers by using heuristic reasoning for which they ignore the 
starting point. They don’t know they are using a heuristic and they don’t know what they 
are basing their reasoning on.  However, if asked to justify their answer they are likely to 
come up with one. That is, they are able to offer reasons why they believe what they do, 
even if these did not actually motivate them to form that belief in the first place. My point 
is that their coming up with reasons for their conclusion is the outcome of a thinking 
process called ‘reasoning’. 24   
Note that by talking about ‘premises’ and ‘conclusion’ I don’t mean to say that the 
only type of reasoning possible is inferential reasoning. As I explain below, I assume 
that, in the practical realm, reasoning includes also decision-theoretical decision making 
processes. What defines reasoning – in any of its forms – is the commitment of the agent 
to taking her decision as rational given other attitudes she has.  
Finally, I don’t mean reasoning to require that the subject intentionally sets out to 
perform a bit of reasoning and arrive at a conclusion as reasoning can happen rather 
spontaneously in the sense that I can spontaneously (i.e. no conscious effort/decision in 
doing it) arrive at a conclusion given some beliefs I have.  
What reasoning is not, I claim, is the processing that takes place, for instance, in the 
visual module. The output of such a module is a representation which I am usually aware 
                                                      
24 This is similar to Mercier and Sperber’s (2011: 58) definition of “reasoning proper”. They write, “[w]hat 
characterizes reasoning proper is indeed the awareness not just of a conclusion but of an argument that 




of, namely a representation usually available for report and for action. However, in this 
case I am not aware of the premises of the inferential process that produced such a 
representation. What’s more, the following is no reasoning: the production of beliefs and 
intentions based on processes that use premises we ignore. Sometimes this kind of 
processes is called ‘intuition’ or System 1, although these labels are often used to mean 
different things.  
I assume that many of our attitudes are the result of such a thinking process that does 
not count as reasoning in my sense. I am actually happy to concede that this is the way in 
which we often come to form beliefs and intentions and that reasoning happens only in 
certain circumstances. All I care here is to show that our beliefs are at least dispositions 
to use a proposition as premise when we engage in reasoning. When we are not reasoning 
(in my sense), such a disposition will not be activated or manifested.25  
Here is a possible worry concerning my definition of reasoning. It seems that, by 
restricting the definition of belief to a form of reasoning that requires some sort of 
metacognition and possibly language, I am implicitly stating that such a definition does 
not cover doxastic states of animals and very young children. And the worry is that either 
my definition is too restrictive and cannot really account for what beliefs are or I am 
committing myself to the controversial claim that animals and babies don’t have beliefs.  
I’d like to remain agnostic concerning the questions of whether or not animals and 
babies have full beliefs. Possibly, only adults and children with some metacognitive 
                                                      
25 Keith Frankish (2004) has recently argued that system 1 runs on partial beliefs or credences rather than 
full beliefs. I’d like to remain agnostic on whether this type of cognitive process makes use of, among other 
attitudes, credences and/or full-beliefs. What I don’t necessarily subscribe to is Frankish’s claim that partial 




capacities have full beliefs. This is a possibility that I can’t explore here.26  Alternatively, 
one could argue that animals and children have beliefs and that CLAIM actually points to 
a subset of beliefs which only adults and older children have. This is in fact what I am 
inclined to subscribe to. de Sousa’s “assent” (1971), Dennett’s “opinion” (1978), 
Sperber’s “reflective belief” (2000, 1996), Rey’s avowal (1988) and Frankish’s 
“superbelief” (2004) all seem to point in the direction of an attitude expressed in 
language, involved in reasoning as a high-level activity, and present only in adult 
humans. A somewhat analogous distinction is drawn by Sosa (2015) when he sets belief 
apart from judgment. Also, Brandom’s (1994) equating assertion with commitment 
suggests that we have a high level, language-based doxastic attitude that is distinct from 
low level doxastic dispositions.   
Also, as I will mention again I chapter 3, the metacognitive capacities that are 
required for reasoning may actually be very minimal. More specifically, one may not 
need to actually metarepresent one’s beliefs when reasoning, but only have their content 
available for report and be able to use it when, for instance, the conclusion that those 
beliefs support is challenged. This latter ability may itself not require the concept of 
‘reason’ either. That is, taking a premise to support a conclusion may only require a fairly 
basic understanding of what counts as a reason. For such a basic understanding all is 
needed is sensitivity to the normative standard of belief and intention, i.e. being able to 
reliably distinguish correct vs. incorrect performances. It is possible that even young 
children may have that kind of ‘sensitivity’ too. If a child is able to assess the validity of 
a claim or belief based on its causes, we may be in a position to grant her an implicit 
                                                      




understanding of reasons. More concretely, if a child reliably spots normatively 
appropriate vs. inappropriate beliefs by accepting or refusing them, this may be an 
indication she knows what norm governs beliefs and claims and what counts as a (good) 
reason for believing or claiming. If this suggestion is on the right track, then perhaps we 
can venture the following hypothesis: 3- and 4- year old children do have an implicit 
grasp of what a reason for belief is. And so they may be able to engage in a form of 
reasoning that requires this kind of implicit grasp. Of course, this is only a suggestion at 
this point. But if it is correct, then the notion of reasoning I am adopting here may not be 
so restrictive as it originally appeared to be and can be extended, if not to animals, at least 
to small children.  
A final point. What I am trying to do here is to vindicate a notion of belief that 
belongs to folk-psychology. However, one may worry that a mature cognitive science 
will eventually get rid of folk-psychological notions all together. For instance, Jeffrey 
(1970: 71-72) argues for the eliminativist position that, strictly speaking, full beliefs do 
not really exist. Here is a famous passage:  
By 'belief' I mean the thing that goes along with valuation in decision-
making: degree-of-belief, or subjective probability, or personal 
probability, or grade of credence. I do not care what you call it because I 
can tell you what it is, and how to measure it, within limits...Nor am I 
disturbed by the fact that our ordinary notion of belief is only vestigially 
present in the notion of degree of belief. I am inclined to think Ramsey 
sucked the marrow out of the ordinary notion, and used it to nourish a 
more adequate view.  
 
However, as Jerry Fodor (1990: 156) has put it: if such eliminativism is true, then 




My hope is that my argument will make the possibility of elimination look less attractive, 
and support the claim that at least those creatures who engage in reasoning must have full 
beliefs or something very similar to that (in light of the suggestions that whatever 
scientific theory cognitive science will end up being, there will have to be some “non-




CLAIM naturally leads to the following metaphysical picture of the mind: 27 
ASSUMPTION: full beliefs are metaphysically different from partial beliefs (or 
credences) and can’t be reduce to them.  
Full beliefs are all-or-nothing attitudes in the sense that they are not graded. For 
instance, either one believes in some proposition p or the belief is absent. All-or-nothing 
doxastic attitudes come in three forms: belief in ‘p’, disbelief in ‘p’, or suspension of 
judgment about ‘p’.28  
In contrast, credences or partial beliefs are attitudes that come in degrees. Talk in 
terms of levels of credence seems very plausible. Indeed, it seems intuitive to many that 
we generally talk of some beliefs as being held with a greater degree of confidence than 
others and that when we use introspection to assess what we believe we notice that we 
have much more confidence in some things we believe than in others. So, for example, I 
                                                      
27 It is not impossible to subscribe to CLAIM and refuse ASSUMPTION by maintaining that full beliefs are 
reducible to credences. Possibly, Frankish (2004) holds this view. 
28 Since disbelief in ‘p’ could be seen as a belief in not-p, it is usually said that this model of belief is 
actually a binary one. And some people reduce suspended judgment to belief in the sense that suspension of 
judgment about p is nothing but the absence of belief that p and disbelief (which is belief in not-p). That 




am much more confident that the Earth revolves around the Sun than that the Universe 
started with a Big Bang. This point has led some philosophers to postulate the existence 
of a doxastic attitude called “partial/graded belief”, or “credence”. Credences come in 
degrees: some propositions we are absolutely certain are true and others we are certain 
are false. Then there are propositions we take to be true or false to a degree. And since it 
is usually thought that one can assign numerical value to credences, we can say that 
credences vary between 1 (certainty that the claim is true) and 0 (certainty that the claim 
is false). 
One common way to quantify degrees of belief is to associate them with a relative 
disposition to place a bet: one’s credence in p is the amount of money one is willing to 
pay for a bet that yields $1 if p is the case and $0 if not (Ramsey, 1926; Savage, 1954). 
So one can measure the degree of one’s belief in p in terms of how much one is willing to 
bet.29 Credences can thus be defined as attitudes that dispose the agent to bet based on her 
confidence that something is the case. To illustrate: I am very confident that my official 
first name is Marianna. High confidence does not require certainty, though. Although I 
am pretty sure my name is Marianna, I am not willing to bet $1 that that is in fact my 
name but only, say, $0.9. Accordingly, if we were to assign a numerical value to 
confidence, then my degree of belief that my name is Marianna would be 0.9 whereas my 
degree of belief that my name is not Marianna would be 0.1. 
One way to read ASSUMPTION is that full beliefs and credences are two 
metaphysically distinctive psychological states. This is a controversial claim as many 
philosophers tend to adopt a reductivist view of full belief and credence according to 
                                                      
29 The relation between degrees of beliefs and betting disposition may not be metaphysical but only a 





which one of the two states is derivative. One way to argue that credences or degrees of 
belief are derivable from full beliefs is to say that when we talk of degrees of belief what 
we are really referring to are flat-out beliefs about probabilities. Here probabilities are 
intended as chances relative to an implied fixed background. So, for example, when we 
say that someone is 50 per cent confident that a coin toss will come up heads, what we 
mean is that they flat-out believe that, if tossed enough number of times, there is 50% 
chance the coin will come up heads. (Or perhaps: if tossed enough times, it will come up 
heads 50% of the time). Alternatively, chances can be interpreted as evidential 
probabilities. For example, one might believe that there is an 80 % chance that I will have 
pancakes this morning. This is a belief about the relationship between one’s total 
evidence and the occurrence of an event.30 
Gilbert Harman (1986) has proposed a different type of reduction of credence to 
facts about full belief. On his view degrees of beliefs are emergent properties, an 
“epiphenomenon resulting from the operation of rules of revision.”  (Harman, 1986: 22) 
And the fact that beliefs can be held strongly or weakly is a matter of how hard it would 
be for us to give them up. Harman (1986: 22) writes, “[…] it may be that P is believed 
more strongly than Q if it would be harder to stop believing P than to stop believing Q, 
perhaps because it would require more of a revision of one's view to stop believing P than 
to stop believing Q.” Degrees of beliefs are thus explained in terms of how strongly or 
weakly we hold a full belief and thus how hard it is for us to give it up. Importantly, on 
this view, degrees of belief are usually not explicitly represented. Of course, that is not to 
deny that we can have full beliefs about probabilities. However, having full beliefs about 
                                                      
30 The standard objection to this reductivist account is that it seems overly demanding to expect that to have 




probabilities is not necessary to have degrees of belief, at least according to Harman. And 
it may not be sufficient either: I believe it is possible that I may assign a degree of 
probability to an event that does not correspond to the actual confidence I have about the 
truth of that event. Presumably, confidence, i.e. (on Harman’s view) how strongly I hold 
a belief and how easily I would give it up, may not be a luminous condition. Accordingly, 
there may be cases in which I fail to assess, or fail to assess accurately, my degree of 
confidence in some proposition I believe.   
I am somewhat skeptical about reducing credences to full belief.  But my goal here is 
to make room for the idea that we do reason with full beliefs, so I don’t have to assess 
any proposal of reduction that goes the other way. 31 I will only focus on attacking the 
position that takes credence or confidence as basic and full belief as derivative. On this 
view, the only doxastic attitude that has metaphysical status is credence.  32 This view 
comes in two flavors: the Certainty view and the Threshold view. The Certainty view 
says that believing is assigning probability 1 to a proposition. Since this is a reductivist 
view, it says that one can simply reduce full belief to certainty. As such, however, it is 
quite problematic: it seems just false that when we fully believe we are also certain of 
what we believe. And if this reduction were on the right track, then we would have to 
                                                      
31 It seems that only an on-off model of belief can fit with philosophical analyses of knowledge which is 
usually taken to be justified true belief plus something else. Credences, in contrast, are not assessable in 
terms of truth and falsity (although they can be assessed in terms of how close/far to truth they are). So it 
seems that they can’t be an element that constitutes knowledge. However, Moss (2013) has argued that 
credences can constitute knowledge. I will not consider this issue here. I won’t discuss implications 
ASSUMPTION may have on various epistemological views.  
32 Sturgeon (2008) and Richard Foley (2009) argue for the metaphysical primacy of credence and offer a 
reduction of full belief to credence. Unfortunately, I can’t do justice to the complexity of this debate here. 
For instance, I can’t evaluate Christensen’s proposal (2004: 98-100) that binary belief is merely degreed 




conclude that we in fact have very few full beliefs (which is contrary to what we 
intuitively think).  
If belief cannot be reduced to credence 1, then the alternative proposal is the 
Threshold View: there is a threshold t such that a rational agent believes p if and only if 
cr(p) ≥ t. Here the threshold is both vague and contextually variable.  
Notoriously, the Threshold View has problems with the following closure principles: 
Deductive closure: Rationality requires of S that if S’s total belief set logically entails 
some proposition p, then S believes p 
Conjunction closure: Rationality requires of S that if S believes that p and believes that 
q, she believes their conjunctions.33  
If one thinks of credence as basic, and of full belief as reducible to credence, one will 
naturally expect the closure constraint to fail. A classical example, often used in the 
literature, is the Lottery paradox: given that you have high credence that your ticket will 
lose, you believe that it will lose (Kyburg, 1961). By the same token, you also believe 
that to be true for everyone else’s ticket. But you also have high credence that one ticket 
will win and you believe it. However, since you rationally believe that each individual 
ticket will lose, given you follow the conjunction principle, you also rationally believe 
that all tickets will lose. Another example is the Preface Paradox (Makinson,1965): if 
high credence is enough for full belief, then it is plausible that when writing a book an 
author rationally believes each of the assertions in her book. However, the author also 
takes herself to be fallible and thus rationally believes that the conjunction of all her 
assertions in the book is false. This is problematic if one holds the view that one is 
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rationally required to believe the conjunction of the propositions one believes. To deal 
with this, some Threshold theorists are willing to bite the bullet, reject the conjunction 
principle and thus allow that a rational agent can have each of the “lottery beliefs” and 
believe each of claims in her book without holding their contradictory conjunction 
(Christensen, 2004). I won’t assess the plausibility of this reply here, but this strategy is 
important for my next point. 34   
There is another quite pressing worry against the Threshold view, a worry that is 
extendible to any reductivist view (no matter the direction of the reduction). For 
simplicity, I’ll call it the ‘motivation objection’. There are two ways to voice this 
objection. One way focuses on the idea that, if we want to keep talking about full belief 
we need to identify the distinctive causal role it plays, a causal role that can’t be reduced 
or explained away by credences. Otherwise, the objection goes, why don’t we just drop 
the belief-talk altogether? A key premise of this argument is that there is nothing else that 
could justify keeping the idea of belief alive other than it having a distinctive 
motivational role. So such an objection takes the following structure: (i) belief’s defining 
element is its motivational role. 35  (ii) The Threshold view says that the distinctive 
                                                      
34 For a different objection to the Threshold view see Friedman (2013) who argues for the rationality of 
suspending judgment on high-credence propositions.  
35 Mark Kaplan (1996) offered a view that may constitute a reply to (i). On Kaplan’s view, belief is not a 
disposition to act in a certain way but a disposition to make a sincere assertion. Here is how he puts it: 
“You count as believing [i.e. believing flat-out] P just if, were your sole aim to assert the truth (as it 
pertains to P), and your only options were to assert that P, assert that ∼P or make neither assertion, you 
would prefer to assert that P.” (Kaplan 1996: 109) The problem with this definition of belief is that it does 
not account for irrational beliefs. Imagine I have a belief about my great abilities at tennis and imagine that 
I also I have no sufficient reasons to believe that. Regardless of that, I am happy to have such a belief and 
have no interest in discovering how accurate it is. However, if my aim is to speak the truth, I’d prefer to 
avoid asserting that I am a great tennis player and for the reason I alluded above: I am aware I have no 




element of belief can be fully captured in terms of credences. (iii) On that view, the very 
notion of belief becomes idle. 
The Threshold view says that full belief kicks in once a certain threshold has been 
reached. Importantly, though, nothing really changes in that case because, as a matter of 
fact, we continue to reason based on our level of credence.  That is, having a full belief 
does not change anything in what we are disposed to come to believe/do or not believe/do 
as a consequence of reasoning. As pointed out by Keith Frankish, on the Threshold view 
the role of full belief in relation to action is idle. Beliefs are motivationally idle, he 
claims, because they “possess just as much causal power as the states of confidence in 
which they consist” (Frankish, 2004: 64). On the Threshold view, the causal power of 
belief is nothing above and beyond the causal power of the level of credence we are in 
when we have a full belief. What’s more, beliefs have the same causal power of states of 
confidence that are close enough to the ones they consist in. Assume the threshold for 
belief is 0.8 credence. Presumably, in many cases a state of confidence of 0.8 has the 
same causal power of a state of confidence 0.75. That means that, from the causal point 
of view, whether or not I fully believe a proposition is actually irrelevant. Nothing that 
wasn’t already there gets to be added once I reach the level of full belief.  
However, the objection concludes, we usually take beliefs to be “explanatory salient 
psychological states” (Frankish, 2004: 64). We cite them when explaining action and we 
use them to predict what people will do. A theory of belief should try to account for that. 
Otherwise, one is left to wonder why we should keep the idea of full belief at all. Why 
don’t we just drop the talk of full beliefs and refer only to degrees of confidence 




I mentioned above that there are two ways to spell out the motivational worry against 
the Threshold view. I explained the first way, and now here is the second. The second 
motivational worry against the Threshold view is that folk-psychology indicates that 
there is in fact a distinctive causal role that belief plays, and reducing belief to credence 
fails to capture that.  So the reduction can’t be done. One way to argue for this is the 
following. Beliefs are dispositions to conform to certain principles of reasoning, 
conjunction closure being one of them. If this is so, then reasoners are disposed to have 
conjunctively closed beliefs. That is, when we believe two propositions we are, all else 
being equal, disposed to believe their conjunction. 36  However, on a Threshold account, 
unless one has credence one in all the conjuncts, one is disposed to assign lower 
probability to a conjunction than to any of the conjuncts that make the conjunction. But 
the Threshold view also maintains that below a certain threshold of confidence one does 
not have a full belief. That means that I may believe two or more propositions but fail to 
believe their conjunction.  
According to the folk conception of belief there must be something amiss with a 
view of full beliefs that does not take into account the following: people are disposed to 
believe the conjunction of propositions they believe and, when they don’t believe, it is 
because of some conflicting dispositions. 37 (Something similar could be said for other 
principles of reasoning like deductive closure.) Similarly, it seems natural that our folk-
psychological conception of belief is that one ought to believe the conjunctions of the 
                                                      
36 Wedgewood (2012), Frankish (2004), and Kaplan agree that beliefs have such dispositions. Christensen 
(2004, chap. 4) and Sturgeon (2008, section 5) deny that beliefs are so disposed. See Kolodny (2008) for an 
argument on why this dispositional view is a version of the Myth of Coherence. 




propositions one believes. But this is not the case for credences. So again, something 
seems amiss.  
There is a way to reply to this that – contra folk-psychology – simply denies that full 
beliefs have such dispositions. This reply can appeal to the fact that there is now a strong 
body of evidence that shows that humans often do not conform to principles of reasoning 
and don’t evaluate arguments based on those principles (Rey, 2007: 75). That is, people 
don’t seem to be very good at spotting bad reasoning38 and generally their reasoning 
seems to be defective. This constant deviation from the norm is, according to some, not 
merely a problem of performance but the result of an underlying competence-problem 
(Stein, 1996).  
I believe that the evidence of the “heuristics and bias” view of reasoning is very 
strong and don’t intend to deny that humans can be faulty reasoners. However, there may 
be good reasons to resist the stronger claim that humans are intrinsically irrational. It is 
true that there is strong evidence that humans reason based on heuristics that lead to 
biases rather than using principles of ‘correct’ reasoning.  Heuristics are mental shortcuts 
we deploy in various contexts to arrive at various conclusions. The reason we deploy 
them, consciously or not, has to do with the fact that heuristics are fast and frugal tools to 
form beliefs and make decisions. Importantly, though, even if we agree that we are prone 
to using heuristics, the evidence we have does not establish that we always employ 
heuristics unless we are tutored to use correct reasoning. Indeed, the move from 
                                                      
38 Here is a standard example of this deviation from rationality: in a series of experiments students were 
asked to evaluate whether the following argument is deductively valid:  ‘All roses are flowers. Some 
flowers fade quickly. Therefore some roses fade quickly.’ In the experiment a very large majority of 
students wrongly deemed this argument to be valid. The explanation for this is that they adopted a 
heuristic: first they noticed that the conclusion is true and then moved from the conclusion being true to 




‘evidence indicates that we often use heuristics’ to ‘evidence indicates that we always do 
it’ seems problematic.39  
What’s more, besides being a problematic generalization, it seems that there are 
positive reasons to resist accepting a skeptical conclusion about human reasoning 
competence. There is evidence that, although in many situations we are indeed bad 
reasoners, there are contexts in which we do much better. That is, there is evidence that, 
when we use reasoning in dialogical or argumentative settings, performance improves 
substantially. For instance, people often employ modus tollens reasoning in 
argumentative contexts (Pennington & Hastie 1993:155). Results in the Wason selection 
task get a lot better when people exchange ideas in a group setting. Studies have shown 
that we are fairly good at spotting argumentative fallacies (e.g. slippery slope) and react 
to them appropriately (by refusing to endorse their conclusion) (Hahn & Oaksford 2007; 
Neuman 2003; Neuman et al. 2006; Weinstock et al. 2004). That means that we are able 
to produce good reasoning when set in the right context even without any tutoring.  
If confirmed, this body of evidence may prove useful to lessen the skepticism some 
have about human reasoning. The strategy is to locate the source of error not in our 
reasoning competence, but in the performance affected by external conditions. 40 
Accordingly, failures of rationality can be explained by the fact that subjects may not 
reason well when placed in contexts not conducive to good reasoning. Now, contexts are 
                                                      
39 As Gigerenzer has put it, sometimes the heuristic and bias camps seem to believe that “the untutored 
mind is running on shoddy software, that is, on programs that work only with a handful of heuristics” 
(1991: 235). As Samuel and al. (2002) point out, though, “[a]t most, what could be plausibly claimed is that 
we have reason to think that, in many instances, human beings use normatively defective heuristics. The 
further claim that these normatively problematic heuristics are the only cognitive tools that untutored folk 
have available is vastly stronger than anything the available evidence will support.”  





‘right’ for reasoning when no countervailing force is present such that prevents reasoning 
and thus belief from following its due course. These countervailing forces may be 
tiredness, sloppiness, and a ‘desire’ to cut corners and save energies and resources. So, on 
this reading, in contexts that are not ‘right’, our disposition to reason well is blocked by 
opposing forces. And this would give support to the idea that beliefs are indeed disposed 
to conform to principles of reasoning other things being equal. And as we saw, this 
would be a problem for the Threshold view.41  
And even if the evidence provided may not be enough to show that beliefs are 
disposed to conform to principles of reasoning, still it seems that – when the right 
motivation is in place – beliefs do conform to these principles. Traditionally, 
psychologists and philosophers alike believe that the point of reasoning is to discover the 
truth and enhance knowledge. In contrast, it has been recently suggested that the function 
of reasoning is argumentative. That is, on this view reasoning abilities are geared toward 
producing arguments and justifications for our claims, beliefs, and actions. Notably, 
though, reasoning is not only designed to produce arguments. It also has the function of 
monitoring them. More specifically, the idea is that there are mechanisms used to filter 
the information coming from communication in order to avoid misinformation. Such 
mechanisms check the reliability of the communicated information by looking at the 
source of the information, at the content of the information, and at the processes through 
which it was formed. This could explain why, when we are in the context of 
communication and argumentation, we are much better at spotting bad arguments: we use 
                                                      
41 I am inclined to support this stronger reading and in the next pages I will assume it to be true. One reason 
for my support is that it seems to me hard to explain how we can make sense of each other’s behavior if we 
accept the hypothesis that we are fundamentally irrational. Unfortunately, I will not offer an argument for 
that here. For more arguments against attributing intrinsic irrationality to humans see Cohen (1981) and 




our reasoning abilities to check whether the information sent is reliable or not, whether it 
aligns with what we know, whether it forces us to revise some of the things we believe, 
and so on (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
To achieve the goal of convincing others (who may not be easily persuaded) it is 
usually better to have good arguments. More specifically, if those we communicate with 
are able to spot potentially bad arguments and our goal is to convince them, the best way 
to do that is to try to have arguments that could pass the test. This would explain why at 
times we see conformity to principles of reasoning: when we are in argumentative 
context, we are motivated to reason well.  
As a result, we can’t exclude that there may be cases in which beliefs will behave in 
a way that is not always parallel to how credence would - when rational - behave. That 
means that it is possible that beliefs may follow their own motivational course, which 
they don’t necessarily share with credences. So if it is true that beliefs at times show an 
independent motivational role, then it seems that one can’t reduce beliefs to credences 
above a threshold. If this is correct, then they must be two metaphysically distinct 
attitudes which is what the Threshold view denies. 
Now, of course, this is highly speculative at this point and it is doubtful that evidence 
from the reasoning-literature can be used to directly support the irreducibility of full 
belief to credence. That is, I don’t think I have provided any definitive argument against 
the Threshold view. My main goal was only to argue for the plausibility of 
ASSUMPTION, and indicate that the possibility of reduction may be less attractive than 




Before ending this section, I will briefly mention an objection that has been moved 
against ASSUMPTION by Scott Sturgeon (2008: 47; 148), an advocate for the Threshold 
view, who argued that a view like ASSUMPTION can’t explain why credence and full 
belief seem to go hand in hand when producing actions:  
Whenever someone goes to the fridge, say, because they believe that it 
contains beer, there is a clear and everyday sense in which they go to the 
fridge because they are confident that it contains beer. […] Coarse and 
fine belief yield everyday action in harmony, marching in step throughout 
everyday practice. This cries out for explanation; and it does so in spades 
on the Divide- &-Conquer approach [read ASSUMPTION]. After all, that 
approach has it that confidence and binary belief are quite different things. 
But then it’s surprising that each marches in step with the other as a source 
of everyday action. Why on earth should that be? Why should strong 
confidence go with binary belief in the production of ordinary acts; and 
vice versa? The Divide-&-Conquer strategy has no internal resource to 
answer this question.  
 
And again:  
 
The Threshold View prompts the natural idea that coarse and fine belief 
march in step as the causal source of action because coarse belief is 
nothing but sufficient confidence. If that were so, coarse and fine belief 
would causally march in step just as they seem to in practice—they would 
generate action in parallel; for that is how causal powers of determinable 
and determinate relate to one another. This strongly suggests that the 
Threshold View is on the right track.  
 
As a reply, let me point out that the fact that ASSUMPTION has no “internal 
resources” to explain why high confidence and belief march together in everyday action 
may not be a problem for ASSUMPTION. That is, there is in fact a plausible way to 
make sense of this phenomenon: beliefs and high credences tend to occur together 
because they are sensitive to or caused by the same kind of input. More specifically, they 




mysterious why they tend to show up simultaneously. Also, as I will explain below, full 
beliefs are employed in reasoning patterns that approximate Bayesian ideals, the same 
ideals credences strive for. As a result, it is not mysterious why they usually march 
together as causes of actions. 
Another way of developing Sturgeon's worry is to ask: Why do we have these 
different kinds of states at all, if they march hand-in-hand? Why do we need both? What 
do we gain by having both? What are the distinct functions such that we use up resources 
maintaining both full beliefs and credences? In the next sections, I will try to offer an 
answer to these questions. The bottom line will be: we need both because, although they 
often lead to similar outcomes, they actually require different level of cognitive 
sophistications and, depending on the situation, they may lead to divergent actions.  
 
PROBLEMS WITH BAYESIAN RATIONALITY AND MODELING  
If there are both credences and full beliefs in the mind, what is their role? 
Bayesianism has provided a powerful account of the role of credences in reasoning. My 
goal in this chapter is to convince the skeptical reader that we need to take also the role of 
full belief in reasoning seriously.  In this section, I will mention some worries 
Bayesianism has to face. In particular the last point I will make here will open the doors 
for an account of belief based on its role in reasoning.  
The Bayesian account of rationality has two components: one component is an 
account of theoretical rationality; and the other component is an account of practical 
rationality. For theoretical rationality, probability calculus is the standard tool for 




degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent and thus obey the laws of 
probabilities. 42  When it comes to practical reasoning, Bayesianism offers a specific 
model of rational choice which is the decision theoretic model. The norm of decision 
theory in its modern form is: when choosing among acts one should choose the act with 
the highest value of expected utilities. For example, when one is deciding whether to 
bring an umbrella to work or leave it at home, one considers the utility of getting wet, of 
staying dry while not carrying an umbrella, and of staying dry while carrying the 
umbrella, as well as one’s credence in rain vs. not-rain. This reasoning captures the 
structure of the considerations involved in instrumental or means-ends reasoning. In 
typical cases, an agent faces a choice among means that lead to different competing ends, 
which she values to different degrees. And, in typical cases, none of the means available 
to the agent will lead with certainty to some particular end. So the agent’s judgment about 
what to do must be sensitive both to judgments about which ends she cares about and 
how much, and to the likely result of each of her possible actions. That means that it is 
rational to choose an act only if it maximizes expected utility with respect to the 
confidence we have in certain outcomes and the value of those outcomes in relation to the 
choice we could make.43  
                                                      
42 Degrees of confidence have epistemic rational constraints: coherence and conditionalization. Subjectivist 
Bayesianism maintains that incoherent beliefs are subjected to a Dutch book, in the sense that there is a 
finite set of bets the agent is willing to accept that (subjectively) guarantees the agent will lose money.  
Similarly, a partial belief is irrational and thus subject to a Dutch book if its degrees don’t change in 
proportion to the probability of the propositions learnt by the believer (Ramsey (1926) and de Finetti 
(1937)). A different view, called Probabilism, does not accept conditionalization. I take that the Dutch 
Book argument is a pragmatic argument for the claim that ideally rational degrees of belief conform to the 
probability calculus. However, it is a matter of debate whether the Dutch book argument is just a pragmatic 
argument or whether it is also epistemically valid.   
43 This conception of decision theory depends on the idea that it is beyond the agent’s control whether a 




There are various motivations to adopt this view. Bayesian decision theory (BDT) is 
a theory that, in the words of David Lewis (1981: 5), is “simple, elegant, powerful, and 
conceptually economical.” What’s more this theory is used in microeconomics, and so 
also enjoys some empirical support. Finally, it has been argued that violating BDT means 
having irrational preferences: if one does not maximize expected utilities one will end up 
with preferences that are intransitive or violating the sure-thing principle (Savage, 1954). 
Still, there are numerous worries that afflict the Bayesian model. I won’t press those 
worries too much, but it is important to mention them.  
First, it is a question about rationality. That is, are Bayesian standards really the 
ideal of rationality? I will tackle this question again (in relation to full-belief reasoning) 
later in the chapter. For now, let me explain what the issue amounts to. The issue is not 
whether Bayesian probability or decision theory is a good standard of rationality in the 
ideal sense. The pressing question is whether it is a good tool to apply to the human 
mind. Here is what I mean. Bayesianism tends to be concerned with modeling reasoning 
processes of certain kinds of ideal agents, setting the standard at the computational level. 
Assuming that humans can reach those levels of rationality, the pressing question is 
whether those standards are rational for humans, and whether they would be really useful 
when implemented by humans to resolve the challenges posed by the environment. This 
is important because Bayesian standards have been adopted to constrain a theory at the 
algorithmic level, which means that whatever theory we may have about 
mechanisms/algorithms the brain uses, it will have to be constrained by the goal of 
                                                                                                                                                              
it were performed in that state of nature. Note, however, that it is possible to construct decision theory 




Bayesian rationality which is set at the computational level (at least for “methodological” 
Bayesians following Marr (1982). See also Bower & Davis, 2012). 44     
The problem seems to be that Bayesianism sets the standards of rationality so high 
that it is perhaps impossible for us ordinary humans to meet them. For instance, Bayesian 
Decision Theory seems to operate under the assumption that in any decision-making 
situation the agent is simply given the options from which she is to choose. Bayesians 
don’t say what, according to them, justifies this feature. But in reality the conditions in 
which an agent is confronted with “the whole set of alternatives from which he will 
choose his action” is limited to only a small set of decisions we make (Simon, 1983: 22; 
Douven, 2002). More commonly, when deciding what to do, searching for options is one 
of the most important aspects of deliberation. Hence, Bayesian standards are good for 
ideal agents, not for us. (However, in the Bayesian camp there have been some attempts 
at ‘de-idealized’ Decision Theory so that its normative requirements could be more easily 
met.) 45 
If so, then it is not obvious that Bayesian standards should be adopted to constrain a 
theory at the algorithmic level, or at least not always. Perhaps other models should inform 
the computational level, models that are not in accordance with Bayesian rationality. As a 
result, that should have some effect on the constraint Bayesian models can impose on the 
algorithmic level. 46 
                                                      
44 As Bower & Davis (2012: 393) point out “this approach is in no way committed to the claim that the 
mind and brain compute in a Bayesian-like way at the algorithmic level.”  
45 For instance, Paul Weirich (2004) developed a Bayesian decision theory compatible with various human 
cognitive limitations. 
46 Some have argued for a notion of bounded rationality which roughly says that it is better or adaptably 
more efficient to not be fully Bayesianally rational. The assumption behind this is that bounded rationality 
and Bayesian rationality often ‘recommend’ different behaviors, so that doing X may conform to bounded 




Second. There are worries about the fact that people are not approximating Bayesian 
ideals, even assuming these are the correct standards of rationality. It seems human 
credences are in fact not in accord with what Bayesian rationality dictates. For instance, 
according to Bayesians we should be assigning probability 1 to all logical truths in order 
to be rational and this sounds like a task we fail at. This goes back to the worry about 
humans being intrinsically irrational I mentioned before. As before, the fact that we fail at 
a task does not rule out that it is possible to describe the computational level in Bayesian 
terms. But perhaps, if we are too distant from that ideal, then it could be said that we 
really lack the necessary competence to become rational in the Bayesian sense.   
Third. A further worry has to do with the computational – the actual calculation – 
complexity of the Bayesian model. For instance, to calculate expected utilities one may 
need to engage in some complicated math which most people can’t do and certainly can’t 
do fast. Actually, there is some skepticism that finite agents like us are really in a position 
to make those calculations at all. What’s more, Harman (1986: 25-26) points out that, if 
we reasoned with degrees of belief, we would have to make extensive use of the 
conditionalization rule, which can be a process of considerable mathematical complexity. 
As he says it, “[o]ne can use conditionalization to get a new probability for P only if one 
has assigned a prior probability not only to E [the evidence proposition], but to P & E. If 
one is to be prepared for various possible conditionalizations, then for every proposition 
P one wants to update, one must already have assigned probabilities to various 
conjunctions of P together with one or more of the possible evidence propositions and/or 




explosion” that finite agents like us would not be in a position to compute. Harman 
concludes that humans can’t reason with partial beliefs.  
One common response Bayesians in cognitive science make to critics (who say it's 
not computationally feasible etc.) is that using heuristics can be seen as an 
implementation at the algorithmic level of the Bayesian ideal, one that approximates the 
Bayesian ideal more-or-less, at least in ecologically relevant circumstances.47 On this 
view, Bayesian models really focus on predictions rather than on how and whether 
Bayesian reasoning actually happens.  That is, Bayesian models (of various kinds) are 
supposedly good predictive tools, but lack power to say what goes on in our psychology 
(Jones & Love, 2011). 
Four and most importantly. The jury is still out on whether Bayesianism is a good 
model for what goes on in the mind/brain (at the algorithmic level). One fair question, 
however, is whether these processes involving credences are actually reasoning proper, 
as I called it above. Perhaps probabilities are used in learning mechanisms, behavior-
production mechanisms of various kinds, but not in reasoning.  If, as I will try to show in 
the following chapters, reasoning proper is a process that requires that the agent takes the 
premises to support the conclusion (i.e. to be ‘reasons’ in the general sense of the term), 
then we still lack an account of whether this reasoning can happen with credences.  
In the literature on Bayesianism, the question of whether credences play a role in real 
agents’ reasoning processes does not seemed to be often directly addressed. Recently, 
Staffel (2013) has offered an attempt to model reasoning with credences. More 
specifically, she has argued that “degrees of belief, just like outright beliefs, can function 
                                                      
47 See, for example, Griffiths et al. reply to Bower and Davis in Psychological Bulletin 2012; Sanborn et al. 
2010. Importantly, these heuristics are qualitatively different from the heuristics the bounded rationality 




as attitudes that we reason from and attitudes we reason to.” (3537) However, what she 
means by ‘reasoning’ is a fairly low level process (akin to System 1), so I think her view 
won’t do for my purpose here.  Frankish has also dealt with the same question in an 
interesting way. In relation to practical reasoning (2004: 31) Frankish points out that, 
“our conscious reasoning very rarely takes a Bayesian form. We generally prefer to 
reason from unqualified premises to unqualified conclusions, employing classical 
inference schemata, such as the practical syllogism.”  His point is that, in general, we 
don’t seem to reason (in the proper sense) by employing strategies that resemble Decision 
Theory. In contrast, Frankish’s proposal is that high level reasoning (which he equates to 
System 2) is done with full beliefs; low level, unconscious reasoning (System 1 for him), 
operates with credences. I am sympathetic to his proposal, and in light of this my goal in 
the remainder of the chapter is to show that we reason with full beliefs, that we do so 
rationally, and that this is likely to be our default reasoning strategy for making 
decisions. This is, of course, compatible with the possibility that low-level (and some 
high-level) reasoning processes are computed with partial beliefs.   
 
FULL BELIEF AND DECISION-MAKING   
In this section of the paper I will argue for CLAIM by showing that, given how we 
reason, make decisions and bring about actions, there must be an attitude that has the 
dispositional role that CLAIM attributes to belief. Saying that there is no such attitude or 
that belief’s dispositional role is not captured by CLAIM, means leaving unexplained 
how it is possible that we reason the way we do. Or so I will argue.  




[f]or some propositions we have] a defeasible or default disposition to 
treat them as true in our reasoning—a disposition that can be overridden 
under circumstances where the cost of mistakenly acting as if these 
propositions are true is particularly salient. […] But if we concede that we 
have such defeasible dispositions to treat particular propositions as true in 
our reasoning, then a hypothesis naturally arises, namely, that beliefs 
consist in or involve such dispositions.  
 
Thus, to reason with credences we need a full attitude that treats its content as true 
even when one is not certain of it. Decision-theoretic reasoning requires an attitude like 
belief as background information (Lance, 1995). When I consider the partition of relevant 
states in the Bayesian framework, I must also treat a number of background propositions 
as they were certain for me even if they are not. Ross and Schroeder (2014: 265) offer the 
following example: 
Suppose Renzo has rented a DVD from a store on Canal St., and the DVD 
is due before the store closes twenty minutes hence. Renzo is deciding 
which train to go to the store by, the Broadway train or the Canal St. 
Express. He reasons as follows: If I take the Canal St. Express, it will cost 
me $3, but I’ll get to the store on time and so I won’t be fined. Thus, I’ll 
be out $3. If, on the other hand, I take the Broadway train, it will cost me 
$2. If it stops at Canal St., I’ll get to the store on time and won’t be fined, 
so I’ll be out only $2. But if the Broadway train doesn’t stop at Canal St., I 
won’t get to the store on time, and I’ll be fined $5, so I’ll be out $7. Since 
it’s as likely as not that the Broadway train won’t stop at Canal St., it isn’t 
worth risking the fine to save $1 on the train, so I’ll take the Canal St. 
Express. 
Now, Renzo is taking into account two possibilities: either the train stops at Canal 
street or it does not. However, he is not certain of this disjunction, i.e. he has non-zero 
credence that the train may never leave the station or crash before even getting to Canal 
street. And yet he does not take into account these possibilities and treats the disjunction 




will be as he can’t rule out the possibility that the price of the train may have changed. 
However, it seems reasonable for him to take this proposition as if he were certain of it 
and thus exclude the possibility of its falsity. As Ross and Schroeder (2014: 266) put it, 
“After all, if he were to take into account every relevant possibility in which he has 
nonzero credence, then his decision problem would be unmanageable, and the store 
would be closed long before he could decide between his options.” Our cognitive 
resources are limited and we can’t take into account the possibility of the negation of 
each proposition that figures in our reasoning and about which we are uncertain. So some 
propositions will have to be taken as certain. And since we define beliefs as the attitude 
that treats a proposition as certain in reasoning, it seems that we can’t calculate expected 
utilities without full beliefs (also Wedgwood, 2012: 323).   
Ross and Schroeder, however, only focus on the fact that reasoning with credences 
requires the use of full-beliefs as background conditions. What remains unclear (in the 
sense that they don’t talk about it) is whether beliefs play the role only of background 
conditions or whether there is actually a form of reasoning that employs only full beliefs.  
For simplicity, assume that what we are after in pragmatic reasoning is maximal 
satisfaction of our desires. There are two ways in which we can decide what to do 
through reasoning. 48 We can base our decisions on propositions that are the reasons (we 
think) we have. Alternatively, we can assign subjective probabilities to some propositions 
and reason from those based on expected utilities. That means that, at times, we engage in 
careful probabilistic reasoning as the one described by – among others – Bayesian 
                                                      
48 Sometimes we don’t pick any strategy and we decide randomly or perhaps based on trivial factors (e.g. 
we buy what product we saw first on the shelve at the supermarket). Sometimes we do that because the 
stakes are either very low or incredibly high and we simply don’t know what to choose. Here, however, I 




decision theory. At other times, we simply start our reasoning by adopting as premises 
flat out attitudes about how the world is or will be.  
Reasoning based on full attitudes is reasoning in terms of reasons. By ‘reasons’ I 
mean considerations that support my conclusion. When I treat something as a reason, I 
am motivated to act on it. So when I decide what to do based on (what I take to be) 
reasons I am motivated by the fact that there is a state of affairs that by being true 
satisfies a desire that I have (or make an action appropriate or required). And since I 
believe it to be true, I am motivated to act accordingly. In contrast, when we employ 
decision theory, no (apparent or real) reasons motivate us to act, but the motivational 
power of reasoning is the product of the fact that the decision we reach maximizes 
expected utilities.49 
Now, common sense strongly suggests that we in fact are motivated by what we take 
to be reasons. Our everyday experience and the way we talk about reasoning seem to 
indicate we often reason by making reference to reasons. So, intuitively, this gives some 
initial support to the idea that we employ full beliefs to make decisions. 50  Beyond 
common sense, there is an on-going research program in psychology dedicated to 
determining what methods we use to make decisions. 51 Research strongly indicates that, 
when deciding what to do, we do not make choices only by calculating expected utilities 
but we rely on a variety of different methods. It appears that these methods are constantly 
used because of their ability to deliver reliable conclusions (in some contexts) while 
                                                      
49  Bayesian decision theory does not use talk of reasons and explains rationality as determined by 
calculation of expected utilities. Bayesians tend to consider reason-talk as a mere remnant of an obsolete 
folk psychology, or at best as a loose way of talking about what to do.  
50 Also, from an internalist prospective, it is unclear that all our reasoning is about desire-satisfaction or 
maximization of utilities. It is possible that desire may be excluded from (some) reasoning patterns.  




using little energy and time.  This shortened reasoning can take various forms so, in what 
follows, I’ll run through a few paradigmatic cases drawn from current research in 
psychology and simple observation/description of our practices.  
Here is one. Full belief reasoning often makes use of explicit rules adopted in 
advance of making any individual decision.52 When we make decisions about what to do 
in a specific situation, we simply adopt the rule that applies to the situation without 
calculating pros and cons. These are sort of pre-established rules of conduct that get 
applied when facing repetitive decisions. So if I notice I am out of bread, I’ll go out and 
buy it. If I see a red light, I stop.  
Alternatively, instead of using explicit rules, we decide what to do by using one of 
our desires as premise. Here is an example of this type of reasoning:  
If I go to the library I’ll write at least 2 pages of my dissertation.  
If I stay home I’ll get nothing done. 
I really want to get some dissertation work done today.  
So I should go the library.  
Importantly, in this form of reasoning (as in the previous rule-based one) we employ 
full beliefs. In addition, here we use full desires as well. Instead of assigning different 
values to different outcomes as in decision theory, here one simply assumes there is only 
one valuable outcome, and ignores any other desire or goal one may have. In the example 
above, I only see as valuable the fact that I will be able to write my dissertation. Although 
there are various things we value and, perhaps, we can even quantify how much we value 
them, at times we also assign ‘maximum’ value to some restricted set of things. We can 
                                                      
52 Some argue that these are not explicit rules, that they don’t take the form of an enthymeme but instead 
are expression of material inferential relations of the following kind: “it is raining, I shall open the 




call these attitudes ‘full-desires’. As in the case of belief, to have a full desire is to have a 
defeasible disposition to act in order to bring about the content ‘p’. That means that, for 
instance, if I fully desire to work on my dissertation I’ll be disposed to use that as a 
premise in my practical reasoning (when p is relevant).53 There are going to be cases in 
which it becomes clear that ‘p’ is not the most important goal or that there are other goals 
that are just as important. In those situations, I will have to adopt a different reasoning 
strategy, and look at the actual value that writing my dissertation has for me as opposed 
as to the value that I may assign to different outcomes. This is why the strategy of 
adopting full attitudes in practical reasoning is defeasible.  
Here is a third reasoning strategy we employ. Sometimes, when we are torn between 
two options, it may not be very practical to adopt a single desire as the unique value to 
make our decision, especially when both options satisfy that desire perfectly well. 
Instead, we will have to run through a bunch of possible good options to find a tie-
breaker. So, for instance, when we are confronted with two options, going to restaurant A 
or B, we often frame our decision by running through various parameters of preferences 
(e.g. price, taste, location) till we get a tie-breaker.54 That is, in this case there may be a 
number of things we value and we just need one of them to make the difference. This is 
aform of ‘one-reason decision making’55 that is quite crude because it does not take into 
account that there may be other options we care for down the line and which we don’t 
                                                      
53 I got this idea straight from Frankish (2004: 95) where he talks about ‘goals’. His view is that by 
“adopting a goal, x, we commit ourselves to taking x, together with other relevant goals and premises, as 
input to conscious intentional practical reasoning.” 
54 I got this example of heuristic reasoning from Weisberg (2013: 7). As Weisberg points out, another 
useful strategy is the take-the-best heuristic theorized by Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). 
55 Even in this case, when choosing A over B, the agent hits upon a desirable feature that A has but B lacks, 




have the chance to examine (Newell and Shanks, 2003; Gigerenzer et al., 2008).  There 
are ways in which we obviate this problem as, for instance, we may rank parameters in 
order of importance (e.g. price is more important than location, but taste is more 
important than price, and so on)56.  
These quite common ways of reasoning do not calculate expected utilities but often 
employ full beliefs (and full desires) as reasons for their conclusion. The reason we may 
decide to adopt one belief-based strategy over another could depend on various factors 
such as the information we possess, the time we have at our disposal, whether or not we 
have rules or full desires that can be relevant in that particular situation, etc. 
Those mentioned above are only some examples of the ways we may reason with 
full beliefs, but many more are possible.57 I limit my analysis to describing only those 
few cases trusting that they are enough to make the claim that reasoning based on full 
beliefs (and full attitudes, in general) is a common practice that agents adopt.58 
 
FULL BELIEF AS HEURISTIC 
Here I argue that full belief-based reasoning is a heuristic. My argument comes in 
two steps: using full reasoning is less costly and perhaps more reliable in some contexts. 
For starters, using full belief when reasoning is less costly than using credences and 
assigning values to different outcomes. So even if – contrary to what some have argued 
(Harman, 1986) – calculating expected utilities may be computationally manageable and 
                                                      
56 Lee and Cummins (2004) posit a more sophisticated method, the evidence accumulation method.  
57 Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) survey some of these methods.  
58 Some have argued that we simply can’t eliminate full beliefs if we want to make sense of some of our 
common practices. So, for instance, Buchak (2014) claims that belief has a distinctive role to play given 
our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible and assigning blame, and 




can be done by using various heuristics, it is presumably still a quite expensive 
calculation because of the cognitive load it requires (at least when done in reasoning and 
thus with some level of awareness). In contrast, reasoning in terms of full attitudes may 
cut some of those costs as it seems plausible that a reasoning strategy based on full 
beliefs may require less energy, cognitive effort, and time than a full-blown partial belief-
based strategy (again: at least when some level of explicit reasoning is involved). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that employing full attitudes together with some of the 
heuristics mentioned above may prove to be more efficient than running through some 
decision theoretic strategy. As a result, it is possible that rationality requires of us to use 
full beliefs in reasoning and not credences, at least by default. The ultimate conclusion is 
draw from this is then that employing full belief is our default strategy in reasoning.  
There are a few arguments in support of the first claim above. For starters, using 
belief as a premise is itself a heuristic (whether or not the reasoning employs any 
heuristics). 59 When one reasons based on partial beliefs less than 1 one forms a partial 
belief that p is, say, 0.8 and a partial belief that not-p is 0.2. Then one needs to calculate 
expected utilities for the possibility both that p and that not-p is true. That means quite a 
bit of calculation and a quite high number of options to keep in mind. In contrast, with 
full beliefs (and full attitudes more generally) one can simply evaluate one’s options 
conditional on p while simply ignoring the possibility that not-p. That means fewer 
options to keep in mind. What’s more, in this type of reasoning there is often no 
calculation to make at all: one simply draws an inferential step from one’s belief and, 
                                                      
59 To illustrate: the inferential reasoning I mentioned above is not usually considered a heuristic form of 




possibly, one’s desire. If so, then using full attitudes in reasoning is a simplification that 
ignores some information to cut costs.  
What’s more, calculating expected utilities with credence may actually be a method 
of reasoning that requires much more revision than deciding based on beliefs in the sense 
that if you calculate expected utilities you may need to revise your decision more often.  
Credences are fine-grain states and in some cases any new information coming in may 
change the level of credence one has (and thus may change the result of our expected 
utilities calculation). So to be fully rational one should be ready to re-calculate one’s 
expected utilities each time new information is acquired.  Here is an example. Say there 
is a big jar with 200 hundred red and blue marbles, but you don’t know the ratio between 
the numbers of red and blue marbles. Say that you have to calculate expected utilities of 
some outcomes based on the credence you form that the last marble you draw will be 
blue. Now, you have drawn 20 marbles, 19 of which have been blue. As a result, your 
credence that the last marble you draw will be blue is 0.95. You now calculate expected 
utilities based on that. Imagine now you draw another 2 marbles and those are red. Now, 
your credence-level is diminished. It is possible60 that this change in level of credence 
may require you to update any calculation made beforehand. And that seems quite costly.  
In contrast, full beliefs are coarse grained. Going from believing in something to 
disbelieving it or suspending judgment usually requires a fairly substantial change in 
one’s evidence.  So the reasoning process in this case is often much more stable, it does 
not need constant revision. If I am right, then having to calculate expected utilities may 
be a quite precise way to proceed, but also more effortful than full belief-based reasoning.  
                                                      
60 However, it is also possible one may use heuristic methods to decide when recalculate expected utilities 




The second issue I mentioned above is that in some contexts reasoning with full 
beliefs may prove to be as reliable as calculating utilities. As it is often the case with 
heuristics, their reliability is tied to the ‘context’ in which they are used. And this is the 
case also for reasoning based on full attitudes: in normal conditions, it seems these are 
effective forms of reasoning. Their effectiveness is explained here in terms of their 
reliability in the production of decisions that largely conform to expected utilities. So 
reasoning by using as premises propositions we fully believe may be just as reliable a 
method as actually calculating expected utilities by using credences. When more is at 
stake, we consider further attributes or even calculate actual expected utilities. But in 
many cases, a restricted set of considerations suffices to settle the matter.  
On top of this, it seems that using approximations is not only reliable but at times 
even more reliable than taking into account all the possibilities in a full rational way. 
Often addition of options increases the burdens of decision without increasing, much or at 
all, the likelihood of a good decision. Thus having many choices to choose from might 
well increase decision costs without improving outcomes.  At the same time, note that the 
efficacy of heuristics is related to the context in which they tend to be used (or have 
evolved) and, when used out of context, they produce biases and suboptimal decisions 
(Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).  
 
TWO MODELS OF RATIONALITY61 
In this section I advance the hypothesis that acting by using belief-based reasoning 
may be at times the rational thing to do. That means that Bayesian standards may not be 
                                                      
61 The argument I offer here is in part a combination of two distinct arguments, one offered by Locke 




the only game in town when it comes to rational behavior and a more nuanced view is 
needed. Now, Bayesian models of decision-making are considered rational because they 
indicate how to maximize the benefits given the subjective probabilities and preferences 
of the agent. The ultimate goal is to satisfy the agent’s desire. The rational way to do it is, 
on this view, to use subjective probabilities and preferences. In its standard formulation 
Bayesian Decision Theory can be stated in terms the following norm: we should perform 
an act only if that act has higher expected utility than any of the other available acts, 
given your credences in the events which bear on the utility of the acts.  
This view seems to exclude the role of full belief in rationalizing action. Here is what 
I mean. The role of belief in producing action is not merely explanatory; belief should 
also be able to rationalize action, and make sense of it. Above I pointed out that belief 
explains actions by taking part in practices of reasoning that use reasons to motivate 
action. And many of these practices are commonly used as reasoning strategies. 
However, the role of belief in rationalizing action remains controversial. Here is a way to 
spell out this worry: 
The rationality challenge: if a full-belief is a disposition to act with the certainty of 
truth, then full belief cannot take part in a rationalization of people’s behavior.62 
If decision theory is a normative standard, as many claim it to be, acting as if p were 
certain, when one is not certain of it, is a violation of the principle of rational decision-
making. Thus, if full believing is what CLAIM takes it to be then, whenever we act on a 
full belief we are either acting irrationally, or the rationality of the action depends solely 
on whether it maximizes expected utilities. So folk explanations of people’s actions in 
                                                      
62 This is sometime taken to be an argument against the existence of full belief. If it is irrational to act on 
beliefs, and – as argued by Davidson - we should attribute rationality to agents, then we can’t say that 




terms of full belief would not be able to rationalize those actions. And this is a problem 
because we naturally see belief as playing a role in rational action and rational decision-
making. Indeed, according to the objection it appears we face a dilemma: either we give 
up CLAIM or we renounce to take belief to be playing the role in rational explanation we 
want it to play.  
I will offer the following reply: at times reasoning with full beliefs doesn’t produce 
choices that are optimal in Bayesian terms. However, I still believe there is room for 
arguing that belief can rationalize action in some instances.  
A few clarifications. My view is not that it is sometimes rational to be irrational 
(although this is not unheard of). The view is that it is at times rational, in a bounded 
sense, to be irrational in an ideal sense. If the goal of practical reasoning is reaching a 
conclusion that satisfies one’s goals or desires, then reasoning with full belief may be 
what in fact gets us there.   
Also, for simplicity I will assume that a belief rationalizes action when the belief is 
true, i.e. when it actually counts as a reason for doing that action. In other words, I will 
leave aside those cases in which a belief may seem to rationalize an action even when 
false. So I will treat ‘belief rationalizes action’ as synonymous with ‘belief provides a 
reason for action’, and use ‘rationalizing an action’, ‘making an action rational’ and 
‘justifying an action’ interchangeably. What’s more, I am not committed to any general 
theory about what sorts of reasons, if genuinely held, would be sufficient to justify 
actions, and so I’ll vaguely refer to ‘sufficient reasons’ hoping that this is enough for 
making my point. Finally, note that my aim here is to vindicate the thought that belief can 




within decision-theory and show that, instead of getting rid of talking of belief as being a 
reason for action, perhaps we should integrate it in a larger decision-theoretical 
prospective.  
Now, when does a fact or true proposition make an action rational? First, when it is a 
sufficient reason for it. Two, the agent who does the action has to be in some relation to 
that fact, i.e. she believes it to be true. More specifically, I will assume that if an agent S 
believes that p and p is true and is a reason to bring about an action X, then S has a 
reason to X. And finally, if the belief that p stands in an appropriate relation to X (e.g. it 
caused X), then we say that X was rational.  
Now, the problem is that it is possible that X or the choice of doing X may not 
maximize expected utilities. So how can we say that X is rational? My proposal is that we 
say that action X is rational in normal contexts if other conditions are in place.  
The proposal comes in two steps: 
1. As a reasoning strategy to maximize utilities, it is rational to use belief-based 
strategies as a default way of reasoning in normal contexts.  
2. In normal contexts it is rational – for a bounded-rationality prospective – to act 
on one’s sufficient reasons even when doing so produces a less than optimal 
choice (for that particular action).  
Importantly (1) is about what reasoning or premising strategy it is rational to use. 
Rationality is on-bounded here. In contrast, (2) is about action, and talks about bounded 
rationality. The two are connected, yet separate, as it may happen that I do the right 




Here is why (1) is, I believe, plausible. First, even in those cases in which reasoning 
based on belief does not offer the same outcome that reasoning by calculating expected 
utilities (and therefore is suboptimal), it may still be rational to choose to reason based on 
beliefs because of the cognitive costs of reasoning otherwise. Acting on beliefs, given the 
cost of calculating expected utility, may in the long run have a higher expected utility 
than performing difficult calculations. For calculating expected utility is itself an act; as 
an act it may not maximize expected utility (Sargent, 2009). In other words, at times it 
may be more rational to choose to reason with belief than having to engage in a complex 
reasoning calculus.63  
My proposal is that it is rational to use belief-based reasoning as a default. As 
Frankish (2004: 54) puts it: 
Perhaps we all habitually lapse from the high standards of Bayesian 
rationality, ignoring the subtleties of confidence and acting on the basis of 
unqualified beliefs. Such a habit might be justified, given our cognitive 
limitations- in particular our lack of skill at conscious probabilistic 
reasoning. If accepting probable propositions flat-out helps us make our 
calculations more tractable, then the departure from strict rationality which 
it involves might be justified by the accompanying reduction in 
computational demands.  
 
Now, default strategies are used in normal contexts. A context is normal unless there 
are reasons to think that the difference between one’s degree of belief in p and certainty 
that p is such that it would make a significant difference in the expected utilities of the 
outcomes of my actions. And by ‘significant’ I mean that the difference is more than the 
actual cost of having to calculate expected utilities.  
                                                      
63 Note that this does not mean that choosing any method that is less expensive in terms of cognitive 
resources (e.g. coin-flipping) is always the rational thing to do. This is because the method itself needs to 
be reliable enough to ensure that the outcome will be, if not optimal, at least good enough to counter-




Here are two examples of two a-normal contexts: 
BET. I am offered a bet on the truth of some proposition ‘p’ that I regard to be false 
even though I am not certain that it is false. However, the bet is practically a win-win for 
me: if I bet on what I believe to be false and I win, I get $1000, otherwise I lose only $1. I 
decide to bet.  
SURGEON. Scott is a surgeon in the local hospital. He is ready to perform a kidney 
surgery on one of his patients. Scott has high credence that the kidney that needs to be 
removed is the left one. He also fully believes that. 64 If he were to act in accordance with 
his belief he would go ahead and perform the surgery. However, Scott is not certain of 
the truth of his belief. Given the stakes, Scott is quick to recognize that were he to be 
mistaken the consequences would be terrible. So he decides to stop by his office and 
check his patient’s dossier before preforming the surgery.65  
BET is not a normal context because there are reasons to believe that the difference 
between my level of credence in not-p and having certainty that not-p is large enough to 
make a significant difference in the expected utilities of the outcomes of my actions.  
In SURGEON, given that so much is at stake, there are good reasons for Scott to 
think that expected utilities in that context significantly vary depending on the level of 
confidence of his belief. Accordingly, since he is not certain of the truth of his belief he 
correctly decides to act not based on what he believes but on his calculation of expected 
utilities based on his level of credence and possible outcomes. 66  
                                                      
64 One could try to argue that the relation between level of credence and belief is contextual, and thus in 
this context Scott does not believe that the kidney that needs to be removed is the left one. I am not 
convinced that belief can be contextual in this way.  
65 The idea for this example is taken from Brown (2008: 1144–1145). 
66 Note that it is not an objection to my view to say that in SURGEON Scott does not have a sufficient 




Note that an important result of this is that, besides having full beliefs about some 
propositions, to act rationally one also needs partial beliefs about those same 
propositions. When it becomes apparent that one’s level of confidence in p is so distant 
from certainty to make a significant difference in the expected utilities, rationality 
requires to switch to a different method of reasoning.  
Now (2): if one acts based on a sufficient reason one has in a normal context, then 
her action is rational. I take (2) to be the combination of two things, i.e. the rationality of 
one’s reasoning strategy in maximizing utilities (in the long run) and the fact that one has 
sufficient reasons for doing an action. If correct, this produces the following principle:  
(Bounded) Rationalization principle: It is rational to do action X if one believes that p, 
such a belief is connected to X in the right way, p is a sufficient reason to X and X is 
done in a normal context.67 
According to this principle, there are cases in which belief can’t rationalize action, 
even if having that belief means having a sufficient reason for doing that action. The 
explanation for that is that in those cases the choice of using belief as reasoning strategy 
is irrational because the actual effort of calculating expected utilities is balanced out by 
the expected utilities of doing a particular action.  
In conclusion, an action based on a belief – as defined in CLAIM – can be rational 
(in the bounded sense) when the belief in question constitutes sufficient reason it. Belief’s 
rationalizing power is not reducible to credence’s, though. In contrast, belief rationalizes 
                                                                                                                                                              
action and I have nothing to contribute to that debate here. All I am saying is that, if there are cases in 
which one has a sufficient reason to act and yet it does not seem rational to do so, then this is because the 
context is not normal.  
67 This may also mean that - in normal contexts and given the other conditions in place - it is irrational to 





action by being sufficient reason for it in those contexts in which it is rational to reason 
based on beliefs.  
 
BELIEF AS DEFAULT IN REASONING  
In this final section I argue that there must be a default attitude, i.e. an attitude we 
adopt as a premise in reasoning in normal contexts, and that is belief. The reason why we 
need a default is the following. Both belief and credence are dispositions to act in a 
certain way. It may happen that they conflict and push in different directions. What is 
rational to do given my credences may be different from what is rational to do given my 
full beliefs.  
So either neither of them motivates or enters reasoning by default or at least one of 
them motivates or enters reasoning by default. If neither of them motivates or enters 
reasoning by default then they both motivate or enter reasoning in relation to specific 
contexts of action. However, if this is the case, then neither of them can motivate 
automatically. The problem with this is that each time an attitude, say a belief, motivates 
action or enters reasoning the context has to be somehow represented (since we assumed 
belief does not motivate by default). But this representation is also a doxastic state (i.e. 
that the context is such and such), and so the worry of a regress surfaces. So there has to 
be an attitude that motivates by default. I think that is belief rather than credence.  
Now, granted that reasoning in terms of full attitudes and reasons is indeed more 
convenient than reasoning is terms of partial beliefs, the next claim I want to make is that 
this is how we reason by default (when, of course, beliefs are available). This proposal is 




corners in order to produce outcomes efficiently with the limited capacities it has. 
Although many of the decisions we make based on heuristics are not relevant here 
because in many of those cases our decisions are the outcome of an intuitive process and 
don’t count as reasoning-based, it is worth explaining the background literature on 
heuristics.   
For instance, in economics there is strong support for the claim that humans don’t 
use decision theory to make financial decisions but appeal to various heuristics. More 
broadly, some psychologists have recently put forward the idea that we reason by using a 
suit of mechanisms that produce responses in a fast, automatic, and fairly effortless way. 
These mechanisms are the default way we reason as they don’t require conscious 
applications of rules and conscious monitoring of the steps of our reasoning process. This 
suit of mechanisms is usually called System 1.  In contrast, when the external conditions 
demand that, we employ a slower, more cognitively demanding way of reasoning, in 
which we consciously weigh the options we have. This second way of reasoning is 
System 2. Importantly, what this kind of research has indicated is that most of the time 
we seem to reason based on heuristic strategies that are efficient given the limited 
cognitive resources we have at our disposal. In other words, probably because of our 
limited resources, when we face uncertainty, we tend to simplify our choices. Given the 
various methods of reasoning we have, some of which more efficient than others, it 
appears that we use those efficient ones as our basic strategy.  
Similarly, the tendency to simplify encompasses also the strategy we adopt in 
reasoning ‘proper’ (i.e. what I called ‘reasoning’). As far as we can, we go for the 




plausible to posit that this is our default way of reasoning. More specifically, if full 
belief-reasoning is somewhat a heuristic, then it is probably our default reasoning 
method. In contrast, when more precision is needed68, we switch to a reasoning strategy 
that calculates expected utilities by conforming or trying to conform to (something like) 
Bayesian Decision Theory.  
In conclusion, in this chapter I argued that belief plays a role in reasoning and 
motivates action by being treated as a reason for action. Reason-based (and thus belief-
based) reasoning appears to be very common. On-going research in psychology shows 
that we often reason by using shortcuts and heuristics in which belief plays the role of 
premise. This way of reasoning, I argued, produces (bounded) rational actions in normal 
contexts, and it is the most rational way of reasoning in those contexts. As a result, this 
gives credit to the claim that belief is the default attitude we use to make choices. 
  
                                                      
68 This point is actually quite controversial. Studies have shown that when the stakes are high we still tend 
to reason based on heuristics (e.g. investment behavior). One reason for that is that in many high stake 
contexts there is a problem of computational intractability that makes it the case that we do (and even 
perhaps should) use heuristic to decide what to do. So perhaps a somewhat more precise claim here is that  
we do use decision theory when more precision is needed and when we think that the problem at hand is 




BELIEF AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
Chapter 2  
 
In this chapter I argue for the claim that belief has a unique role in our mental lives. To 
do so I attack the recent claim that the output role of belief, its ability to influence action 
and other attitudes, is shared by other cognitive attitudes such as (propositional) 
imagination, acceptance and supposition. My argument comes in various steps. First, I 
defend the claim that only belief (and desire) can motivate action. Second, even assuming 
that other cognitive attitudes can motivate action, that is not enough to show that their 
consequences are the same as belief’s. Belief is an ‘unqualified’ cognitive attitude 
whereas all these other attitudes must come with some kind of constraint on their use that 
limits the type of inferences or reasoning patterns they can enter into. This has two main 
upshots: for belief the possibility to be defined in terms of its unique role in inference and 
reasoning is still open. And we do not need to refer to belief’s relation with truth to 
individuate belief uniquely. As I will argue in the final chapter, it is actually because 
belief has the kind of unconstrained output role it has that we can’t believe at will.  
   
In philosophy and cognitive science, mental attitudes types (e.g. beliefs, desires) 
are often defined in terms of how they are connected to other mental attitudes. This 
relation is explained by looking at attitudes’ input (or upstream) and output (or 
downstream) roles, namely the sort of inputs they are sensitive to and the sort of 
consequences they tend to have (Fodor, 1985; Nichols and Stich, 2003). When applied to 
belief, it has been often argued that beliefs are individuated by their output role in causing 
action and the formation of other attitudes. Not long ago, in fact, it was common to 
individuate belief as the cognitive attitude par excellence, by being an attitude that has a 
content, usually a proposition, represented as being true, and combining with a conative 
attitude to give rise to action. Sure, there are other cognitive attitudes that populate our 
mind (e.g. supposition, imagination), but these are clearly distinct from belief for lacking 




This standard picture and the possibility to individuate belief based on its 
motivational role have come under attack in three related ways. First, belief has 
progressively lost its predominant role as the attitude which produces action because, as 
the new story goes, belief is at times neither sufficient nor necessary to explain action. It 
is not necessary because often action can be explained by invoking other mental attitudes 
(e.g. imagination) that make sense of it just as well as belief does. And it is not even 
sufficient because some of the things we do just can’t be explained by belief, as in the 
case in which we act contrary to what we believe. To illustrate, if I believe that the bridge 
is safe, why do I refuse to step on it? If I believe that the female candidate is just as good 
as the male candidate, why do I keep hiring males? And so on.  
Two (and partially as a result of one), an array of new cognitive attitudes (i.e. 
attitudes that present their content as true) has been emerging and the category of 
“cognitive” attitudes has gradually become more densely populated. To offer a fully 
convincing account of what produces action it has appeared to many that either we need 
to postulate the existence of new, previously unacknowledged cognitive attitudes, such as 
alief (Gendler, 2008) or in-between attitudes (Schwitzgebel, 2010), or we should offer a 
new metaphysical picture of those well-known cognitive attitudes, and say that belief and 
other mental attitudes, such as imagining, are not necessarily discrete states but stand on a 
continuum (Schellenberg, 2013).  
Three, many now believe that non-doxastic cognitive attitudes (e.g. imagination, 
acceptance - call them “secondary cognitive attitudes”) share the same output role as 
belief and thus its downstream consequences are not enough to individuate belief. The 




usually spelled out either in terms of some aim that is constitutive of belief (belief aims at 
truth, or believers aim at truth) or in terms of a norm of correctness that is part of the 
nature or concept of belief (see Introduction and chapter 5).  
This last point has been forcefully defended by David Velleman (2000). Velleman 
starts off by noticing that belief is part of a large group of cognitive attitudes that all 
present their content as true. These attitudes, he adds, also share the ability to cause 
actions when combined with some suitable conative attitude. So we can’t differentiate 
believing from, say, assuming based on belief’s output role in causing action. As a result, 
Velleman presents the following ‘Identical Output role’ view:  
(IOR) all cognitive attitudes share the same output role.  
IOR is important because it paves the way for the argument that it is belief’s 
truth-directedness (i.e. its aiming at truth) that distinguishes it from all other truth-
regarding attitudes (Velleman, 2000: 252; Shah and Velleman, 2005). Velleman is not 
alone in this. For instance, in Gendler’s own words: “I think that the most helpful way of 
distinguishing beliefs from other related cognitive attitudes is neither […] nor through 
their dispositional connection through desire to action, but through their telos of truth.” 
(2007: 236)  Similar arguments are offered by Engel (2004), Lynch, (2009), Railton 
(1994), and Wedgwood (2002).  
My goal here is to prove this picture wrong. First, I defend the claim that only 
belief (and desire) can motivate action. As a result, we don’t need to invoke other or new 
attitudes to explain action: belief and desire will suffice. Second, even assuming that 




consequences – as a whole – are the same as belief’s.69 This means that belief can indeed 
be singled out for its unique output role and independently of its relation with truth.  
 
SETTING UP 
Before starting I need to make some clarificatory remarks and explain some of the 
terminology I will adopt. For starters, here I talk about ‘cognitive attitudes’. There is a 
distinction to be drawn between cognitive and conative attitudes. Although this is quite 
vague, for our purposes it is enough to say that conative attitudes (e.g. desire, hope, wish) 
present their content as to-be-made-true, whereas cognitive attitudes present their content 
as true.  
In philosophy and cognitive science, mental attitudes types are often defined in 
terms of their input (or upstream) and output (or downstream) roles, namely the sort of 
inputs they are sensitive to and the sort of consequences they tend to have. Output roles 
are usually explained in terms of dispositions. By dispositions to act (or form other 
attitudes) I mean ceteris paribus motivations to act (and form other attitudes). By saying 
that belief is a disposition I mean that when the conditions are right, if one believes that p 
(and has a related desire) no extra motivation (or decision) is needed to make one act in 
accordance with the content of one’s belief. In particular, if I am disposed to do X I am so 
disposed regardless of any decision pro or against doing X.  In contrast, if an attitude 
does not dispose me to do X, then in order to be motivated to do X I must either decide to 
do it or have an additional desire to do it. (This point will become more clear once I 
introduced the view – held by many functionalists – that imagination does not dispose 
                                                      
69 For simplicity, I will only focus on two sets of secondary attitudes, i.e. imagination and acceptance, and 




one to act. On this view, to act on one’s imaginings one needs to decide to do so or to 
desire to do so.) 
A disposition is a default disposition only if it motivates by default, i.e. in normal 
contexts. What’s more, a disposition that motivates by default motivates automatically. 
In contrast, a disposition that motivates only in some contexts does not motivate us 
automatically but it requires an additional input, namely a representation of the context as 
‘the right context’, or as ‘such and such context’ (and ‘context’ is the practical setting in 
which a certain attitude was introduced). To detect dispositions we should look at them as 
emerging in patterns of functional roles. More clearly, as I will concede below, it may be 
true that individually imagination and belief dispose one to act and produce action in 
similar ways (other things being equal), but this is not enough to argue that they share the 
same functional role.  
Finally, philosophers tend to draw the distinction between standing vs. occurrent 
belief. Some philosophers have gone so far as to claim that there are no standing beliefs 
and that all our beliefs are occurrent states.  In contrast, following the computational view 
of the mind, I take standing-state beliefs to be stored representations in the belief-box, 
whereas I see occurrent beliefs as activations of these representations for reasoning 
(Fodor, 1987).  
 
IMAGINATION & ACCEPTANCE … WHAT ARE THEY REALLY? 
The goal of this section is to convince the reader that there are things we imagine and 
things we accept/suppose to be true and that, despite some differences, these two attitudes 




acceptance, but just offer some intuitive remarks that should suffice to explain why I am 
lumping these attitudes together.  
Let me first address some understandable worries. We may be concerned that the 
ways in which we talk of imagination and the like are not all together unified.  Ordinary 
talk of imagination seems to be all over the place. We say things like “I imagine we will 
have a good time at the party” meaning “it is likely we will have fun”. These expressions 
have little to do with imagination in the sense of daydreaming or fantasizing. Similarly, it 
is common – and I myself will do that below – to link imagination and pretense. 
However, I can pretend to be rich to convince you to marry me, but it is unclear to what 
extent I need to imagine to be rich to do that.  On the other hand, we say things like “He 
imagines to be Napoleon” when someone is under the delusion to be Napoleon. But that 
person is not in any way pretending to be Napoleon. His imagining is likely the source of 
his delusion, as memory can be the source of one’s belief. In this sense, imagination is a 
faculty that can produce beliefs, mostly delusional ones. To add even more confusion: 
Alvin Goldman distinguishes ‘e-imagination’, i.e. enactment imagination, from 
imagination that has as its object a proposition and is similar to suppositions and the like 
(more on this in a minute). Enactment imagination is the simulation of another attitude. 
For instance, during a heated political discussion, I can imagine to believe that Trump 
will be a good US President to understand my Republican friend’s viewpoint. Here I am 




imagining is a process I am in. In contrast, propositional-imagination does not seem to 
require any simulation.70   
Given the heterogeneity of the ways in which we speak of ‘imagination’, my job 
here requires that I keep things manageable. I will focus on a kind of imagination that 
takes, as its content, a proposition. Propositional imagination thus happens when we 
imagine that such-and-such is the case. To imagine that the cup is full is to have an 
attitude with the representational content the cup is full. Importantly, such content is – 
when imagined – presented as true.  
What’s more, I will assume that imagination and belief can share contents: one 
can actually simultaneously believe a proposition and also imagine it (see Leslie 1994 for 
a nice illustration of this phenomenon). There is a caveat here: imagination cannot have a 
singular thought as its content when the demonstrative is inside the scope of the 
imagining operator. I can imagine that that person is a policeman only if the ‘that’ refers 
to something outside the scope of the imaging itself. If there is no person there, then the 
indexical fails. So one can’t hook an indexical to an imagined object unless it is used 
anaphorically: ‘I believe there is a person there and imagine that person is a policeman’.71 
Alternatively, one imagines that there is a person there and that that person is policeman.  
Propositional imagination is a self-standing cognitive attitude and thus can’t be 
reduced to belief or any other attitude. 72  That excludes the use of “imagination” as 
equivalent to “believing something to be likely”. The aim of this chapter is to show that 
this distinction can be drawn based on belief’s and imagining’s divergent output roles.  
                                                      
70 For a lucid analysis of the difficulties of trying to account for all the roles imagination can play in terms 
of a single mental activity (or attitude) see Kind (2016). Also, Gendler (2011) illustrates the various 
taxonomic challenges posed by imagination.  
71 This is why disjunctivists think that imagining and the like can’t be the same mental state as perceiving.  




Finally, the kind of imagination I am focusing on here is mostly done 
deliberatively or is, at least, under our power. We can decide to imagine being Napoleon; 
and usually we can also stop doing that of our own accord.  
Now, propositional imagination is very similar to a group of attitudes which 
includes suppositions, assumptions, acceptances, presuppositions and the like. They are 
similar to propositional imagination in various respects: they entertain a proposition and 
treat it as true; they are mental attitudes not reducible to beliefs although they can share 
the same content of beliefs;73 and reasoning and cognitive systems treat inputs coming 
from acceptances in the same way as they treat inputs coming from beliefs.  
For the most part philosophers agree that acceptance/supposition/assumption is a 
mental state that is distinct from belief, 74 and that we can resolve to accept a proposition 
for a variety of reasons: evidential, moral, professional, religious, and so on. Indeed, we 
provisionally assume a proposition for the sake of argument (Fisher (1989). Green (2000) 
explains that we accept propositions for the sake of drawing out their logical or material 
implications (Fisher, 1989), or simply to entertain a possibility (Denham, 2000). But we 
also do it for some practical or moral reasons.  Imagine I want to save money to send my 
now two year-old daughter to college, so I decide to reason by assuming that it will end 
up costing me $500,000. In fact, I believe it will cost less than that, but I just want to be 
on the safe side. Thus, I save $2600 each month and put it on her bank account. Another 
case. During a conversation you say to me, “The blue car she stole was a sedan.” Even if 
                                                      
73 Nichols et al. (1996) call acceptances ‘pretend beliefs’. To pretend-believe p is to feed a representation of 
p into the inference mechanism without necessarily believing it in order to produce, among other things, 
counterfactual reasoning.  
74 For an account of these attitudes see van Fraassen (1980), Stalnaker (1984), Bratman (1987), Rey (1988), 
Cohen (1992), Engel (2000), Van Leeuwen (2009; 2014) among others. The notion of acceptance includes 
attitudes that are so different that one may doubt they should be regarded as a belonging to the same 




I know that the stolen car is not blue, I might, for the sake of keeping the conversation 
going on, accept that it is. So I nod along and let you talk (Stalnaker, 2002: 718–9). Or 
take the following. A lawyer might accept that her clients are innocent for professional 
purposes. While working, her actions and behavior reflect what she accepts to be true 
regardless of what she actually happens to believe.  
These attitudes are similar to propositional imagination in various respects. In 
particular, they bear a similar relation to singular thought. Thus, a lawyer can imagine, 
believe, suppose, or accept that her client is innocent. But she can’t 
assume/accept/suppose that that client is innocent unless the indexical refers to an actual 
client. What’s more, as for imagination, these attitudes influence action, in relation to 
some suitable conative attitude: If I want to save for my child’s college and assume it will 
cost  $500,000, I will be motivated to save $2600 each month. And so on. Let me point to 
one last key parallel between imagination and acceptance. This will come up again, but I 
want to mention it from the start. Acceptance and imagination are by their very nature 
compartmentalizable. This allows for the fact that one can accept/imagine p and that not-
p as long as the two attitudes pertain to two different ‘compartments’ of the mind, in the 
sense that they relate to different sets of inferential relations or get activated in different 
situations and contexts (work vs. home). Thus one can accept/imagine contradictory 
propositions without facing the situation in which contradictory propositions play the role 
of premises in the same set of inferences and at the same time. Notably, this 
compartmentalization is not the result of some cognitive shortcoming of our part, but the 




So, given these similarities, I am prepared to group acceptances and imagination 
together and see how they differ from belief.  But not everybody agrees. For instance, in 
a recent paper M. B. Jackson argues against what she calls the Common Nature Thesis, 
i.e. the thesis that imagining, supposing, and accepting are all instances of the same 
“mental kind”. Her argument is that imagining has a strong phenomenological component 
that suppositions may lack. Other philosophers have argued that imagination is a distinct 
category from acceptance and supposition. Gendler (2000), for instance, has pointed out 
that “imaginative resistance” sets imagination and other secondary cognitive attitudes 
apart. Take some morally charged proposition p that you do not believe to be true. 
Gendler maintains that you may feel a strong resistance to imagine that p is true, but you 
have no problem supposing or accepting for the sake of the argument that p holds 
(Gendler, 2000: 80–81). Finally, Weatherson has recently pointed out that supposition, 
acceptance and the like “can be coarse in a way that imagining cannot”. He seems to 
believe that “[w]e can suppose that Jack sold a chair without supposing that he sold an 
armchair or a dining chair or any particular kind of chair at all” (Weatherson, 2004: 20), 
whereas apparently this can’t be true of imagining.  
I will not deal with these worries here as I don’t deny that there are some 
differences between imagining, supposing, accepting, and so on. The real question, 
though, is whether these differences are enough to set these attitudes apart. The view I am 
defending here is that its output role is what makes an attitude what it is. So the working 
assumption here will be that there is a category of mental states (called ‘secondary 
cognitive attitudes’) that share the same output role. That is, propositional imagination, 




output role, though, is not the same as belief’s. That said, it is not pivotal to me to 
establish that imagination and the like actually form a unitary category of attitudes. I will 
use that only as a working assumption to identify how secondary cognitive attitudes 
differ from belief, and leave for another day the question of whether there are differences 
among secondary cognitive attitudes themselves.  
 
WHAT MOTIVATES ACTION 
As mentioned above, Velleman puts forward the following ‘Identical Output role’ view:  
(IOR) belief and secondary cognitive attitudes share the same output role.  
Mental attitudes are commonly characterized by their functional roles in the sense 
that different attitudes have different functional roles associated with them. Functional 
roles are specified largely by defeasible dispositions to interact with other states and 
mechanisms. We can distinguish two sets of functional roles. There is “input/formation-
role” and an “output/motivation-role”. For belief the input role is, roughly, the disposition 
to be caused by evidence or truth-tracking mechanisms (e.g. perception, inference). The 
output role of belief is usually explained in terms of how belief motivates action.   
On Velleman’s view, secondary attitudes also motivate one to act in the same way 
as belief motivates. Hence, Velleman concludes, one can’t individuate belief only by 
appealing to its output role. How does he get there? His first step is to point out that 
belief is the attitude of presenting a proposition as true. 75 When we believe something, 
we take it to be true. However, there are other attitudes that ‘regard’76 their contents as 
true : assuming a proposition means treating it as true, imagining something to be true is 
                                                      
75 I intend attitudes as having propositions as their content. I don’t deny there may be non-propositional 
attitudes, but they won’t be the focus here. 




also a way of holding it to be true, and so on. As a result, Velleman proposes to call the 
attitudes that entail regarding their content as true ‘acceptances’ (I prefer the term 
‘cognitive’). 77  On his view, acceptances include beliefs, assumptions, suppositions, 
imaginations and the like.   To avoid any confusion I will simply call them ‘truth-
regarding/cognitive attitudes’ and set them in two groups: secondary cognitive attitudes 
and belief.  
Now, the idea that all those attitudes entail regarding their content as true may 
seem hardly believable. Intuitively, when I imagine that I won the lottery I regard the 
content of my imagining as a fiction rather than as something true. But that’s not what 
Velleman believes (2000: 183). He explains: 
Of course, there is a sense in which things that are merely assumed or 
imagined are not regarded as really true. But the relevant sense is not that 
they aren't regarded as true at all; it's rather that they are regarded as true 
but not really-regarded as true, that is, but not seriously or in earnest. What 
distinguishes a proposition's being believed from its being assumed or 
imagined is the spirit in which it is regarded as true, whether tentatively or 
hypothetically, as in the case of assumption; fancifully, as in the case of 
imagination; or seriously, as in the case of belief. 
 
So all the attitudes mentioned above ‘regard’ their content as true in the sense that 
they represent it as true (and not as part of the content). They differ because belief 
represents its content as really true, whereas other attitudes represent it as fictionally-true 
or true for the sake of the argument. As a result, since attitudes other than belief can be 
                                                      
77 Note that Velleman’s definition of acceptance is different from how others have defined it. Indeed, in 
recent years a number of writers have drawn a distinction between belief and acceptance. In his account of 
acceptance Cohen (1992) argues that accepting a proposition involves committing oneself to taking it as a 
(explicit) premise in one’s reasoning. He calls it a ‘premising policy’. More recently, following Cohen 
Frankish (2004) has argued that acceptances are dispositions to premise only in a restricted sense. That is, 
when we accept a proposition we are disposed to use it as premise only in deliberations of a certain type. 




identified as regarding-as-true attitudes, then the fact that belief is a truth-regarding 
attitude cannot be used to individuate belief. Velleman concludes that it is belief’s truth-
directedness (i.e. its aiming at truth) that distinguishes it from all other truth-regarding 
attitudes.  
The connection between truth and belief emerges when Velleman defines belief 
based on its input. It is no news that belief’s functional role has an input-side: belief is 
disposed to be responsive to evidence. By this it is usually meant that belief tends to be 
produced in response to evidence and is open to review in the face of contrary evidence. 
That’s not the case with secondary cognitive attitudes, or so it may seem. Unfortunately, 
defining belief based on its input role may prove harder than expected. More specifically, 
there may be reasons to believe that belief’s sensitivity to evidence is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to individuate belief. As for the necessity claim, it seems intuitive to think 
that some of our beliefs are neither produced by evidence nor open to review in light of 
contrary evidence. An example of that are beliefs recalcitrant to any contrary evidence 
such as some optimistic beliefs, delusions, and religious beliefs. As a result, it seems 
problematic to attempt to explain the notion of belief in relations to its input conditions 
since belief can be insensitive to evidence. Now, one may reply that evidence-insensitive 
beliefs are just beliefs for which something went wrong. Note that the claim here is that 
beliefs are disposed to be evidence-sensitive, and so if a particular belief does not change 
in accordance to evidence it is possibly because something went awry, and the belief did 
not behave as it is supposed to. The problem with this is that some beliefs we have seem 




evidence-sensitivity is required for being a belief, one may find it hard to call those 
beliefs at all. 78   
As for the sufficiency claim, among secondary cognitive attitudes there is also 
what one may call ‘scientific acceptances’: cognitive attitudes we hold toward factual 
propositions that we ultimately don’t believe to be true even though they are in fact 
backed up by evidence.79 For instance, some philosophers of science maintain that we 
don’t really believe our scientific theories but only accept them. 80 This is because we 
know that they will be eventually proven false or at least replaced by other theories. This 
sub-category of acceptance is in fact formed in response to evidence and is open to 
review in the face of contrary evidence (at least to some extent).  Indeed, we tend to hold 
our scientific theories in response to strong indications that their content is true and 
typically we would not hold them without strong evidence. If so, then it becomes hard to 
figure out how these acceptances differ from belief in their input-dispositional role.  
To rescue the intuitive idea that there is a special relation between evidence and 
belief, Velleman argues for a two-level structure explanation of belief: belief is created 
with an aim. Thus what makes a cognitive attitude a belief and not an imagining, is the 
fact that belief was created with the aim of truth. This aim belongs either to the agent who 
has the belief or to the cognitive system responsible for producing that belief.  Velleman 
                                                      
78 Gendler suggests that these evidence-immune beliefs are not really beliefs but aliefs. (However, see 
Glüer and Wikforss (2013) for interesting objections against Gendler’s proposal). Currie (2000) argues that 
delusions are not beliefs (but see Bortolotti 2009). Rey (1988) and Van Leeuwen (2014) focus on religious 
credences and argue that they are not beliefs.  
79 Although the notion of evidence is left somewhat unexplained here, I take it is possible to say that E is 
evidence for H if E is a sign or reliable indicator that H is true even though it can be defeated by other 
evidence to the contrary.   
80 van Fraassen (1980) famously proposed a distinction between acceptance of an empirical theory and 
believing it to be true, arguing that evidence of a theory’s empirical adequacy justifies only accepting rather 




explains the metaphor of belief aiming at truth in terms of a functional account of belief 
according to which the essential feature of belief is the function of the mechanism that 
regulates it and what this mechanism is supposed to do, namely tracking the truth. And so 
to be a belief is to be brought about by a mechanism whose function is to track the truth. 
Now, this mechanism may fail and produce a belief that is false and irresponsive to 
evidence. In this case, such a belief-producing mechanism has failed to fulfill its function. 
As he claims (2000: 254-255),  
Even when a belief is prevented from responding to corrective influences, 
the fact remains that its regulative mechanisms are being prevented from 
doing what they were designed to do. A phantasy and a biased belief are 
alike in that they fail to track truth; but the phantasy has no tendency to 
track the truth at all, whereas a biased belief is diverted from truth; and 
something can be diverted from truth only against the background of a 
tendency to track it. 
 
So in his 2000 book Velleman advances the idea that there is a telos, 
constitutively connected to belief, and that truth-directedness is the key feature of belief. 
That’s his positive thesis.  
At the same time, Velleman (2000) has forcefully objected to the possibility of 
sorting out belief by looking at its downstream output effects. Now, Velleman’s argument 
encompasses three fairly controversial claims and for his argument to constitute a 
knockdown blow to the project of defining belief in terms of its output role, it must be 
able to show that all these claims are true. The first claim is that secondary attitudes 
motivate action. The second is that they do so in the same way as belief does it. As a 




I believe that all of these claims are problematic. I will tackle them in turn. Let’s 
start with the first. Beliefs motivate actions in the sense that they tend to ‘combine’ with 
conative attitudes (e.g. desiring) to produce actions and they satisfy those conative 
attitudes only when they are true. To illustrate, if I desire to drink some water and believe 
that there is water in the fridge then I am motivated to go to the fridge. My going to the 
fridge would satisfy my desire to drink only if my belief that there is water in the fridge is 
true.  
What about how secondary cognitive attitudes influence action? There are two 
major views about this relation. One, say the dominant view, is committed to the 
following picture. Imagination produces action only indirectly. We imagine and then we 
have a desire to act on our imagining, and that is what produces action (Nichols and 
Stich, 2003). In contrast, the second view maintains that imagination produces action 
directly by combining with some kind of conative attitude, usually called i-desire (this 
view is defended by at least Gregory Currie, Andy Egan, Alvin Goldman, and David 
Velleman). These are the two competing views at the moment. As I understand it, the 
underlying disagreement between these two views can be put as follows. One view, the 
dominant one, says that imagination does not feed in the practical reasoning mechanism. 
The opposing view says it does.  
As for imagination, there are two ways to spell out the role of acceptances and the 
like in producing action. One is to say that acceptances don’t really figure in practical 
reasoning. What is really going on is that when we accept a proposition as true we figure 
out what would be the case if that proposition were true and we form a related belief. 




us in practical reasoning is not an acceptance, but a belief about how things would be if a 
given proposition were true. This approach is able to absorb examples like those above 
within the belief-desire account of action.  
In contrast, the alternative proposal says that acceptance figures as a premise in 
reasoning and combines with a conative attitude of some kind. As briefly mentioned 
above, in the literature of imagination, philosophers have come up with the idea that, 
along with real desires, we have pretend-desires or, what they call, i-desires. That I know 
of, nothing of this sort has been proposed for secondary cognitive attitudes. For 
simplicity and by looking at the cases of acceptance mentioned above, I assume that, if 
acceptances and the like enter practical reasoning, they combine with normal desires to 
give rise to action. So, to illustrate,  if I want to save for my child’s college and assume it 
will cost  $500,000 I will be motivated to save $2600 each month. And so on. 
Velleman focuses on imagining and offers a number of examples that are 
supposed to show that imagining that p and believing that p are alike in disposing the 
subject to act as if p. First, he argues that the way children act when they engage in make-
believe-games demonstrates that imagination has a motivational component as well. 
What’s more, in a game of make-believe imaginings can combine with conative attitudes 
to produce actions in the same ways as beliefs combine with conative attitudes to give 
rise to actions in real life. This is Velleman’s central example: a child pretending that he 
is an elephant. Velleman argues that such cases of pretense are cases in which imagining 
being an elephant disposes the child to behave as if he were an elephant. As a result, the 
child acts on the basis of his imagining that he is an elephant. So here is how things 




and forms a pretend-desire, or i-desire (which Velleman calls ‘wish’). To have a pretend-
desire is to enter into a state with a first-order world-directed content whose causal role is 
significantly like the causal role of desire. The imagining motivates the child to move 
toward the pail of water and to dangle his arm between his nose and the seat of a chair.  
Now, the picture Velleman is sketching by appealing to imagination and the like 
is at odds with a specific view of how intentional action happens. On this view, what 
motivates one to act is always a desire-belief combination that causes and rationalizes 
one’s performance (Davidson, 1963; Smith, 1994). Typically, desires and beliefs 
rationalize by providing a means-end rationale, and it is usually said that the agent is 
acting rationally because the action is based on mental attitudes that correspond to an 
instance of means-end reasoning. On this view, no secondary cognitive attitude motivates 
action.  
So what happens when we imagine and act as a result of it? Can the belief-desire 
model make sense of this type of action? Nichols and Stich (2000) have focused on 
action that happens in pretend-play. As I mentioned above, they have argued that the 
pretending is motivated by a desire to act out one’s imaginings. According to this view, 
the child imagines to be an elephant, and desires to act like one. So she is motivated to 
engage in some elephant-like behavior given her initial desire to act like an elephant and 
her belief about what it means to behave like an elephant. Put it more generally, a child 
who acts in accordance with her imagining that p does so because she wishes to act more 
or less as she deems she would act if p were the case. On this picture, belief rather than 




As Nichols and Stich put it, “[p]retenders behave the way they do because they 
want to behave in a way that is similar to the way some character or object behaves in the 
possible world whose description is contained in the Possible World Box [PWB]” (2000: 
128). The outcome of the PWB is a conditional belief of the form “If it were the case that 
p, then it would be the case that q & f, h…”. What causes the child’s pretended behavior 
is in part the desire to behave similarly to how one would behave if the antecedent of the 
conditional belief were true. If this is how pretense behaviors are motivated, then it 
follows that imaginings don’t really have a motivational role of their own: they are never 
the cognitive input into practical reasoning. It is the conditional belief that motivates the 
action whenever the subject desires to behave as if the antecedent of that belief were true. 
Velleman’s point about imagining (and accepting more generally) stands in direct 
opposition to this belief-desire model because, on his picture, imaginings can directly 
motivate action when suitably paired with conative states such as desires or wishes. In 
opposing the belief-desire model Velleman is making two distinct claims. For starters, 
imagining can produce intentional actions and not just behavior. Spelling out what an 
intentional action is has notoriously proven very hard and here I don’t have any positive 
account to offer. The key point here is that imagination and all secondary cognitive 
attitudes more generally can offer intentional explanation of action, in the sense they have 
content which matters in the explanation of the action. 
In this chapter, I will take the labels ‘intentional action’ and ‘explanation’ to apply 
fairly widely. More specifically, I will take intentional actions to include both simple 
activity and autonomous action, as Velleman defines them. As Velleman (2000) draws 




are the result of our choice to act based on what we take to be reasons to act. In contrast, 
activity is a behavior brought about without any actual choice. What’s more, on his view, 
what distinguishes mere behavior from activity is that the latter but not the former is the 
product of our attitudes exerting their causal power in a normal way (Velleman, 
2000:126). 
Now, going back to imagination, Velleman argues that imagination does bring 
about and explain intentional action, which includes both activities and full-blown 
autonomous actions. In the latter case, when we play the game of make-believe, we act 
on our imaginings because we so choose. At other times, we simply act out of our 
imagining, not as a result of a choice but as a result of imagining itself exerting its causal 
power in a normal way.  
This leads us to the second point. Velleman claims that the belief-desire model is 
not the best explanation of the actions that he claims are motivated by imaginings. 
Importantly, the issue here is not whether we can come up with a belief-desire 
explanation of those actions as Velleman concedes that such explanations are always easy 
to concoct. Velleman’s claim is that invoking imagination is just a better way to explain 
those actions.  
A number of writers have argued recently that the traditional belief-desire picture 
of intentional action must be radically revised. A source of dissatisfaction with the belief-
desire model is based on the fact that it seems that such a model can’t by itself explain 
some of the things we do. Indeed, there seems to be a number of actions that we regularly 
do that may be hard to explain just referring to a belief-desire psychology. As a result, 




thinks is - a previously unacknowledged cognitive mental state, i.e. alief. On her view, 
alief is not a propositional attitude but a habitual disposition to react to certain stimuli by 
acting in a certain way. She offers two paradigmatic examples of how alief produces 
intentional action and in a way that is in opposition to belief. One example goes like that. 
Even if we don’t actually believe at all that the glass in front of us is contaminated with 
feces, the fact that a misleading label “feces” is applied to it is actually enough for us to 
refrain from drinking from it. Here is another case: when asked to walk onto the glass 
platform of the Grand Canyon Skywalk - even if we are positive that it is perfectly safe – 
we feel highly motivated not to walk out on it.  An important caveat: on Gendler’s view 
all these instances of avoidance behavior would count as intentional actions.  
Gendler’s main claim is that we face a dilemma. Either we give up the (input) 
functional account of belief or we accept that there is more to action than belief and 
desire. The first horn of the dilemma gains support once we notice that whatever is 
motivating us in avoiding drinking from the glass in the example above, is an attitude 
insensitive to evidence. Gendler’s point is that in the examples above what motivates us 
is a stubbornly evidence-insensitive attitude, impossible to modify or eradicate, 
apparently hard-wired and triggered by only certain types of stimuli. As a result, it is hard 
to believe such an attitude could be belief if we are to keep our traditional notion of 
belief. There is a further worry. If we were to say that such an attitude was indeed a 
belief, we would have to accept that, at least in those situations, we were entertaining two 
contradictory beliefs at the same time. Although it may be possible to argue that this is 
not a psychological impossibility (but just a result of our irrational nature), it is not a 




of belief, we must accept that what is motivating us is not a belief but a sui generis 
mental state that she calls ‘alief’. However, if we grant Gendler that there are aliefs, then 
we fall in the second horn of the dilemma and we have to give up our belief-desire model 
and the idea that one needs belief to be motivated to act.  Gendler recommends that we 
embrace the second horn of the dilemma. 
The literature on alief and imagination is by now quite vast, and I don’t aim at 
offering an answer to many of the issues that have been brought up there. However, I 
generally worry about the explanatory gain of explaining action in terms of imagination, 
acceptance or other attitudes such as alief. It seems there is a perfectly legitimate way to 
make sense of what is going on in the Grand Canyon above: I believe that the glass 
platform of the Grand Canyon Skywalk is perfectly safe and I am disposed to act on that. 
However, I can’t stand heights and so I just do not like to walk on the platform. You can 
say I have irrational fears, or fears that aren’t cognitively construed, but this is hardly a 
new phenomenon. So it escapes me what is the explanatory gain we get from postulating 
the existence of the new mental phenomenon of alief, when emotions would just do the 
trick.     
Going back to Velleman’s point about acceptance and the like, when I accept or 
suppose something for the sake of an argument, for instance, it is arguably not the 
proposition accepted to be true that motivates me to act or reason in a certain way. What 
motivates me is the fact that I believe I have strategic reasons for not contradicting you at 
this stage of the argument. Indeed, I want to show you that, even granting you the 




anything, it seems. It is my belief that accepting a proposition will foster some goal I 
have that does the job of motivating.  
But what about imagination? Velleman argues against the belief-desire 
explanation of what happens in various cases of children’s pretense.81 His main point 
seems to be that pretending is acting out of one’s imagination, whereas the belief-desires 
model leaves the pretending child outside the pretense. The belief-desire view, says 
Velleman, offers a very depressing picture of the child’s game as if the child, in her 
pretense, was spending most of her time strategizing about what it means to be an 
elephant rather than acting as one. But even assuming Velleman is right about this, I 
wonder whether he is confusing two distinct senses of ‘imagining’ here. Recall that here I 
am focusing on propositional imagination, as this is what Velleman seems to have in 
mind when he talks about imagination. However, as pointed out above there is also a 
second kind of imagination, e-imagination. Imagination in this sense is a faculty that 
simulates belief and desires. This faculty is used to make various calculations or 
understand others’ viewpoints, for instance. It can also be the source of the child’s 
pretending to be an elephant when playing a game of make-believe. These belief/desire-
simulated states produce choices or decision. So in this sense imagining does produce 
action but only because imagining means simulating one’s belief/desire states (Goldman, 
2006). This clearly contrasts with Nichols and Stich’s approach to how imagination gives 
rise to action, and solves Velleman’s worry that their approach was excluding 
imagination from action-production. But this is not the sense of imagination Velleman is 
concerned with. And it is not instrumental to Velleman’s threat to the belief-desire model 
                                                      




since e-imagination motivates because it re-enacts the belief/desire pair. But on 
Velleman’s view imagination is a different mental state than belief and not merely a way 
to re-enact a belief. He clearly states that the state of imagination that motivates the 
pretending children is similar to a supposition, and presents its content as true. This is 
why, he maintains, it is able to produce an action. But it is unclear that this is the case, as 
I just suggested. The type of imagination at play in pretended play could be described as 
a faculty that allows us to re-enact beliefs and desires to produce actions.  If so, 
Velleman’s attack is off target.  
 
HOW ATTITUDES MOTIVATE ACTION: REPLY TO VELLEMAN (PART 1) 
In this second part of the chapter, I will grant Velleman that what motivates 
pretense is usually not a belief but an instance of imagining. In other words, for the sake 
of the argument I am prepared to accept that imaginings do motivate intentional action. I 
will also grant him that the same extends to other belief-like attitudes, acceptances, 
suppositions and the like. Importantly, though, that by itself is not enough to establish 
that these cognitive attitudes have the same output role as belief. In fact, I don’t believe 
that they do. My position is that belief is an ‘unqualified’ cognitive attitude whereas all 
secondary cognitive attitudes must come with some kind of constraint on their use that 
limits the type of inferences or reasoning patterns they can enter into.  A qualified attitude 
is an attitude that needs, to enter reasoning, an attitude that is unqualified.  
Before laying out my proposal, let me flesh out a possible way to reply to 
Velleman’s claim that imagination motivates action in the same way as belief. The 




context-bound in a way belief is not. And this can be extended to the other secondary 
cognitive attitudes. In other words, whereas belief motivates in all situations, secondary 
attitudes’ motivational role is restricted to specific contexts and is activated only when 
such contexts are represented in some way. This proposal has the merit of making sense 
of some of the intuitions that back up Velleman’s argument, while discounting his final 
conclusion. Regardless of its strong plausibility, I worry Velleman may be in a position to 
reject this line of argument.  As the final step, I will present my argument for why pace 
Velleman belief’s output role is in fact unique.  
The claim that imagination motivates action in the same way as belief has struck 
many as frankly implausible.  Even if I imagine that I am a bird who wants to fly, many 
would say, I am definitively not motivated to jump out of my window and fly out. That 
idea simply does not cross my mind! As a reply, Velleman has pointed out that we should 
look at what happens in games of make-believe and other cases of actions putatively 
produced by imagining. But if Velleman wants to have a chance of getting his story off 
the ground, he needs to make sense of the following important phenomenological point: 
Explanandum: in many cases merely imagining, supposing, accepting something to be 
the case does not seem to motivate one to do anything (even when paired with the 
relevant i-desire) 
This can be rephrased by saying that, even if we actively imagine such and such, 
that bit of imagination (paired with an i-desire of some sort) does not seem to show up as 




A proposal has been recently brought forward that tries to make sense of the role 
of imagination (and other cognitive attitudes) in producing action. This proposal is able to 
make sense of Explanandum while maintaining that imagination does produce action.  
The proposal is simple. It grants Velleman that there are indeed a lot of 
similarities between imagination/acceptance and belief with respect to action, but it also 
points to the intuitive idea that imagination, assumption and the like can motivate only in 
the contexts in which they were introduced. Let me try to be a little more specific. By 
‘context’ I mean the situation in which the acceptance, imagination and so on was 
formed. To illustrate, ‘a game of pretense’ is the context in which I imagine I am an 
elephant and that the chair is a pail of water; ‘work’ is the context for accepting that my 
client is innocent; ‘my current paper’ is the context for my granting Velleman’s that 
imagination motivates. And so on. Importantly, though, context does not necessarily 
(only) indicate a time-place relation but also a set of inferential moves. Thus, context may 
refer to a subset of the (logic and material) inferential relations a proposition may give 
rise to. As a result, if I accept a proposition for the sake of an argument, the argument in 
question does not encompasses all the propositions that follow from what I accept, but 
only a subset of those propositions. Similarly, if I imagine I am an elephant I may 
imagine I have a trunk but other things may just fall outside the context of the fiction or 
game, e.g. that I can trump or that I weigh 7,000 kg, and so on.  
For instance, O’Brien (2005) has pointed out that, granting there may be some 
similarities in the way the child reacts if she imagines she is an elephant and the way she 
would act if she believed that she were an elephant, there are also some striking 




life, i.e. living outdoor in the Savanna, trying to communicate with other elephants and 
consuming “elephant edibles” (Noordhof, 2001: 253). No such thing happens when the 
child imagines she is an elephant. Thus, there are some things we are disposed to do 
when believing that are not shared by imagination. What’s more, just imagining 
something does not motivate us accordingly. If I am the office, even imagining I am the 
Queen/King of England does not motivate me do anything with that. This is because I 
don’t see my office as the right setting for me to act on my imagining. Differently, when I 
am playing with my daughter, imagining may motivate me to act in various ways.  
Imagination is, thus, restricted to a context: it motivates us only in some specific 
situations and with respect to a limited set of possible actions.  
So here is the same idea put in different words. When I imagine that p, I treat p as 
true and I am disposed to act as if p were true only if I insert an extra premise that 
represents the context as being such and such. Hence, imagining that p is not enough to 
motivate me to do anything or, put it differently, imagining that p is not enough to be 
disposed to treat p as a premise in practical reasoning. Imagination per se does not access 
the practical reasoning mechanism. It requires an extra-input: a representation of the 
context as fictional.  
When I am watching or reading Othello, I imagine that Othello will kill 
Desdemona, and I desire to avoid that. However, this imagination + desire combination 
does not motivate me (to pretend) to stop Othello from murdering Desdemona. I am not 
motivated to pretend to do anything in this context. Why? Well, a possible suggestion 
goes as follows: although I am reading fiction, I am myself not in it, but I am simply a 




when I am playing a game of ‘cops and robbers’, I am in the context of enacting that 
particular fiction. That means I have 
A) the belief that such a game consists of such and such actions, moves, 
inferential patters, and so on 
B) the belief I am in that specific game  
When I read a work fiction, in contrast, I have A but not B. Say that, instead of being a 
simple spectator, I am an actress acting in a theatrical representation of Othello. In that 
case, one may say, I am actually participating in the (fictional) story, I am making it, I am 
part of it. I know I am not Desdemona but it is possible that (good) acting requires me to 
imagine being her. When acting, I also have the belief that I am enacting the fictional 
story Othello, and that I am in the context of that theatrical representation. In that case, 
the belief about the context I am in, paired with my imaging of being Desdemona, may 
actually motivate me to act as if I were Desdemona.  
But if this view is right, then it is bad news for Velleman. For two reasons. One, 
belief is not bound to context. It is not that we believe one thing at home and its negation 
at work. So belief and those other cognitive attitudes can be set apart just by looking at 
how they behave with respect to context. They’ll share the same motivational role, but 
only in a limited, narrow sense: whereas belief’s functional role is a default disposition, 
imagination and acceptance don’t motivate by default but only in relation to a context.  
As a result, we have now an asymmetric relation between belief and secondary 
cognitive states (Van Leeuwen, 2009). That is, there is an asymmetrical relation between 
imagining, acceptance, assumption on one side and belief on the other, such that 




need imagining to motivate action. This is because, as we saw, imagining’s ability to 
motivate depends on the fact that there is another attitude which represents the context as 
the right one. Thus, my imagining to be a Queen motivates me when playing with my 
daughter but not when I am at home doing laundry: only in the context of the game does 
the imagining enter my reasoning as a possible promoter of action. In addition, to be able 
to motivate, imagining belief to set the context (Van Leeuwen, 2009). To reiterate then, 
the view proposed is that the output role of belief must be different from the output role 
and downstream consequences of secondary attitudes because there is an asymmetrical 
relation between the two categories: secondary attitudes need belief to be able to 
motivate, whereas the opposite is not the case.  
As a result of this, if Velleman accepts this view, he so-to-speak wins the battle 
but loses the war. That is, in adopting this view he has a way to show that there is in fact 
a clear parallel between belief and secondary cognitive attitudes, but this parallel holds 
only because there is a larger, more significant disanalogy between these two categories.  
 
VELLEMAN’S REPLY 
 Velleman separates the rational import attitudes have on other attitudes and on 
actions from their motivational role. This allows him to argue that secondary cognitive 
attitudes can motivate beyond the context in which their influence would be deemed 
rational (or at least reasonable). On Velleman’s view, the fact that imagining rarely 
produces action is no evidence that imagining is not so disposed, but is evidence of the 
fact that there must be something that often countervails imagination’s motivational 




seems context-dependent while denying that it actually is so. He has an error-theory for 
why things seem this way. It is just that in many situations there are countervailing forces 
–we are largely unaware of – that stop us from acting on our imagination. But that does 
not mean that, absent those forces, we would not act on what we imagine to be the case.  
To be more specific, Velleman individuates three elements that may play a role in 
stopping imagining from producing action. First, he mentions that we are often inhibited 
from acting on our imaginings.  More specifically, as adults we learn to inhibit the 
motivational push of what we imagine, and this inhibition explains why adults are not 
very good at playing games of pretense. More importantly, invoking this inhibition can 
be a way to explain why we often don’t act on our imagining.82 There is a second element 
that often prevents us from acting out of our imaginings. Usually, when we imagine that 
p we also believe that p is false. As a result, this contrary belief exerts its own 
motivational power that is presumably contrary to the one exerted by what we imagine.  
Clearly, the fact that beliefs can act as counterbalancing forces is not a small 
concession: saying that beliefs can counterbalance imagining is tantamount to admitting 
that there is something beliefs can do that imaginings can’t. However, at this point this 
reply is insufficient. It is not clear that only beliefs play the role of counterbalancing 
forces. Velleman never says that and I doubt he believes it. And even if true, that does not 
show that belief and imagining are not the same with respect to their motivational role. It 
only shows that they differ somehow. 
                                                      
82 I find Velleman’s talk of ‘inhibition’ slightly unsatisfactory. A reason for that is that he says very little on 
how inhibition is supposed to work. He also does not say anything on whether such inhibitory force exerts 
its power over all acceptances or only over imaginings. For the time being, I will set this issue aside, but 




Finally, Velleman could argue that the reason why imagination and belief seem to 
have different upshots has nothing to do with beliefs and imagination per se but with a 
third element that makes it the case that we either act on what we believe or on what we 
imagine. It would be quite challenging to try to offer a complete account of Velleman’s 
theory of action here, but let me point to some key elements of it (which I have already 
hinted at above). On his view, our intentional autonomous actions are the result of a 
choice, which is an additional capacity that goes beyond the motivational power of 
whatever attitude may cause the action. This capacity reinforces the motivation force 
exerted by some specific attitudes by also blocking any countervailing attitude. The 
notion of choice at play here is the same as a ‘practical cognition’, and explained in terms 
of a second-order motive that influences first-order motivates (Velleman, 2000: chapter 
8). That means that even when there are two opposing attitudes exercising their 
motivating force, we usually subscribe only to one of those motivating forces by putting 
additional force on it. The attitude we subscribe to, Velleman maintains, is the one that – 
in our light – makes sense and makes our actions intelligible  (Velleman, 2000: 96).  
It would take me too far afield to try to critically engage with Velleman’s account 
of action here, and so I think it is only fair for me to try to understand the implications of 
his view with respect to the motivational role of imagining. On that note, can Velleman’s 
view about action explain what is going on in the two different situations in which I 
imagine to be Queen? Possibly. Note that it is plausible that in both scenarios what I do 
may be the result of a choice. If Velleman is right about choice, then in both cases I am 
acting based on what attitude I choose to be motivated by. When I am playing with my 




doing laundry: since acting on my imagining would make very little sense, I act on what I 
believe. Crucially, though, that does not mean that my imagining is not able to motivate 
me in both cases. It simply means that I made a choice to not be so motivated.  
Does Velleman have any positive evidence to support his view that imagining and 
other similar attitudes motivate by default? Remember we are granting him that 
secondary attitudes can motivate action. Based on that assumption, yes, I believe he 
might produce two sets of evidence to support his view. First, Velleman offers examples 
in which imagining motivates outside imaginative contexts and without the help of belief. 
That breaks the alleged asymmetric relation between imagining and believing.  Here is 
one. As I am walking down the street, I start imagining that someone has stolen the wallet 
that is in my pocket. Instinctively, I reach for my pocket to check that my wallet is still 
there. According to the view sketched above imagination can motivate us only if some 
belief represents the context as the ‘practical setting’ of pretense or make-believe. But 
clearly this does not happen in this case: I check my pocket because in fact I don’t 
believe this is a situation of pretense83. Or similarly: imagine that I am watching a soccer 
match on TV and start yelling at the referee. Perhaps, my behavior in this case does not 
count as a full-blown intentional action84, but it is surely close enough to intentional 
action to allow for explanation by means of cognitive states with representational 
contents. And so, arguably, what is going on here is that I desire that the referee would 
change his decision to assign a penalty and imagine that he can hear me and so I start 
shouting at him without, perhaps, even realizing it. If so, then my imagining is able to 
                                                      
83 Other examples of this kind have been discussed by Gendler (2008) as cases of action motivated by 
‘aliefs’.  
84 In fact for Velleman a full-blown intentional action is only an action that results from a choice, what he 
calls ‘autonomous action’. As I mentioned above, this is different from mere activity which is still 




motivate me to act as if its content were true, even in contexts that have very little to do 
with pretense. My disappointment with his decision, my wish to change his mind and my 
imagining cause me to act – but the action takes place in a real setting, not a setting of 
make-believe, i.e. not a setting that I conceive of as ‘pretense’.  
Velleman is not alone in thinking that there are actions like these, called “a-
rational actions”, actions that seem pointless as they do not fulfill any specific goal, and 
don’t seem to satisfy any desire. Typical examples of these actions include mussing up 
the hair of one’s child, scratching the eyes in a photograph of someone, or banging one’s 
fist on the table.  Hursthouse (1999) believes these actions to be expressive of an emotion. 
Velleman (2000: 269) points out that the explanation of these actions involves some kind 
of imaginings too. Be as it may, the point here is that it seems that imagining (or some 
other attitude that is not belief) can motivate beyond pretense and make-believe contexts 
and without the need to represent context in any way.85 On this view, the reason why 
imagining in fact rarely causes action across contexts and, when it does it, it is only for a 
short moment, is because of some opposing force (e.g. conscious choice, inhibition, a 
countervailing belief) that stops or weakens imagining’s defeasible motivational push.  
A-rational actions aside, there is a second element that puts some pressure on the 
idea that what takes belief and other cognitive attitudes apart is context-dependency. 
Some secondary cognitive attitudes are reasonably used across the board and need no 
belief to motivate.  In fact, examples of default secondary cognitive attitudes abounds, 
although they are seldom recognized as such: 
                                                      
85 I don’t mean to imply here that Velleman’s diagnosis of what is going in these cases in not controversial. 
For a skeptical look at his view see Raz’s point that, in cases like those I mentioned above, it is far from 
clear that the agent is producing an intentional action at all. And even if one were to concede that those are 




PHYSICS: Gina has only a very superficial knowledge of physics as she rarely 
encounters situations that require a thorough understanding of it. She holds that the 
general theory of relativity is the correct theory of gravitation.  Even so, in everyday 
situations she assumes or accepts the much simpler, Newtonian theory of gravitation. She 
knows it to be false, and thus doesn’t believe it. And yet this is what she commonly 
assumes to be true across contexts.   
CORNERSTONES PROPOSITIONS: “I am not dreaming”; “I am not a brain 
the vat”. These are propositions that are not contents of beliefs but of non-epistemically 
warranted acceptances. These are, in other words, not things we believe but that we 
accept to be true (Wright, 2004). 
MATH FICTIONALISM. When we normally engage in mathematical discourse 
we presuppose that mathematic entities exist (Yablo, 2002a,b; 2005). 
What makes these attitudes secondary cognitive attitudes? They are attitudes 
towards propositions not believed to be true, and they can function as premises in 
reasoning, guide and motivate action. Interestingly, though, although some secondary 
cognitive attitudes are attached to specific contexts (e.g. work, argument), the examples 
above show that some are operative by default and its members can enter our reasoning 
without needing any context-setting representation. Thus, Gina accepts Newtonian 
physics across the board and usually uses it whenever she has to do some calculation. She 
does not have to reflect on it, it simply what she does. For her Newtonian physics is not 
supposed to be restricted to some situations, but permeates whatever she does: it is her 
default motivating attitude. 86  Why? Mainly for practical reasons as it requires much 
                                                      
86 Dub (2015:11) has offered similar examples and noted that it is unclear why we could not imagine that 




easier calculation than the general theory of relativity, which she holds to be the correct 
one. CORNERSTONES PROPOSITIONS is also a clear example of an acceptance used by 
default, if any. Wright (2004) has quite forcefully argued that propositions such as “I am 
not dreaming”, “I am not a brain the vat”, are not things we believe, even though we may 
take ourselves to believe them. Something similar can be said for mathematical entities, 
at least according to Yablo. What these examples show is that perhaps Velleman is right 
in thinking that secondary attitudes motivate by default, without the need of any context-
setting representation and thus without belief. When this is not the case, it is because 
other forces stop them. But these forces may not be always active, as we just saw. Notice 
that this is also true for belief: sometimes we don’t act on some of the beliefs we have 
because other forces countervail them. If this is right, then it is unclear that there is any 
asymmetrical relation between secondary attitudes and belief.    
 
BELIEF AS OUR UNQUALIFIED ATTITUDE: A REPLY TO VELLEMAN (PART 2) 
In this final section, I will show that belief’s output role is not shared by other cognitive 
attitudes such as imagination and acceptance, not even when used by default. Before I 
start, let me point out that here I concede that the motivational role of belief, narrowly 
construed, may be shared by secondary cognitive attitudes. That is, I grant that 
imagination and the like may well motivate action in the same way beliefs does. And yet, 
I conclude here, that does not mean that they share the same output role in general. 
Importantly, the force of my argument hangs also on whether it is able to show 
that belief has a unique output role without presupposing the idea that belief is directed at 




from secondary attitudes is belief’s relation with truth. According to Velleman (2000) 
that meant that belief is necessarily formed by a mechanism whose function is to track 
the truth.  Velleman’s point is that belief’s truth-directedness is the condition of 
possibility for belief’s role in reasoning. In contrast, I will now show that no appeal to the 
notion of truth is needed to explain belief’s role in the mind. 
 
THE REGRESS STOPPER 
By their very nature, secondary attitudes are contextualizable and thus 
compartmentalizable. So it is a condition of possibility for these attitudes to exist that 
there is an attitude that is not contextualizable and thus non-compartmentalizable. This is 
what I mean. It is possible (and legitimately so) to both accept a proposition in one 
context and its negation in a different one. It is possible to imagine one thing and its 
opposite, at least in different contexts or fictions. So it is possible to imagine that 
Superman is bald in one fiction or story and that he is not in a different one. Similarly, 
one needs to acknowledge that it is possible to accept, suppose, and assume different 
things at the same time in different contexts and that we often do so. Nothing prevents 
that psychologically: adults seem perfectly able to keep in mind multiple different 
possible scenarios. And that also seems a perfectly rational thing to do. Importantly, 
though, we can accept contradictory propositions only if these belong to different 
contexts. Put it differently: we can’t employ contradictory propositions (of the same type 
of attitude) as premises of the same reasoning patters at the same time.  
Importantly, we should not misunderstand this point and think that the fact that 




That is, it is not my position that the reason why secondary attitudes vary with respect to 
context is that in one context one has (usually pragmatic) reasons to accept, imagine, or 
suppose a proposition, and in a different context one may lose those reasons and acquire 
new ones, and thus come to accept, imagine or suppose some opposite proposition. This, 
I claim, happens with belief as well; that is, (reasonable) beliefs change according to the 
(epistemic) reasons one has. To illustrate: If I have sufficient evidence that p is true, I 
believe that p. Were that evidence undermined by some other consideration, I would stop 
to believe that, and if I acquire new (contrary) evidence I may end up believing the 
opposite of what I initially subscribed to. So if context-dependence ultimately means 
sensitivity to reasons, then belief is just as much context-dependent as acceptance is. But 
that’s not my point.  
What makes secondary attitudes contextualizable is that I can, at the same time 
and in relation to different contexts and patterns of inferential relations, imagine, 
suppose, and accept that p and that not p. I can, in other words, keep both prospectives in 
mind at the same time without confusing myself or feeling the pressure to eliminate one 
of them. That this is possible is a key feature of secondary attitudes as a class of attitudes. 
That means that not only I can imagine that p and suppose that not-p at the same time; it 
also means that I can imagine that p and imagine that not p at the same time. I can hold 
two contradictory pieces of imagination at the same time.  
Secondary cognitive attitudes are ‘qualified’ in a further sense. I may accept a 
proposition for the sake of the argument I am having with a friend, but the set of 
propositions I may end up accepting based on that initial acceptance is constrained by the 




accept that p and proposition ‘f’ is entailed by ‘p’, it seems rational to accept that f only if 
‘f’ is somehow relevant to my accepting p in the first place. That means that the set of the 
inferential relations in which ‘p’ is set is not necessarily identical to the propositions one 
is disposed to rationally accept having accepted ‘p’ in the first place. So it is always in 
principle possible to accept a proposition without accepting its entailment. This even 
more true for imagining, where one can restrict the number of propositions imagined to a 
small subset of the implications of what one imagines. Again, this is what makes 
acceptance and secondary cognitive attitudes more generally ‘contextualizable’, i.e. 
applicable to a subset of all possible inferential relations and situations. As I said, this 
feature is, I believe, part of the nature of these secondary attitudes. 
The fact that secondary attitudes are always potentially dependent on contexts and 
confinable to a subset of inferential relations makes it the case that there must be an 
attitude that is, as a whole, not subject to restrictions (modulo some specific cases I will 
tackle below). This attitude is the condition of possibility of secondary attitudes, because 
it is able to draw the limits for them, quarantine them and set them apart while being in 
itself limitless. This is our primary cognitive attitude.  
The phenomenon of quarantining can account for the fact that usually what we 
imagine, suppose, or accept does not influence action outside appropriate contexts (what I 
called ‘Explanandum’ above). Quarantining also prevents imagination and the like from 
contaminating our beliefs: if I imagine of an object that it is a glass of water, I will not 
come to believe it to contain a wet, transparent and thirst- quenching liquid. Importantly, 
as I mentioned above, that does not mean that quarantining always prevents us from 




good predictive power, I can assume it to be true and derive predictions and thus beliefs 
from it. Quarantining can allow that. In contrast, contagion happens when this is true: 
secondary attitudes influence action and belief outside the context in which they were 
introduced. To illustrate, if I imagine that a chair is a pail of water in the context of a 
game of pretense, that imagining should not influence what I actually believe, and so I 
should not come to believe that the chair contains a wet, transparent and thirst- quenching 
liquid. And if I do that, then that’s an example of contagion.  
Finally, quadrating prevents between-contexts permeability, that is, any carrying 
overs from one fictitious context to other contexts. For instance, imagine a layer who 
accepts that his client is telling the truth about that night but at some point - while 
working on her case - also assumes that he his lying, and that he was not where he says 
he was. She does that to anticipate possible moves of her opponent in court, and thus 
come up with a good defensive strategy. To be able to do that, she has to keep in mind 
the implications of these nested assumptions while making sure they don’t overlap with 
other assumptions she makes. Although this trick probably requires some effort, it is 
plausible that she has the cognitive resources to do it. If so, then there has to be a way to 
temporarily quarantine one set of assumptions from both her beliefs and other possible 
sets of assumptions that she may be holding at the same time.  
There is similar common phenomenon: we often prevent producing the 
expectation that real-world objects and events have the characteristics they are supposed 
to have in the context of games of make-believe or in the context of supposition. And 
evidence shows that this quarantining ability is present even from an early age. As 




pretend cookies are edible, and show serious dismay if an experimenter tries to bite one 
with the apparent intent to consume it. They […] do not they expect that if the red blocks 
represent sandwiches in one game, and bars of soap in another, that the sandwiches will 
somehow be soapy or the soap-bars somehow edible.” (Gendler, 2010: 241) What’s 
more, in normally functioning agents we don’t see cases of massive contagion. 87 We all 
experience some cases of cognitive contagion, perhaps more than we would expect, but I 
think it is fair to say that quarantining holds it in check for the most part. And likely so, 
since an extreme tendency towards contagion tends to be associated with systemic forms 
of psychopathology such as schizophrenia.  
So let’s go back to my initial argument. To fulfill its function, our quarantining 
mechanism needs to be able to represent the context in which a given acceptance was 
introduced, the inferential relations that compose such context, and so on. That is, to do 
its job and prevent contagion our quarantining mechanism needs, at a bare minimum, to 
hold a representation of the context in which a specific acceptance was introduced. Thus, 
to quarantine an imagination I, the quarantining mechanism has to represent the context 
in which I was introduced. Without such a representation, quarantining is not possible.88  
The context-representing attitude that is employed by quarantining must not itself be 
open to quarantining, otherwise a regress would potentially ensue. So to avoid regress 
secondary cognitive attitudes cannot have the function to ground quarantining. There 
must a primary attitude in charge of that. This attitude is not contextualizable, and its 
influence can in principle be extended to all the inferential relations related to its content. 
                                                      
87 We have more cases of emotional contagion. See Gendler (2003), for a discussion of the relevant 
literature. 
88 Contexts can be represented by propositions such as “this is where I assume that…”, “here I play the 






Besides being a regress-stopper, our unqualified, primary cognitive attitude is 
potentially needed to ground the use of secondary attitudes in reasoning. As I will argue 
in the next chapter, reasoning is an inferential process guided by the aim of reaching a 
conclusion supported by normative reasons. There are two types of premises in 
reasoning: premises that play the function of being reasons and premises that do not have 
that role. Contextualizable attitudes are the latter. Given secondary attitudes’ 
contextualizability, it is always possible that their ability to work as a legitimate premise 
is limitable to a specific set of situations and inferential relations. As we saw, it is indeed 
part of the nature of secondary attitudes that it is always possible to limit the scope of 
their influence by adopting an attitude of the same kind with contrary content or by 
limiting their inferential downstream effects. I may assume that p and assume that not-p 
without contradiction, if I do so in different contexts. The fact that this can happen 
without contradiction means that I will not be forced to eliminate one of the two opposing 
assumptions: they are both legitimate assumptions.    
As a result, their status as premises is always dependent on something else that 
grounds their use in reasoning. That means then that their role as premises cannot be that 
of a reason (they do not carry justificatory value by themselves), and thus they always 
potentially need a further attitude to ground their role as premises. So once again, there 
has to be attitude that is not contextualizable and whose role as a premise is used as 
legitimate by default in the sense that we treat it as a legitimate premise automatically. 




we don’t need to justify qua premise. And this is again the unique role our primary 
cognitive attitude has.  
 
OUTPUT ROLE IN THEORETICAL REASONING 
I will now address the question of how secondary attitudes behave with respect to 
theoretical reasoning, and show that the downstream effects of secondary attitudes must 
necessarily be different from the downstream effects of the primary cognitive attitude 
mentioned above.  
I define theoretical reasoning as the kind of reasoning that employs only cognitive 
attitudes as premises and, as a result, produces a cognitive attitude as a conclusion. 
Cognitive attitudes are attitudes that represent their content as true. Acceptance, 
imagination, supposition and the like are all cognitive attitudes.  
It is common among philosophers to maintain that the functional role of belief in 
theoretical reasoning involves a disposition to conform to material and logical inferential 
relations in accordance with requirements of formal rationality (coherence requirements). 
Believing that p means being disposed not to believe that not-p. Believing that if p then q, 
while also believing that p means being disposed to believe that q. And so on.  
Do secondary attitudes tend to behave in the same way as belief? Are those 
disposed to accept that p, and that p implies q, disposed to accept that q? It does seem that 
imaginings and acceptances have properties very similar to beliefs’, and behave 
inferentially as beliefs do. If I accept that my friend is innocent, it is plausible to say that I 
am also disposed to refuse any proposition that goes against that claim. If a lawyer 




what she takes to follow from it and disposed not to accept any contrary proposition (in 
that context). And finally,  “if I imagine that my house is on fire, and imagine that if my 
house is on fire I’m in danger, I’ll be imagining that I’m in danger” (Sinhababu, 2013: 
160–161). Indeed, it is plausible that we are in fact disposed to (imaginatively) subscribe 
to the consequence of the propositions we imagine (when we are rational we do so within 
the boundaries of the context our imagination is placed in).  
So it seems that being disposed to conform to requirements of formal coherence is 
a characteristic of all cognitive attitudes. This symmetry is often called ‘mirroring’. It has 
been studied specifically in relation to pretense and imagining but I assume it can be 
extended to all sorts of secondary attitudes. Mirroring says that if I imagine, pretend or 
assume that p, and “if I am tacitly or explicitly attending to my belief that if p then q, then 
(ceteris paribus) I will be inclined to” pretend, imagine, or assume that q (Gendler, 2006: 
184). Mirroring is probably due to the fact that our inference mechanisms treat pretense 
(and other non-doxastic cognitive attitudes’ content) in “roughly the same way” they treat 
real belief’s content (Nichols and Stich, 2000: 125). So I will assume that, given their 
dispositions, various secondary attitudes will tend to conform to requirements of 
rationality, be closed under entailment, and by and large end up being coherent.  
This tendency, however, will emerge only locally, i.e. only within the various 
contexts secondary attitudes are placed in.  That means that globally, they will in fact 
emerge in patterns that are incoherent. This is clearly a result of their contextualizability. 
This is what I mean. At the local level, i.e. within the context of the limited inferential 
relations they are usually placed in, a set of supposed or accepted propositions will 




above show that. However, given that across different contexts we may accept many 
different and at times diverging propositions, the set of all the propositions we accept 
stands in no relation of coherence. This is true also for the propositions we imagine. They 
are also, as a whole, incoherent. More generally, that means that secondary cognitive 
attitudes, as  a class, are not disposed to accord with the requirements of coherence (or 
formal requirements of rationality).   
In contrast, our primary attitude will be globally convergent toward coherence 
(modulo irrationality). This feature is the result of its not being, as a class, 
contextualizable and is clearly related to its functioning as a regress stopper and as a 
background condition for the existence of secondary cognitive attitudes. So, our 
background attitude will be functionally distinguishable from secondary cognitive 
attitudes also with respect to its output role in theoretical reasoning. Not at the local level, 
not at the level of individual attitudes or subset of attitudes, but globally. Hence, the 
primary cognitive attitude, as a whole, converges toward a coherent set; secondary 
attitudes don’t.  
 
IS BELIEF OUR PRIMARY COGNITIVE ATTITUDE? 
I previously showed that for secondary attitudes to exist and to function as they do 
in our psychology, there has to be a category of attitudes that are unqualified, 
unconstrained, and function as the background for those secondary attitudes. It is now 
time to argue that this primary cognitive attitude is belief. To do that, I claim that belief is 




share some of the key features of secondary attitudes. I will also discuss possible 
objections.  
For starters, it seems to many that belief does not admit the possibility of holding 
contradictory beliefs. Some have argued, however, that it is not impossible for us to 
harbor contradictory beliefs. Take the following example presented in Lewis (1982): a 
resident of Princeton has the following three inconsistent beliefs: he believes that Nassau 
St. runs North-South; he believes that the railroad tracks run East-West: and finally he 
believes that Nassau Street and the railroad tracks run parallel to one another. What’s 
going on here is, according to Lewis, that the agent can harbor contradictory beliefs: one 
is that the street and the tracks run North-South, and the other is that the street and the 
tracks run East-West. How is that possible? The idea is that the agent fails to bring those 
beliefs to bear, he simply does not see that they are in contraction because he does not 
activate them at the same time, in the same contexts. As a result they both get to be 
activated and used in reasoning, albeit in different situations.  More generally, what this 
example illustrates is that the idea of actual human beings having a perfectly coherent 
system of beliefs that guides our actions and reasoning across contexts is in fact a myth. 
As Lewis (1982) puts it, our beliefs are compartmentalized and drive different aspects of 
our practical and theoretical reasoning in different contexts (Stalnaker, 1984; Egan, 
2008).  
When this is happens, though, it is mostly the result of a cognitive failure of some 
kind which has to do with specific beliefs and not with the category of belief as a whole. 
That is, it may be possible to harbor contradictory beliefs if we fail to bring them to bear, 




is a malfunction of our cognitive system. In contrast, as we saw, there is nothing wrong 
with contradictory imaginations, suppositions, acceptances and the like. There is no 
failure in having contradictory assumptions, as long as we are able to keep them apart and 
relate them to their original context.  So belief and secondary attitudes differ on this. 
Second, belief seems to fit the description of an attitude that is not open to be 
voluntarily quarantined. No other attitude seems to fit the bill. This raises the following 
worry, though: imagine I believe my brother stole a lot of money from me, but my 
therapist is able to convince me that that belief is the result of a Freudian mechanism of 
some kind. I thus come to treat that belief as illegitimate premise and try to isolate from 
reasoning as much as I can. In this case, one may say, I’d use quarantining for belief as 
well, so what is the difference with imagination here?  
First, I am not sure separating this belief from reasoning counts as quarantining at 
all. Quarantining mechanisms prevent various attitudes to show up as possible premises 
of reasoning. If something is to count as a belief, but never shows up and presents itself 
as possible premise in any reasoning, then it can hardly be said to be a belief at all.  And 
even assuming that isolating one of my beliefs does count as quarantining, one notable 
feature of this case is that such quarantining is not dependent on a context. It is not that I 
quarantine a belief in some context and not in others. If a belief fails as a premise, it fails 
in all cases. So, if quarantining occurs and compartmentalization is possible for belief, it 
is still not the same thing that happens with imagination and the like as it does not require 
context-setting.  
In addition, even assuming that some beliefs require quarantining, quarantining is 




being open to quarantining is necessary for an attitude to be a secondary attitude. No such 
thing is true for belief. Indeed, we can imagine an agent who lacks the psychological 
mechanisms necessary for quarantining. That agent is in a position to have beliefs but no 
secondary attitudes. So belief can still be the category of attitudes that we treat as 
legitimate in reasoning, and that can function as bedrock in our reasoning system. 
And finally, a belief can be quarantined because it is defective, but it is not 
quarantined qua belief. In contrast, a secondary attitude’s quarantining is not the result of 
a defect in the attitude but the result of a judgment on our part that that attitude is not fit 
or relevant in a certain context. Based on the example above, take the following 
problematic piece of reasoning: “Since my brother stole my money, I will not invite him 
over for Christmas”. The reasoning here is not bad per se, it is the choice of the premise 
that is problematic because of the epistemic status of the belief in question: I have no 
evidence for it.  Thus, although defective, that piece of reasoning is not defective in the 
same way as reasoning from imagining that I am the Queen/King of England to claiming 
and believing that I live in Buckingham Palace. This last bit of reasoning is absurd 
because we think imagining to be the Queen/King of England should not influence 
beyond the context of my daydreaming.  
The result of all this is that we can legitimately expect that beliefs will converge 
toward forming a coherent set or at least a set of beliefs that would look very different 
from the set of secondary attitudes an agent may have. As I pointed out above, secondary 
attitudes tend to form locally coherent sets, but at the global level we can expect them to 




to be expected from belief in line with the fact that belief is not contextualizable. So the 
downstream consequences of belief and secondary cognitive attitudes are bound to differ. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I tackled Velleman’s claim that belief and secondary cognitive attitudes, 
e.g. acceptances and imagination, share the same output role. Contra Velleman (and 
others), I strongly doubt that secondary cognitive attitudes can produce action. And even 
if they do, most secondary cognitive attitudes’ influence is limited to some specific 
context and situation. Most importantly, there are some inferential patterns imagination 
and the like cannot enter into anyway: they can’t function as regress stoppers and as 
bedrock in reasoning. As a result, the role of these attitudes is necessarily qualified or 
restricted in some way. In addition, when involved in theoretical reasoning, each 
secondary attitude’s behavior, as a whole, must substantially differ from belief’s. 
Therefore, belief is functionally distinguishable from secondary cognitive attitudes also 







BEYOND RULE-FOLLOWING: REASONING WITH PURPOSE  
Chapter 3  
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to propose a new constitutive account of reasoning. 
First, I show that the widely endorsed rule-following view of reasoning is insufficient to 
make sense of what reasoning is. As an alternative to that view, I defend the claim that 
reasoning should be seen as an aim-directed activity. Finally, I argue that engaging in 
reasoning requires having the aim of arriving at a conclusion supported by at least 
sufficient reasons. This Reason View is well positioned to make sense of some key 
features of reasoning, and should be preferred over all its competitors.  
 
 
The topic of reasoning has attracted a lot of attention lately89. Besides being 
interesting in its own right, an answer to the question ‘what is reasoning?’ promises to 
shed some light on the type of influence we have over our mental lives while bearing on 
long-standing, philosophical issues such as agency and rationality. In this chapter, I will 
initially offer a pre-theoretical sketch of what I mean by ‘reasoning’. In doing so, I will 
show that we need a way to distinguish reasoning from mental processes that are not 
reasoning, namely inference and associative thinking. After that, I will explain my 
dissatisfaction with what is for many a very plausible account of reasoning, namely the 
rule-following view. This view, I claim, is insufficient to clearly set reasoning apart from 
non-reasoning processes. To amend for that, I point toward a different approach: 
reasoning should be seen as an activity constituted by an aim. Not any aim will work, 
though. Thus, I propose the Reason View of reasoning: reasoning is a process of attitude-
                                                      
89  See, for instance, Broome, 2013; Boghossian, 2014; McHugh and Way (2016, ms); Neta, 2013; Pettit, 




revision that is necessarily guided by the aim of arriving at a conclusion supported by at 
least sufficient reasons.  This approach is fully consistent with the rule-following model 
while avoiding its shortcoming.  
A final point before starting. There are two types of reasoning: theoretical and 
practical, and, possibly, the difference between practical and theoretical reasoning lies 
solely in the conclusion-state: paradigmatically, intention for practical reasoning and 
belief for theoretical reasoning (Broome, 2013; Harman, 1986:2). My account of 
reasoning aims at offering a unifying view of reasoning, one that works for both 
theoretical and practical reasoning. However, to keep things manageable, in this chapter I 
will mostly focus on theoretical reasoning.  
 
REASONING AND INFERRING 
Recently, there has been a lively discussion concerning the nature of reasoning. 
Before saying what that is, though, we need to carve out a pre-theoretical account of what 
mental phenomenon we take reasoning to be. Reasoning – many agree – is a kind of 
attitude revision (Harman, 1986) that usually starts with some (full) attitude-premise and 
ends with dropping, forming, or withholding another (full) attitude. In this respect, 
reasoning is an inference.90 Through inference one may come to have a new belief-like 
attitude; alternatively, one may abandon such an attitude; or it may simply be that one 
withholds an attitude. 91  Also, for simplicity let’s assume that inference is only 
conceptual, so for instance the transitions that go on in the perceptual systems are not 
                                                      
90 Sometimes by ‘inferring’ we simply mean transitioning from one proposition to another (Wright, 2014), 
but this is not what it is usually meant by inferring in the literature. 
91 The reason why I talk about belief-like attitudes is because I assume that inference and reasoning can 




inferences (Burge, 2010: 406). It is also widely held that inferring is a causal process, in 
which some attitude A causes one to form/drop/withhold attitude B. It is also a natural 
view that the causal process going on in reasoning is a basing process of forming or 
dropping attitudes for motivational reasons. Basing distinguishes inferring from purely 
associative thinking.  
Beyond inferring simpliciter adult humans seem to engage in possibly more 
sophisticated inferential processes that we often call reasoning. To explain what I mean, I 
will point to some key differences between inference and reasoning by drawing the 
reader’s attention to characteristics of reasoning that are not shared by all inferences.  
Personal-level process: It is often said that reasoning is “person-level”  
(Boghossian, 2014: 2). First, that means that reasoning is a process attributable to the 
whole person rather than to a sub-mechanism of the mind (e.g. perceptual modules). But 
often by ‘personal-level’ theorists also mean ‘conscious’. Thus, in defining reasoning, the 
psychologist Haidt (2001: 818) states that “[t]he reasoner searches for relevant evidence, 
weighs evidence, coordinates evidence with theories, and reaches a decision […]. Some 
of these steps may be performed unconsciously […], but a key part of the definition of 
reasoning is that it has steps, at least a few of which are performed consciously.”  
In general, reasoning, but not necessarily inference, is a mental process in which 
(at least some of the) premises and conclusions, the attitudes we operate from and arrive 
at, are conscious (Pettit, 1993: 223-224). (By ‘conscious’ I mean, roughly, that they are 
available for report). Although the inference carried out in reasoning is usually 
unconscious, we are aware of the starting and arrival points of that inference. Again, 




understood, refers to a very special form of inference […], where not only is a new 
mental representation (or conclusion) consciously produced, but the previously held 
representations (or premises) that warrant it are also consciously entertained.” In ‘simple’ 
inference, as I call non-reasoning inferential processes, we form an attitude or arrive at a 
conclusion through a causal process, but we are often unaware of the premises and, at 
times, also the conclusion remains unconscious. Here is an example. At the end of a long 
dinner party, we leave with the strong impression that the atmosphere at the party was 
somewhat tense; but we can’t really tell why: the process that got us to form that belief is 
based on subtle cues we detected only unconsciously. Many are happy to call this 
inference, but not reasoning (Johnson-Laird 2008: 60–72; Valaris, 2016). Note that these 
unconscious inferential processes can be based on reasons, i.e. considerations in light of 
which an agent arrives at a certain conclusion, just as much as reasoning. 92  So reasoning 
is a subclass of basing relations. More specifically, reasoning is conscious basing. 
Activity: Reasoning is an activity. By this is often meant that reasoning is 
something we do and take active part in. In addition, theorists seem to agree that 
reasoning is “attention hogging and effortful” (Boghossian, 2014: 2; Haidt, 2001: 818). 
Non-reasoning inferential processes, in contrast, are something that happens to us, or at 
least something we have little control over (Mercier and Sperber, 2011; Pettit, 1993). 
Take the case of unconscious basing I mentioned above. If I find myself thinking that the 
atmosphere at the party was tense, I haven’t done anything to reach that conclusion, nor 
did I take part in the inferential process. So that inference does not seem to count as an 
activity. 
                                                      




In the literature, there have been various attempts to explain in what sense our 
mental lives can be active93. In what follows I will offer an account of reasoning that 
captures the idea of reasoning being an activity. That said, it is important not to overstate 
the extent to which reasoning is an effortful, slow process.  At times, reasoning is very 
slow, and captures the full attention of an agent. That’s deliberative reasoning. Not all 
reasoning is deliberative, though. Deliberation seems to be a fairly high-level form of 
reasoning, usually sprung by the explicit questions: “What should I believe?”, “Is this 
right for me to do?” And so on. By contrast, in (non-deliberative) reasoning we don’t 
pose any question, but go from attitude to attitude (or lack thereof) without explicitly 
attending to the relation between the attitudes we started with and the conclusion we draw 
from them. In other words, in (non-deliberative) reasoning, we are aware of our premises, 
and we find ourselves working our way toward a conclusion with usually little effort and 
self-reflection.  
Endorsing attitudes: Another element of distinction between reasoning and simple 
inference is that the result of reasoning is something we endorse. This point has not been 
fully explored in the literature, and is bound to strike the reader as more controversial 
than the previous two points.  
Let’s look at some plausible marks of endorsement. Reasoning often results in 
forming a propositional attitude. Attitudes such as beliefs (and intentions) are often 
defined as dispositions to use propositions as premises in reasoning and inference (when 
relevant). So endorsing an attitude means first and foremost that we have no prima facie 
objection to its use as premise in future reasoning and inference. In addition, when it 
                                                      




comes to beliefs, it seems reasonable to say that the beliefs we endorse are the beliefs 
whose content we are disposed to sincerely assert in speech.  
In addition, I believe that endorsing a conclusion X means that we control X and 
take responsibility for it. To explain this let’s again look at belief. There are beliefs that 
are irresponsive to reasons to the point that the agent feels she has no control over them, 
and is reluctant to take responsibility for them. Examples of these are paranoid, alienated 
(Hunter, 2011), dissonant (Borgoni, 2015) or phobic beliefs (Egan and Elga, 2005). We 
can use Huddleston’s (2013) convenient label and call them “naughty beliefs”, i.e. 
evidence-immune beliefs we have, but often openly reject. (I assume that the category of 
“naughty attitudes”, i.e. attitudes that are irresponsive to reasons, can be extended to 
other attitudes beyond belief94). In contrast, there are attitudes we actually have control 
over, and happily take responsibility for. And note that the idea of endorsed beliefs is 
hardly new. de Sousa’s “assent” (1971), Dennett’s “opinion” (1978), Sperber’s 
“reflective belief” (2000, 1996), and Frankish’s “superbelief” (2004) seem all to suggest 
that we support some of our doxastic states with particular force or conviction, and that 
these are the result of some kind of high level reasoning. These are the beliefs we see as 
reflecting our rational agency (Moran, 2001; Boyle, 2011). These are the beliefs we 
endorse.  
True, reasoning does not always conclude with the formation of an attitude: in 
reasoning, we may end up dropping or withholding an attitude as well. But this poses no 
worry for my view. We can endorse our dropping/withholding of an attitude just as much 
                                                      




as we can endorse an attitude. In these cases – as in the case of attitudes we endorse – we 
feel we have control over what happens in our minds. 95 
Now, I believe that reasoning is the paradigmatic way in which we produce 
attitudes (or lack thereof) we endorse, not inference. Our inferential processes can give 
rise to conclusions we don’t endorse; indeed, these processes can go wrong in important 
ways, and we can be perfectly aware of that. And so we can find ourselves believing 
something we don’t subscribe to. Imagine that your therapist convinces you that your 
conscious belief that you should hire the male job candidate over the female one is 
inferentially based on your unconscious belief that women are intrinsically less qualified 
than men. And yet you have difficulties taking control over it: you just can’t stop 
believing that you should hire the male job candidate over the female one. This is a belief 
you now don’t endorse because you know it to be poorly based. Still, the inferential 
process that grounds it is not disrupted by that. In contrast, the idea I am pushing for here 
is that there is no such thing as reasoning toward a conclusion we don’t endorse: if we 
inferentially arrive at a conclusion, and don’t endorse it because we believe it is falling in 
some ways, then that inferential process does not count as reasoning.96  It is, of course, 
possible to reason poorly. But imagine a reasoner who reaches a conclusion through 
reasoning and becomes aware that that reasoning pattern was badly handled. Such a 
recognition on her part counts already as a way of reasoning out of that conclusion. If she 
can’t do that, then there are reasons to suspect that she was not reasoning in the first place 
(as argued by Haidt, 2001 for moral judgments). 
                                                      
95  Although commonly used in philosophy, the notion of ‘control’ is admittedly very obscure and 
controversial; for now I trust the reader has in intuitive grasp of it.   
96 As a result, I don’t think there is such thing as akratic reasoning. There are akratic attitudes (or lack 




Before ending this section, let me mention an obvious worry the reader may have 
at this point. What about hypothetical/ exploratory reasoning or reasoning with reduction 
ad absurdum? That seems to be clear case of reasoning in which we do not endorse our 
conclusion. As a reply, let me point out, first, that these are only limited cases of 
reasoning. When we think of paradigmatic cases of reasoning, we do not think of 
hypothetical reasoning. So it should not come as a surprise that our conception of 
reasoning does not perfectly fit those cases, as they are at the fringes.  In addition, note 
that the end point of hypothetical reasoning is not a belief, but a hypothesis. Similarly, 
reasoning per absurdum means starting with propositions one accepts to be true for the 
sake of the argument and ending with another proposition that is again taken to be true 
for the sake of the argument. The end point of our reasoning, i.e. this attitude of accepting 
or taking to be true, is something we endorse, albeit only within the limited context of our 
argument or hypothetical reasoning (see chapter 2 for an argument on this). Note that 
acceptance is not necessarily responsive only to epistemic reasons as belief. Indeed, we 
accept propositions for the sake of an argument or to show the absurdity/ falsity of some 
premises. So it is not the case that we don’t endorse the conclusion of our, e.g. reduction 
ad absurdum, reasoning. We do, but for pragmatic reasons.97  
Justification-transmission process: Inference and reasoning plausibly differ in 
their epistemic roles: whereas inference can transmit only epistemic “entitlement”, 
                                                      
97 “After a long philosophical discussion, she reasoned herself into a corner, but could not accept the 
conclusion that time does not exist”. Isn’t this a counterexample to the idea that in reasoning we always 
reach a conclusion we endorse? Hardly. Note that the sentence above is very ambiguous. It is not even clear 
that the reasoner there formed some kind of attitude as the last step of her reasoning process. She does not 
believe, or accept, or withhold judgment concerning the conclusion that time does not exist.  However, as 
stated at the beginning, in the literature of reasoning, it is usually said that reasoning can’t just ends with 
some proposition but produces some kind of stance vis-à-vis that entertained proposition. Otherwise it does 




reasoning is a process that can transmit epistemic justification (Burge, 2003). Plausibly, 
this is due to the fact that reasoning requires some reflective awareness concerning the 
justificatory status of the premises vis-à-vis the conclusion. This idea squares nicely with 
the inferential internalist claim that justification is transferred from premises to 
conclusion only if the subject is in a position to know or justifiably believe, by reflection 
alone, that her premises provide her with a reason for the conclusion (e.g. BonJour, 
1985). One way to explain this is to say that to be justified in arriving at a conclusion as a 
result of reasoning one needs to exclude blame. Being justified – in this sense of 
justification – is in part a matter of being blameless. Hence, to transmit justification 
reasoning – being a reflective activity – requires that the agent justifiably take her 
premises to justify her conclusion. Note that the ‘taking’ here can take various forms. 
Some forms of internalism require that in reasoning one actually justifiably believes that 
the premises are supported by the conclusion. Other forms of internalism only require 
that one is in a position to come to form that belief. Regardless of these differences, 
however, the important point here is that reasoning seems to be able to transmit a 
(sophisticated form of) warrant in part in virtue of its being an inferential process that 
requires some reflective self-awareness. An analysis of reasoning should be able to 
account for this notion of ‘taking’ which, on this view, is key to transmit justification.98  
                                                      
98 A final word about the reasoning vs. inference distinction I am trying to draw here. A way to capture it is 
in terms of the system 1 vs. system 2 distinction (Haidt, 2001; Boghossian, 2014: 2). However, I believe 
that doing so would be of little help. Some psychologists have recently put forward the idea that we 
“reason” by using a suit of mechanisms that produce responses in a fast, automatic and fairly effortless 
way. These mechanisms – called System 1 – are often said to use associative or intuitive processes to 
deliver their output (Kahneman, 2011). In contrast, System 2 processes are much slower, more cognitive 
demanding thought-processes, in which we consciously weigh the options we have. System 2 is akin to 
what I called reasoning (although, as mentioned above, I don’t think that reasoning is all-conscious, nor do 
I think that it always all that slow and cognitive demanding – but I won’t press this point). But unconscious 





THE RULE-FOLLOWING MODEL OF REASONING 
Reasoning is often described as a rule-following process. On this view, thought-
transitions count as reasoning only if guided by rules. The two main recent proponents of 
the rule-following view are Paul Boghossian and John Broome, so I will consider their 
views in turn. Although the rule-following strategy has enjoyed a lot of support, and 
many find it extremely compelling99, I will criticize it as insufficient to make sense of 
reasoning. Importantly, I don’t aim at arguing that the rule-following approach is 
mistaken, or that no successful rule-following account of reasoning can be developed. I 
will show, however, that since the two existing strongest rule-following proposals fall 
short in important ways, we should look for a new theory of reasoning.   
Boghossian. Paul Boghossian has forcefully defended the claim that reasoning is a 
matter of following a rule. So in reasoning attitude A produces attitude B because we are 
guided by rules that somehow mandate that transition (what types of rules we will say in 
a moment). His account of reasoning emerges out of what he takes to be an important 
feature of reasoning, namely the taking condition: 
(Taking Condition): reasoning necessarily involves taking the accepted truth of 
your premises to support your conclusion, and drawing such a conclusion because of that 
fact.100 
                                                                                                                                                              
associative thought-processes. So inference does not fit in System 1. At the same time, unconscious 
inference hardly fits the standard description of System 2, which is mostly conscious and produced with 
some effort. So for these reasons I find this System 1-2 analogy somewhat unhelpful for my purposes, and I 
ask the reader to put it on one side.   
99 See, for instance, Boghossian (2014), Broome (2013), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013), Wedgwood (2006), 
Wright (2014).  
100 The idea of the taking condition is taken from Frege’s (1979: 3) following statement: “To make a 





In Boghossian’s words that means that “[a] transition from some beliefs to a 
conclusion counts as [reasoning] only if the thinker takes his conclusion to be supported 
by the presumed truth of those other beliefs.” (2014: 4) Boghossian believes that this 
attitude of ‘taking’ needs to play a causal role so that the agent draws her conclusion 
because of that taking attitude. Hence, the taking condition seems to shed some light on 
the distinction between the causal process that goes on in reasoning vs. deviant causal 
chains. It is also helpful to draw a distinction between reasoning and associative thinking. 
As Boghossian (2014: 4) points out, “A habitual depressive’s judging ‘I am having so 
much fun’ may routinely cause and explain his judging ‘Yet there is so much suffering in 
the world’ […].” However, the direct causal route between the two attitudes (belief “I am 
having so much fun”, and belief “there is so much suffering in the world”) does not make 
this a case of reasoning. What’s missing, asks Boghossian? Well, he believes that the 
taking condition can at least be one of the missing elements in that picture. Finally, it is 
worth noticing that the taking condition captures in one scoop some of the key features of 
reasoning mentioned above. In particular, by imposing a degree of self-refection and 
awareness on reasoning, the taking condition seems well positioned to explain why 
reasoning is something we – as agents – do, and not simply in inferential process that 
happens sub-personally (Boghossian, 2014). And it can also be helpful to explain how 
reasoning can transmit justification.  
Following Boghossian, many theorists agree that the taking condition is tracking 




Tucker, 2012; Valaris, 2016)101. I personally believe that the focus of our analysis of 
reasoning should not be on the taking condition, but on the aim we have when reasoning. 
That said, for now I will grant that the taking condition really is at the essence of 
reasoning, and come back to this issue again when I offer my positive view.  
Before raising my worry about Boghossian’s rule following strategy, I would like 
to make the following proposal which – I believe – is completely in the spirit of his 
account.  The taking condition, as it is stated above, is too weak to capture something 
substantial about reasoning. Here is what I mean. The taking condition, whether one 
believes it is an actual feature of reasoning or not, has been mostly understood in terms of 
“taking the premises to be reasons”, and in this context by “reason” theorists usually 
mean normative reasons, namely considerations that count in favor of some response.102 
Notoriously, though, there are different kinds of normative reasons: sufficient, 
conclusive, pro-tanto and even prima facie. Prima facie reasons are considerations that 
appear to be reasons, but may actually not be reasons at all; so I doubt the taking 
condition concerns them. Similarly, taking one’s premises to offer some (pro-tanto) 
reason for a certain conclusion is not enough to capture the spirit of the taking condition. 
To see this imagine someone inferring p from r while saying that r is only a reason to 
conclude p, but perhaps there are better reasons for not concluding that p. Could the 
taking condition accept that? I doubt it, and it is excluded by the fact that Boghossian 
(2014: 15) himself explains the taking condition as taking the premises to justify one’s 
conclusion. Thus, it seems that the taking condition, as defined above at least, is much 
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(2014) has raised worries about the taking condition.  





too weak to explain what is going on in reasoning. If it is true that we take the premises to 
be reasons for our conclusion, we need to take those premises to form at least sufficient 
reasons to reach that conclusion. And, even more strongly, in deductive reasoning, we 
take our premises to give us conclusive reasons to reach our conclusion (Boghossian, 
2014: 5). So I think that we should redefine the taking condition as follows: 
(Taking Condition) reasoning necessarily involves taking your premises to (at 
least) sufficiently support your conclusion, and drawing such a conclusion because of that 
fact.  
Does Boghossian (2014) manage to make sense of the Taking Condition? 
Boghossian (2014) himself takes the “taking” in the taking condition to be problematic. It 
seems intuitive to say that the taking condition requires a doxastic reading. Accordingly, 
when reasoning we have a second-order belief that our conclusion is supported by the 
premises. As Boghossian puts it, “[t]he first thought that is likely to occur to one is that 
the Taking Condition requires that a thinker have a meta-belief about the relation 
between his premise judgments and his conclusion, a belief to the effect that his premise 
judgments supply him with a justification for believing his conclusion.” (2014: 6) 
However, such an explanation leads us into troubles. It is a natural thing to say that this 
meta-belief should play the role of a premise in bringing about the conclusion of one’s 
reasoning. This, many agree, raises the worry that now we would need a further premise 
that says that all these premises taken together support the conclusion. This clearly 
pushes us into a regress.  
To avoid this, Boghossian (2014) has favored an alternative approach, namely 




following proposal struggles with the problem of explaining what rule-following is. More 
specifically, if applying a rule requires some reasoning, then in order to follow a rule in 
reasoning, one has to go through a bit of reasoning; but to do so, we need to follow a rule 
and thus a regress ensues (Boghossian 2012). 103 To avoid the regress, Boghossian settles 
for the following position: we should take the notion of “following a rule” to be a 
primitive notion.  
Importantly for our purposes, Boghossian thinks that this proposal can explain the 
taking condition: if someone follows the rule to do F in circumstance X, then she takes X 
to be a reason to do F in the sense that the obtaining of X is treated as a reason to do F. 
Applied to epistemic reasoning, this means that if someone follows a rule in reasoning 
such as, roughly, “if (believed) p then (believed) q”, she takes the truth of p to be a reason 
to believe that q. Moreover, such a person believes that q because of this. Hence, 
understanding reasoning as involving following a rule seems to be able to accommodate 
the taking condition, at least according to Boghossian. 
Boghossian’s view is appealing as it promises to explain many of the features of 
reasoning we have been hoping to make sense of. Unfortunately, I believe Boghossian’s 
rule-following view fails where it hopes to succeed the most. That is, his view proves too 
weak to account for the taking condition, which – as the reader may recall – was his main 
motivation for offering the rule-following approach in the first place.  
According to Boghossian (2008), in reasoning we follow rules, such as:  
[MP]: If you are rationally permitted to believe both that p and that ‘If p, then q’, 
then, you are prima facie rationally permitted to believe that q. 
                                                      
103 Another solution is that following a rule is a dispositional state that does not itself require any reasoning. 
Alternatively: following a rule is a feature of a system of the mind we have no access to. Boghossian 




[I] For appropriate Fs and Gs, if you have observed n (for some sufficiently large 
n) Fs and they have all been Gs, then you are prima facie rationally permitted to believe 
that all Fs are Gs.  
Boghossian’s claim that rule-following is a primitive notion is bound to strike 
many as unsatisfactory. Still, here we don’t need to concern ourselves with the question 
of how agents follow a rule like [MP] or [I], and how, for instance, they bring about the 
transition from believing p and believing p -> q to believing q. Instead, assuming [MP] 
and [I] are indeed rules we follow in reasoning (however we do it), we need to ask 
whether following [MP]/[I] can guarantee that we satisfy the taking condition.  
First, as John Broome has pointed out in his criticism of Boghossian’s proposal, I 
can follow a rule without thinking that it is a good rule, or a rule worth following. So I 
may be growing increasingly skeptical of [MP], and still decide to apply such a rule to 
some propositions p and q. Understandably, I would not take my premises as reasons for 
my conclusion, in any plausible reading of “take”. Second, as mentioned above, the 
taking condition does not simply boil down to the fact that we take our conclusion to be 
supported by or follow from the premises, or that our premises function as reasons for our 
conclusion. If the taking condition tracks something substantial about reasoning, it needs 
to be much stronger than that. We need to take our premises as sufficient support for our 
conclusion. This is because that ‘taking’ needs to somehow figure in the explanation of 
why we form the conclusion we form; and we don’t reason toward a conclusion if we 
merely think that all we have is a pro-tanto reason for it. This casts doubts that following 
[I] in reasoning can explain the taking condition. Suppose that, while following [I], you 




all Fs are Gs. Now, that consideration undermines the support that your observations can 
give to the conclusion, and you know it. So you can follow rule [I] without thinking that 
your premises are sufficient reasons for our conclusion. Hence, following a rule such as 
[I] does not capture the taking condition.  
To address this, one could insert a “ceteris paribus” clause in [I] to make sure that 
following a rule like [I] gets us the taking condition. Ceteris paribus clauses are 
problematic as they threaten to conflate the distinction between correct and incorrect 
performance (Earman and Roberts, 1999), and should be avoided, if possible. More 
importantly, this proposal threatens to make [I] unhelpful for Boghossian’s purposes 
because what follows under the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause is any condition that allows the 
agent, who follows [I], to take her premises as sufficient reasons for her conclusion. But 
this turns out to be the taking condition. i.e. the condition the rule-following story was 
meant to explain! With the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause, claiming that in reasoning we follow 
[I] becomes explanatory idle. This problem generalizes. If Boghossian is to say that 
reasoning means following (what we take to be) a good rule – whatever that is – he needs 
to tell us what a good rule is. He seems to be forced to say that that is a rule that makes 
the premises of our reasoning be sufficient reasons for its conclusion. But that is 
viciously circular: the rule-following proposal was fashioned to explain the taking 
condition not vice-versa. So his proposal is insufficient for that.  
Broome. Perhaps there is hope for the rule-following strategy: John Broome has 
recently put forward a proposal which is somewhat different than Boghossian’s. As 
Broome (2013: 232) puts it,  “[i]t is an essential feature of reasoning that the operation is 




a rule is, first, a disposition to conform to it. Second, he rightly points out that,  “[i]n 
order to follow a rule, you do not need to know explicitly what the rule is. You follow the 
rule, but you may do so in the way in which you often follow rules of grammar. You may 
compose grammatical sentences without knowing explicitly what grammatical rules you 
follow in doing so.” (Broome, 2013: 232)  
However, as in the grammar case, when you reason from premises to a conclusion 
you see your conclusion as right. 104 Broome explains ‘seeming right’ as a counterfactual 
disposition. Processes that are guided by a rule are open to revision and checking. He 
says, “[h]aving the attitude of seeming right involves a disposition to stop having this 
attitude in particular circumstances, specifically if you were to check the act and it were 
no longer to seem right.” (Broome, 2012: 22) On this view, seeming right is the mark of 
rule-following.  
On Broome’s account, the fact that reasoning is rule-following process has two 
important implications. First, Broome maintains that a rule following process is 
necessarily an active process. So by virtue of being a rule-following process, reasoning is 
thereby an activity. So the rule-following account can explain one key element of 
reasoning, namely its being an activity. Second, the fact that reasoning is rule-following 
avoids the problem of deviant causal chains which, Broome seems to believe, is a 
problem an account of reasoning needs to address. Causal relations are subject to deviant 
causal chain, as I mentioned above. Only those causal relations among attitudes that are 
guided by a rule, Broome says, can count as reasoning.  
                                                      




Broome’s solution may look more attractive than Boghossian’s because it 
promises to explain key features of reasoning without getting entangled with the 
difficulties of the taking condition. Yet, I believe that Broome is throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater. 105  Boghossian’s taking condition was, I believe, addressing 
something important about reasoning that Broome’s account leaves unexplained, namely 
the fact that the result of reasoning are attitudes (or lack thereof) we endorse. For Broome 
(2013: 237) “[s]eeming right does not entail an implicit belief whose content is normative 
[…]. The ‘right’ in ‘seeming right’ is only relative to the rule; it is not normative. You 
can follow a rule without believing it is permissible to do so.” Assume I follow a rule R 
in my reasoning and when I reach conclusion C, I take C to be correct or right vis-à-vis 
R. Say, however, I take R to be a wrong or stupid rule to follow, and thus I am also 
inclined to believe that C is not a good attitude to have. On Broome’s account then I can 
reason toward an attitude I don’t endorse. And this is problematic, I believe.  
Above I pointed out that what makes reasoning different from other inferential 
processes is that in reasoning we end up with a conclusion we endorse. (Again, 
‘endorsing’ means, roughly, that we are willing to use it in further reasoning and take 
responsibility for it.) I believe endorsement is a key feature of reasoning, but let’s put it in 
question for the sake of the argument. If not through reasoning, how do we reach 
attitudes we endorse? One possibility is to say that having an attitude automatically 
means endorsing it. But besides being quite a commitment to take, it contradicts 
Broome’s point that we can reach conclusions based on reasoning whose rules we don’t 
endorse at all.  So we can have an attitude that is the result of us following a rule we 
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don’t subscribe to. So Broome is committed to saying that having an attitude is not the 
same as endorsing it. So how do we explain endorsement? A seemingly plausible solution 
would be to maintain that endorsing an attitude is having a second-order belief (or 
seeming) that such an attitude is good, or right or justified. But a regress is looming at 
large. If to endorse an attitude, I need some second-order attitude, then how do I endorse 
that further attitude? How can that second-order attitude function as an endorsement if it 
is not itself endorsed? So it seems natural to say that to endorse an attitude we don’t need 
any second-order attitude. What else? Perhaps endorsing an attitude means having no 
disposition to change it. The problem with this is that, on Broome’s account, that is true 
for all cases of rule-following. As I pointed out above, all rule-following requires that 
you see your conclusion as right with respect to the rule, which for him means that you 
are not disposed to change that conclusion, otherwise - on his view - that does not count 
as rule-following to begin with.  
As a result, I believe it is natural to suppose that we endorse an attitude when we 
reached it through reasoning. I am not saying this is the only way, but it seems to me to 
be the paradigmatic way in which we do that. As we saw, Broome’s account of reasoning 
is compatible with the idea that we can take the rule we follow as incorrect. But if 
reasoning is what brings us to have attitudes we endorse, Broome is forced to say that, 
when we reach an attitude through reasoning, something else is needed, something 
beyond rule-following that makes the reached conclusion into an attitude I endorse.  And 
this seems to be the normative belief he is refusing to include in reasoning.106 Hence, I 
                                                      
106  In his book on reasoning, Broome introduces a further necessary condition for reasoning which, 
however, applies only to theoretical reasoning. He believes that to reason from belief A to belief B one 
needs to have an implicit linking belief. Apparently, this point seems to go in the same direction of 




believe that, as stated, Broome’s solution either becomes the same as Boghossian’s or 
avoids the problems faced by Boghossian, but at the expense of failing to make sense of 
what I take to be an important feature of reasoning. 107  
Against rule-following. Finally, let me mention some worries that threaten the 
rule-following strategy as a whole. First, I worry about the scope of the rule-following 
strategy. Boghossian and Broome both seem to believe that the fact that reasoning is rule-
following at least partially solves the problem of deviant causal chains and basing. In 
addition, they seem to believe that it can also explain why reasoning is a first-person 
activity. But they can’t have it both ways! The problem emerges because the deviant 
causal chain issue is faced also by inferential causal chains in general, and as such seems 
to require a similar explanation across the board. If the rule-following strategy is meant to 
tackle that issue, then it means that inference – not just reasoning – is a rule-following 
process. If so, then appealing to rule-following can’t explain why reasoning is a first-
person activity, and so we need an account for that too. Thus, rule-following is at best 
incomplete as an account of reasoning: it may capture why reasoning is an inference, but 
                                                                                                                                                              
given some premises, a conclusion will follow because of the rule she is following, independently of 
whether the agent takes that rule to be correct or not. So this does not help him with the problem mentioned 
above. 
107 A supported of Broome’s rule-following strategy could try to push back and say that all we need is to 
introduce a further clause: reasoning is following a rule one believes to be good, a rule that that other things 
been equal delivers a conclusion supported by the premises. This solution, however, is at risk of pushing us 
back into the regress problem. This belief is meant to explain why in reasoning we reach conclusions we 
endorse; as a result, it seems that this belief needs to play a direct role in producing that conclusion. But 
this raises the regress-worry mentioned above. Alternatively, one could try to argue that such a supporting 
belief needs to somehow ‘accompany’ the reasoning process without being a causal force into it. This 
proposal needs to be spelled out more, though. In what follows, I will offer an account of reasoning that 
goes into a similar direction, in the sense that reasoning is an inferential processes guided by a specific aim. 
So those who don’t want to give up the rule-following approach could keep it within the framework of the 




not why it is an activity. Alternatively, if rule-following serves to explain the active part 
of reasoning, then it can’t be the solution for deviant-causal chain issues.  
Second, the rule-following strategy is committed to anti-particularism. Moral 
particularism is the claim that moral reasoning does not consist in the application of 
moral principles to specific cases. The rule-following view of reasoning necessarily 
opposes this view. There is also a version of particularism for the theoretical realm which 
can be easily dismissed. Although it seems that we have a set of deductive rules at our 
disposal, this is notoriously a problem for induction. It has proven very hard to come up 
with a universal logic of induction (Norton, 2010), and it is unclear that, when reasoning 
inductively, we really apply any general rule. So I worry that the rule-following picture 
would work only for deductive reasoning. In contrast, the view I propose below is fully 
compatible with particularism of all stripes.   
Finally, even if the rule-following story can address all these worries, it does not 
capture the point of reasoning. To use Dummett’s famous example, the point of playing 
chess is to defeat your opponent. We could define chess by listing its rules and saying 
that playing chess is tantamount to following those rules. That may be right, but misses 
the whole point. Similarly, if reasoning is indeed rule-following, we need an account of 
reasoning that make sense of that while explaining what the point of reasoning is. 
Clearly, the point of reasoning is not to follow rules per se, as that would be pointless. If 
it is true that we follow rules in reasoning, we do it with some other goal in mind, as I 






REASONING WITH AN AIM: CORRECTNESS 
Reasoning is an inferential process with an aim. The aim of reasoning is an aim of 
the agent, a goal the agent necessarily has when reasoning. An aim is a desire to obtain a 
certain result (Sosa, 2010). The aim one has is mostly shown in the dispositions one has. 
In this sense, having an aim or goal means being motivated by certain considerations and 
not others, and being disposed to prevent certain occurrences to happen and change 
things around if the aim is not satisfied. Having an aim X does not mean necessarily 
intending to do X; it is enough to have a certain disposition to do something if it turns out 
I am failing to achieve X (Alvarez 2010). Also, the aim of reasoning does not have to be 
necessarily consciously entertained by the reasoner; however, a normally competent 
reasoner will not explicitly (and sincerely) deny that this is her aim when reasoning.  
Also, note an aim-directed activity may involve a lot of processes I have no direct 
control over. Take the activity of growing roses in my garden. There is surely something 
I do first, i.e. planting them and watering them. But other than that, there is not much I 
am directly involved into, as the plants grow by themselves. However, my aim of 
growing them makes it the case that if something goes wrong (e.g. too little rain) there 
will be action on my part (e.g. more watering). Notably, we say that I am growing roses 
in my garden even though I am only attending to their growth. Similarly, when reasoning 
we are guided by a specific aim. And yet reasoning is also an automatic process, as I 
can’t directly control the causal (inferential) relations among attitudes. However, what 
makes reasoning reasoning is the fact that we are supervising those causal relations: if 
those processes fail to deliver a specific goal, there are things we are disposed to do; we 




inferential connections, and so on. If things go well, instead, we let it take its course and 
don’t intervene.  
But what is the aim of reasoning? A very natural proposal is that reasoning aims 
at – is guided by the aim of – forming correct attitudes and dropping incorrect ones. 
‘Correctness’ here is a normative property of attitudes such that, roughly, they fit the 
world right given the type of attitudes they are. This normative property can be rendered 
in terms of what one ought to believe, fear, desire or what is good or fitting to believe, 
fear or desire.108   
The idea that reasoning has the aim of correctness is not new. Shah (2003) makes 
the point that reasoning or deliberation aims at forming an attitude that is correct with 
respect to the constitutive correctness norm of that attitude. The paradigmatic example of 
a correctness norm is belief: belief is correct if and only if true. Perhaps this analysis can 
be extended to other attitudes. Intentions are correct if and only if good, or permissible. 
Fear is correct if and only if its object is dangerous. And so on. Along similar lines, 
Moran (2001) argues that – when taking a deliberative stance toward our attitudes – we 
are really asking a question and inquiring about the world. Similarly to Shah, Moran’s 
view seems to be that our goal in reasoning is guided by the correctness norm that is 
constitutive of the attitude we are forming. More recently, McHugh and Way (2016a) 
have offered a new version of the correctness view by developing an account of good 
reasoning. They see correctness as the same as fittingness. As they put it, “[t]he core idea 
is that attitudes are associated with standards for their objects. An attitude is fitting when 
its object meets its standard.” (2016: 13) Again, the paradigmatic example is that a belief 
                                                      
108 A synonymous of correctness is ‘fittingness’. The concept of fittingness is often employed to offer a 
fitting-attitudes account of value: O is good when it is fitting to value O. A popular recent suggestion is that 




is fitting if and only if true; an intention is fitting iff permissible. On their view, reasoning 
aims at issuing fitting attitudes.  
The Correctness view is highly intuitive: it does seem that when we reason we 
want to get at the world, and we want to get things right. Yet, I have some worries about 
the correctness strategy in general. One worry is that the correctness proposal does not 
clarify why reasoning would always aim at forming attitudes that are correct. It is in fact 
possible to imagine someone arguing that there is more to attitudes than correctness. 
Indeed, one may think that attitudes can be valuable beyond correctness, namely they 
may harbor moral and practical values. This of course does not show that the aim of 
reasoning is not correctness, but it leaves open why we would always care about 
correctness when there may be other more important values to pursue. On the correctness 
view then, it seems that in reasoning we may end up with conclusions that are correct but 
that we still don’t see as rational, as we may think that are reasons for having or not 
having an attitude independent of correctness. This squares poorly with the idea that in 
reasoning we form conclusions we endorse and which we see as reflection of our 
rationality.  
A somewhat related point is that, at least for some philosophers, it is possible that 
when forming attitudes such as belief we may be partially influenced by pragmatic goals 
(see chapter 5 for why). Unfortunately, the goal of correctness either excludes that 
possibility (in reasoning we aim only at correctness!) or, if it allows for other goals to 
enter the reasoning process, then it can’t explain why the goal of correctness is seen as 




particularly appealing, and I am not sure the correctness view has a clear way out of this 
dilemma.  
Furthermore, I worry that the correctness-aim may not be necessary for reasoning 
since we use reasoning also to form attitudes that have no (clear) correctness conditions. I 
am thinking of suppositions, acceptances in context and even bits of imagination. There 
is no clear sense in which an acceptance is correct or incorrect (given the sense of 
correctness we are dealing with here). There is no sense in which imaginations are correct 
or incorrect. So we would need an explanation for what happens in those cases. I am not 
saying it cannot be done, but it requires some further investigation. More worryingly, this 
extends to suspension of judgment as well, as there are no correctness conditions for that 
one either (Wedgwood, 2002: 272). And suspension of judgment seems to be a genuine 
attitude just as much as belief and disbelief (Friedman, 2013). 
Relatedly, some subscribe to the idea that the standard of correctness for belief is 
shared by other attitudes, such as guesses and conjectures (McHugh, 2011: 385). This 
raises the following dilemma. On the one hand, one may reasonably say that that in 
reasoning we do not aim at forming true conjectures. If we did, we would do our best to 
ensure their correctness. But we don’t: we make conjecture for all sorts of reasons with 
little evidence to back up their truth. So the aim of reasoning does not seem to work for 
those attitudes either. On the other hand, if we insist that in reasoning we do aim at 
forming true conjectures, then we need to explain how the aim of truth differs in belief 
vs. conjecture. That makes the correctness view explanatory insufficient. Again a 




A related worry is that this fundamental goal leaves issues of rationality totally 
unexplained, and is therefore insufficient to explain what is going in reasoning. When 
applied to the correctness of belief, truth would be the goal that should guide us in 
reasoning and deliberation. Unfortunately, it fails to “determine how one is to balance the 
value of having a correct belief about p against the disvalue of having an incorrect belief 
about p; so it cannot determine when it is rational to believe p and when it is rational to 
suspend judgment about p” (Wedgwood, 2002: 274). Hence, if truth were our 
fundamental goal when reasoning theoretically, that would provide little guidance and we 
would be at loss about what to do most of the time (Engel, 2013). 109 
So, although quite intuitive, the correctness view leaves us with a few issues to 
solve. I will come back to the correctness view in the next chapter. But now it is time to 
present a different view of the goal we have in reasoning.  
 
THE REASON VIEW OF REASONING 
As an alternative to the correctness view, here is the view I will now defend: 
reasoning is an inferential process in which we have the aim of arriving at a 
conclusion supported by (at least) sufficient reasons.110 111 
                                                      
109 A way to block this is to defend the view that a correct belief has to be knowledge. 
110 In a similar light, Boghossian (2014:5) points out that “no causal process counts as [reasoning], unless it 
consists in an attempt to arrive at a belief by figuring out what, in some suitably broad sense, is supported 
by other things one believes. In the relevant sense, reasoning is […] something that we do with an aim—
that of figuring out what follows or is supported by other things one believes.” An approach sympathetic to 
the Reason View can also be found in Dancy (2004). McHugh and Way (2016) also discuss the Reason 
view. But to my knowledge this version of the Reason View has not been proposed by anyone before. 
111 Talking about sufficient reasons may be problematic when referred to suspension of judgment and 
dropping of attitudes. I think these worries can be addressed by referring to the idea that when reasoning we 
want our conclusion to correctly respond to the reasons we have. If intended broadly enough, that means 




The aim of reaching a conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons is 
constitutive of reasoning in the sense that it is what makes reasoning what it is: reasoning 
is having an inferential thought processes guided by this aim. 112  The conclusion of 
reasoning consists in dropping, withholding, reaffirming or forming an attitude. Doing 
one of those things in a way that is supported by sufficient reasons and correctly responds 
to (the balance of) all the reasons one has, is the constitutive aim of reasoning. Insofar as 
the reader accepts the idea that correctly responding to reasons is tantamount to being 
rational, my claim here is that reasoning aims at rationality, or at least at this sense of 
rationality.113  
The view I am offering here fits nicely with the claim that the notion of ‘reason’ is 
fundamental (see Parfit 2011; Scanlon 1998), and not dependent on our goals.114 That 
said, however, I will not take an explicit stand on this issue, and assume that the notion of 
reason at play here is compatible with different approaches.   
Normative reasons are things that count in favor of (or against) 115  a certain 
response. By “response”, I mean the holding, withholding or dropping of an attitude 
(rather than propositions). It is also a natural position to have that reasons support 
responses by contributing a kind of epistemic weight to them. And ‘sufficient normative 
                                                                                                                                                              
sufficient reasons to hold a belief that p, while lacking sufficient reasons to disbelief that p, I respond 
correctly to my (lacking of) sufficient reason only if I suspend judgment on p. 
112 McHugh and Way (ms) and Whiting (2014) also offer views of reasoning as an aim-directed activity. 
The Reason View as presented here is deeply influenced by their views.  
113 We are rational, Joseph Raz has suggested, insofar as we exercise the capacities that enable us, in 
general, to respond correctly to reasons. So when reasoning, I claim, we aim at fulfilling that capacity, at 
being rational in this sense. However, even if the reader is not sympathetic to the idea that rationality is 
responding correctly to reasons, it is important to clarify that my argument here does not depend on it in 
any way.   
114 This does not exclude that reasons may be naturalistically grounded, though. I will remain agnostic on 
this and other issues of the ontology of normative reasons here.  




reasons’ are reasons that, on balance, sufficiently weigh in favor of a response. Roughly, 
an agent S has sufficient pragmatic reason to φ only when S has a reason to φ, and no 
stronger reason not to φ. In contrast116, having sufficient evidence to form a belief that p 
involves arguably more than having stronger evidence for p than for not-p; it requires 
some high degree of subjective probability that p is true. 
What kind of reasons my conclusion should be responsive to when reasoning? 
Any reason there is, or the reasons I have? This point is important when we think that 
there may be reasons for doing, believing, intending something we may be totally 
unaware of and that are not my reasons. Views differ on this issue, but fortunately my 
proposal is compatible with all of them. To keep things manageable let me focus on the 
two main approaches on this topic.  
Many distinguish the following two things: the fact that there are reasons to do or 
believe something and the fact that I have those reasons, that those reasons are my 
reasons and are available to me. Those who endorse this view tend to maintain that 
reasons are true propositions or facts, and that to have those reasons one needs to stand in 
some relations to those facts or true propositions (Lord, 2010). If we endorse this view, 
then the aim of reasoning is to get to a conclusion that correctly responds to the reasons 
we have. These, however, are potentially only a subset of the reasons that there are for an 
agent to reach that conclusion. This may seem unsatisfactory, but it is not. The reason 
why it may seem unsatisfactory is that it seems that when we reason we want a 
conclusion that is supported and justified by the balance of all the reasons. Our 
prospective may be limited and the reasons we have, even when sufficient, may 
                                                      
116 Some authors hold that one can have an insufficient reason for a belief even if no opposing reason is 




constitute only a small subsets of the reasons we could potential get access to were we in 
a better epistemic position. In contrast, I believe that asking that this be our aim is asking 
too much. There are reasons we may never get to make ours and that are beyond our 
reach. And there are cases in which we have to make a choice with the limited 
information we have. In those cases, it is unclear that, when we reason, we can aim at 
anything else than being supported by the reasons we have. Why? Well, only available 
reasons can guide us in deliberation and reasoning, whereas reasons we have no possible 
access to can’t guide us at all. So it would be indeed odd to insist that, when reasoning, 
we aim at arriving at a conclusion that is supported (also) by reasons we don’t have 
within reach, and that can’t function as our base when reasoning. 
On a different view of reasons, theorists are more inclined to draw a distinction 
between the objective reason relation and the subjective reason relation: an objective 
reason is a reason there is for someone to do or believe something; a subjective reason is 
a reason someone has. Objective reasons are factive. Subjective reasons are mental states 
and may not be factive (Schroeder, 2008). A supporter of this view can adopt my 
approach to reasoning and agree that reasoning aims at arriving at a conclusion supported 
at least by sufficient subjective reasons. Again, this may appear quite unsatisfactory. 
When we reason, one may think, we don’t aim at arriving at a conclusion based on false 
premises: we want to get at a conclusion based on intuitively good, i.e. true, premises. 
Although this is true, it should be noted that the agent can’t differentiate between 




for an agent aiming at having a conclusion supported by objective reasons is the same as 
aiming at a conclusion that is supported by subjective reasons.  117 
In conclusion, I believe that the plausibility of my view of reasoning is preserved 
on various accounts of normative reason. It is now time to argue for the Reason View by 
showing how it can deal with various issues concerning reasoning.   
 
DEFENDING THE REASON VIEW 
The idea that reasoning has an aim constitutive of it – whatever that aims is – is 
not far-fetched. At least intuitively, it seems that when reasoning we have a direction, we 
are trying to get to a conclusion. So saying that reasoning is guided by an aim does not 
sound implausible to begin with. Similarly, it is plausible that agents aim at reaching 
conclusions supported by sufficient reasons: agents want to do, believe, and intend what 
is supported by reasons. Why? Well, first, we want attitudes we can defend and argue for 
if questioned. Reasoning is thus the way in which we form attitudes for which we can 
give reasons, and don’t need to retract if challenged. This may be key in securing a status 
as reliable epistemic and communicative agents (Brandom, 1994).  
In addition, it is quite plausible that in reasoning we want to reach attitudes that 
are intelligible to ourselves and to others. As our attitudes are part of our identity and self, 
we want to have attitudes that are not only correct but also rational and that form a 
somewhat coherent, intelligible psychological unity. Again, reasoning seems to be the 
most obvious way to reach that goal.  
                                                      
117 Also, some theorists have defended the claim that reasons are only either factive psychological attitudes 
(e.g. true beliefs, knowledge, evidence) of the agent or facts that the agent has access to. On this view, no 




But beyond being quite intuitive, the Reason View can make sense of important 
features of reasoning.  
Personal Level. Reasoning is personal level and reasoning, but not necessarily 
inference, is a mental process in which premises and conclusions, at least some of the 
attitudes we operate from and arrive at, are conscious. The Reason View squares nicely 
with this idea: an inferential process can be guided by the aim of getting conclusion 
supported by reasons only if at least part of the process (the premises, at least) is 
consciously available to the agent. Otherwise, how would she be able to monitor that the 
process is leading to a conclusion supported by reasons, if she has no clue about what is 
going on, or no clue about what motivated that conclusion? 
 Activity. Reasoning, contrary to simple inference, is an activity. It’s aim-
directedness makes it analogous to other personal-level activities. Take an activity such 
as gardening. Arguably, there is no gardening if you stop aiming at making your plants 
grow. You can decide to stop watering or trimming them, and let them grow as they 
want. However, the moment you do that, you are not gardening your plants anymore. 
Hence, the activity of gardening itself has a constitutive aim. Similarly, reasoning has a 
constitutive aim, a goal that it cannot be undermined by any other aim one may have, if 
one still counts as reasoning. Importantly, this aims determines the kind of control we 
exercise in reasoning (Hieronymi, 2009). Reasoning, like gardening, involves a lot of 
automatic processing that is beyond our direct influence. Still, we do exercise partial 
control on the inferences that constitute reasoning by overseeing the causal processes, 
and being active in changing things around if something goes awry, and threatens the aim 




activities that share that feature, and makes sense of the idea that reasoning is itself an 
activity.  
In addition, there is a tradition in philosophy that distinguishes between a passive 
and an active role we have with respect of our attitudes: activity is, paradigmatically, 
responding correctly to reasons. On this view, reasoning is an active process because, by 
being guided by the aim of arriving at a conclusion supported by reasons, reasoning is 
how we exercise a reflective control over our mental attitudes. Thus, reflective control 
over attitudes is the result or the expression of our (rational) agency (Boyle, 2009, 2011; 
Moran, 2001). By being expression of our agency, reasoning is thus something we do, not 
simply something that happens to us.  
Endorsing attitudes: The Reason View makes sense of the idea that in reasoning 
we produce attitudes or conclusions we endorse. Endorsing an attitude does not 
necessarily mean having a second-order belief that that attitude is justified or rational: it 
is enough for an attitude to be endorsed that it is the result of reasoning. On my view, the 
reason why reasoning forms attitudes we endorse is because reasoning is the process 
aimed at forming attitudes supported by reasons - so arriving at the conclusion of 
reasoning means accepting something qua supported by reasons. We do not need to 
believe we have reasons for it: the fact that we reasoned to it is already expression of our 
endorsement.  Thus, my proposal explains why reasoning to an attitude is tantamount to 
endorsing it without any need for meta-cognitive beliefs to take place in the reasoning 
process (Pettit, 1993).  
Note that nothing I have said requires that reasoning is in fact a rational process, 




evidence that reasoning may actually take us away from rationality and justification. In 
addition, recent studies in psychology seem to indicate that some of our attitudes are 
formed in a way that is mostly not transparent to us. These attitudes pop up in our minds 
and we have little idea how they got there. Reasoning, on this view, is there to rationalize 
the attitudes we have.  For instance, in his landmark paper, "The Emotional Dog and Its 
Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," Jonathan Haidt 
considers the mechanism by which we arrive at moral judgments, asking whether our 
moral judgments are made intuitively or as a result of reasoning. He claims that moral 
judgments are made by reliance upon unconscious intuition and that reasoning is merely 
ex post facto, applied only after the fact to justify one’s intuition and subsequent moral 
judgment. These results are extended also to other types of judgments and indicate that 
our attempts at justification of attitudes and choices sometimes collapse into forms of 
confabulation (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This confabulatory process forms new attitudes 
that are held basically because of their ability to rationalize attitudes we formed in 
different ways (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
What I have said about reasoning is compatible and in line with these recent 
findings. First, my proposal is not about what reasoning achieves, but about the status of 
the attitudes produced by reasoning. If – as I believe – the status of those attitudes is the 
one of endorsement, then it does not matter whether that endorsement is in fact well-
placed. Even if it turns out we are not all that good at reasoning correctly, the important 
issue here is what we are trying to do when we reason, not whether we achieve it. In 
addition, my view is compatible with the possibility that in reasoning the causal process 




are meant to support it. On my view, such a process is supervised by the aim of getting 
attitudes supported by reasons, and that squares nicely with the studies in human 
confabulation. Even if, as a result of reasoning, we end up confabulating about the 
reasons we have for having a particular attitude, it still must be the case that we somehow 
aim at forming a conclusion supported by normative reasons, otherwise the confabulation 
would not take place at all. So this actually supports my view, and the idea that reasoning 
is guided by the aim of having attitudes backed up by reasons. 118   
The Taking Condition: Boghossian and others defend the taking condition, 
namely that reasoning necessarily involves taking your premises to (at least sufficiently) 
support your conclusion and drawing such a conclusion because of that fact. As I 
mentioned, this boils down to the claim that in reasoning we take our premises as 
normative reasons for the conclusion. The Reason View intuitively explains the taking 
condition, and thus could be congenial to those who accept that condition of reasoning. 
When reasoning, we have the aim of reaching a conclusion supported by at least 
sufficient reasons. Since the premises we adopt are our means to reach a well-supported 
conclusion, it is no surprise that we aim to use premises that are reasons. That does not 
mean we have any explicit attitude toward our premises in reasoning; more specifically, 
we don’t necessarily believe that our premises support our conclusion. But in reasoning 
we do aim at a conclusion supported by reasons, and the suggestion here is the ‘taking’ of 
                                                      
118 It possible – as suggested by Mercier & Sperber (2011) – that the biological function of reasoning is to 
form arguments. On their view, the biological function of reasoning is to argue and offer reasons for 
attitudes we already have. This explains, on their view, way we are so prone to biases such as the 
confirmation bias. My analysis, however, is about what the agent is actually trying to achieve in reasoning, 
and not about the biological function of reasoning.  As stated before, the aim of reasoning is an aim agents 
have. Although an agent’s aim in activity X does not have to be necessarily consciously entertained, a 
normally competent agent will not explicitly (and sincerely) deny that this is her aim when engaging in X. 
Relatedly, agent’s aim motivate us to do certain things, and see certain conditions as reasons for doing 




the taking condition is captured in terms of an aim rather than a belief. Having an aim or 
goal means being motivated to do certain things and not others, prevent certain 
occurrences from happening, change things around if the aim is not satisfied, and so on. 
Accordingly, if in reasoning we see that our premises do not sufficiently support our 
conclusion, there are things we will be disposed to do to change that. In other words, 
suspecting that our premises fail to support our conclusion will motivate us to change it. 
And we will also be disposed to see that as a reason to change it. This is what aims do. 
Unless we suspect that something is wrong, no belief is needed. The aim of reasoning 
explains why, in that case, the fact that we sail along and do not intervene is testament of 
our taking our premises to be reasons for our conclusion.  
This is true modulo some exceptions that are usually acknowledged in the 
literature on the taking condition (Boghossian, 2015:43; Valaris, 2014, fn. 3). That is, in 
reasoning we don’t always take our premises as reasons for our conclusion. A clear 
example of that is reductio ad absurdum in which the premises are propositions we 
assume to be true for the sake of the argument we are making and don’t take to be 
reasons. This extends to all the case of reasoning in which we use, as our starting points, 
propositions we accept to be true in some contexts but not others, things we suppose, or 
even imagine to be true (Velleman, 2000). In all these cases, we hardly see our premises 
as reasons. This is compatible with the Reason View. It is not that in hypothetical 
reasoning and the like we don’t aim at arriving at a conclusion supported by reasons. Of 
course, we do. It is just that in those cases the reasons that support our conclusion are not 




A final point. By saying that reasoning requires some sort of metacognition, I am 
implicitly stating that animals and babies don’t reason. They have inferential processes 
all right, but they do not count as reasoning. I take this to be hardly controversial. That 
said, we should also notice that the metacognitive capacities that are required for 
reasoning may actually be very minimal. That is, taking a premise to support a conclusion 
may only require a fairly basic understanding of what counts as a reason. For such a basic 
understanding all is needed is sensitivity to the normative standard of attitudes.  
Interestingly, even young children may have that sensitivity. If a child is able to assess 
the validity of a claim or belief based on its causes, we may be in a position to grant her 
an implicit understanding of reasons. More concretely, if a child reliably spots 
normatively appropriate vs. inappropriate beliefs by accepting or refusing them, this may 
be an indication she knows – at least implicitly – what norm governs belief and what 
counts as a (good) reason for believing (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig, 
Clément & Harris, 2004; Rakoczy and Tomasello, 2009). If this suggestion is on the right 
track, then perhaps we can venture the following hypothesis: 3 and 4- year olds children 
do have an implicit grasp of what a reason for belief is. And so they may be able to 
engage in a form of inferring that requires this kind of implicitly grasp.  
Inference:  Reasoning is a type of inferential process. Inference that happens in 
reasoning is a causal process among attitudes. In understanding the inferential process 
that goes on in reasoning, not any causal process will serve our purposes, however; what 
we need is an account of inference among attitudes that can avoid deviant causal chains, 
and distinguish inference from associative thinking. I have a suggestion that could work 




Turri, 2011; Wedgwood, 2006): A causal relation between attitudes is an inference only 
when it is the manifestation of an agent’s competence to produce good inferential 
patterns.    
Let me be more specific. Inferences are subpersonal processes, and by this I mean 
that we have no access to them. That said, whatever mechanism brings about our 
inferences, it can be seen as what allows instantiating the agent’s119 cognitive competence 
to either implement good rules or establish causal patters that conform to good inferential 
patterns. I don’t have a way to fully explain what good patterns are here; however, it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that inference is good when it produces good reasoning (for 
those creatures who can reason). That does not mean you need to be able to reason to 
make a good inference. However, the notion of good inference becomes explanatorily 
dependent on that of reasoning (see next chapter for more).120  
Now, the aim of reasoning is what determines what good vs. bad reasoning 
amounts to. It is also natural to suppose that good reasoning sometimes falls into patterns 
(McHugh and Way, 2016). Intuitively, if reasoning has a constitutive point or aim, a good 
pattern of reasoning (or “principle of revision” – Harman 1986) is a pattern that can, 
other things been equal, be used to achieve that aim. On the view I propose reasoning 
aims at a conclusion that is supported by reasons. Thus, correct patters of reasoning are 
those patterns which normally allow the formation of a conclusion that is actually 
supported by the premises (if these are fit to be reasons, and let’s agree that for an attitude 
or a content of an attitude to be a reason it has to be the case that the content is true or the 
attitude is factive.). To illustrate, Modus Ponens is a good attitude-forming pattern 
                                                      
119 I remain agnostic on whether this includes non-human animals. It seems intuitive that it includes 
children. But I will put this issue aside.   




because it allows to produce attitudes conclusively supported by reasons when the 
premises are true. In contrast, affirming the consequent is bad deductive reasoning 
because it does not transmit conclusive support from premises to conclusion, even when 
those premises are true beliefs, and thus fit to be reasons. So my proposal is that a causal 
relation among attitudes is not an inference, but is a deviant causal chain or an instance of 
associative thinking, when it is not a manifestation of the agent’s competence to 
implement/conform to good inferential patterns. This claim, however, needs to be 
substantially refined. In particular, to make this work I need to say more about how this 
account of inference is different from my proposal about reasoning. Unfortunately, this 






REASONS VS. CORRECTNESS: WHEN IS REASONING GOOD? 
Chapter 4  
 
 
What is reasoning? When is reasoning good? In this chapter I will argue again for the 
view of reasoning I called the Reason View: reasoning is the process of attitude revision 
that aims at a conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons. Here I argue for the 
Reason View by expanding on some of the arguments presented in the previous chapter. 
In particular, I will show that the Reason View can make sense of what we mean by 
‘good reasoning’, and that the Reason View is more plausible than its immediate 
competitor, i.e. the Correctness View: the view that says that reasoning aims at forming 
attitudes that are correct.  
 
 
REASONING AND ITS CONSTITUTIVE AIM121 
Take the following set of propositions: 
It is raining 
If it is raining, I will get wet 
Therefore, I will get wet 
 
When is the transition from the first proposition to the last an instance of 
reasoning? The reader will recall that I started with a pre-theoretical understanding of 
‘reasoning’. Thus, following others in the literature, I take reasoning to be a mental 
process in which we operate on contents of mental attitudes (Broome, 2013). Contents, I 
assume, are propositions such as ‘It is raining’. They are the contents of belief-like and 
intention-like mental attitudes. The output of reasoning also has to do with the content of 
our attitudes. More specifically, the output of one’s reasoning may be that one comes to 
have a new belief-like and intention-like attitude; or the output of one’s reasoning may be 
                                                      





that one abandons or withholds such an attitude; or it may simply be that one reaffirms an 
attitude one already has (Wedgwood, 2006).  
There are two types of reasoning: theoretical and practical. It is likely that the 
difference between practical and theoretical reasoning lies solely in the conclusion state 
(Broome, 2013; Harman, 1986:2). Practical reasoning is the kind of reasoning whose 
conclusion state is an intention-like state (or the abandonment of it)122, and theoretical 
reasoning is the kind that has beliefs-like states (or the abandonment of it) as its 
conclusion. My account of reasoning aims at offering a unifying view of reasoning, one 
that works for both theoretical and practical reasoning. The reason why I talk about 
intention-like and belief-like states is because I assume that reasoning can involve not 
only belief and intention, but also cognitive and conative attitudes such as assumptions 
and suppositions. That said, for simplicity here I will mainly focus on reasoning that 
involves beliefs and intentions, and make reference to other attitudes when it becomes 
relevant. 
Reasoning is a kind of attitude revision (Harman, 1986), but there are kinds of 
attitude-revision processes that are not reasoning. Our attitudes might change through 
simple association, or they may change through some inferential process we have no 
access to. Note that these unconscious inferential processes are based on reasons, i.e. the 
considerations in light of which an agent arrives at a certain conclusion, just as much as 
reasoning. However, I contend that not all cases of inferential basing are instances of 
reasoning. Here I am interested only in a specific kind of inferential activity and as a 
result I see the term ‘reasoning’ as applying narrower than the term ‘inferring’. Why? 
                                                      
122 Some philosophers think that practical reasoning concludes with an action, but I doubt this makes much 




Well, first, reasoning is a “person-level” process in which premises and conclusions, the 
attitudes we operate from and arrive at, are conscious (Boghossian, 2014: 2; Pettit, 1993). 
And by ‘conscious’ I mean, roughly, that they are available for report. In contrast, 
inference and basing can at times be unconscious (Evans, 2013). What’s more, reasoning 
is an activity, in the sense that reasoning is “attention hogging and effortful” 
(Boghossian, 2014: 2; Haidt, 2001: 818). Relatedly, reasoning is not something that 
simply happens to us and we have no control over, but something we do and take part in.  
In contrast, we seem to have little control over unconscious basing and unconscious 
inferential processes in general. Finally, as explained previously, another element of 
distinction between reasoning and inference is that the result of reasoning is something 
we necessarily endorse. Roughly, endorsing a conclusion X means that we control X and 
take responsibility for it. I think there is strong evidence that some of our attitudes are 
irresponsive to reasons to the point that the agent feels she has no control over them, and 
is reluctant to take responsibility for them. In contrast, there seems to be attitudes we 
actually have control over. These are the beliefs or attitudes we see as reflecting our 
rational agency (Moran, 2001; Boyle, 2009). These are, in other words, the attitudes we 
endorse. I contend that the standard way to endorse them is to form them through 
reasoning. In contrast, when we arrive at an attitude through unconscious inference, we 
may not necessarily stand behind it. And this marks a difference between the two 
processes (but for more see chapter 3). 
I argued before that we should explain reasoning as a process of attitudes-revision 
guided by a constitutive aim. The aim of reasoning is an aim of the agent, a goal the agent 




result. And a desire is – at a bare minimum – a disposition to do certain things. That is, 
having an aim or goal means being motivated to do certain things and not others, prevent 
certain occurrences to happen, change things around if the aim is not satisfied, and so on.  
As stated in the previous chapter, saying that reasoning is guided by an aim does 
not sound implausible. 123 Second, the claim that reasoning has a constitutive aim makes 
sense of the fact that, intuitively, reasoning is an activity; non-reasoning processes, in 
contrast, simply happen to us (Broome, 2013). Another important point: the idea of 
reasoning being guided by an aim seems helpful to make sense of the highly plausible 
claim that reasoning is a thought process in which the conclusion we arrive at is a 
conclusion we endorse, i.e. not simply something we happen to reach, but a conclusion 
we stand behind. The idea that reasoning has an aim can make sense of this because the 
attitudes we reach through reasoning are attitudes that (seem to us to) fulfill the aim we 
have when reasoning; they fulfill our goal and thus we endorse them (with some caveat - 
more on this below).  
Now I will also show that reasoning’s aim can offer a plausible account of correct 
or good reasoning. Plausibly enough, reasoning is constituted by (causal-inferential) 
transitions among attitudes. In particular, in reasoning premise-attitudes cause a 
conclusion-attitude (or lack thereof). Some of these patterns or transitions, such as those 
which constitute affirming the consequent, or the gambler’s fallacy, lead to bad 
reasoning. Modus ponens and modus tollens are, in contrast, good patters. The aim view 
is able to make sense of this distinction. On this view, a good pattern is what normally 
allows reasoning to fulfill its aim, when the starting points of the transition, i.e. the 
                                                      




premises of the reasoning, are good (McHugh and Way, 2016).  In addition, this promises 
to shed some light also on what constitutes good basing too. Indeed, as I mentioned 
above, in the inferential transitions that constitute reasoning, we base our conclusion off 
of the premises, i.e. the reasons in light of which we come to that conclusion. A good 
basing-relation is thus a transition that instantiates a good pattern.  
Now a question naturally arises: what is the aim of reasoning? And when is a 
transition among attitudes a good transition? In what follows, I will first examine a very 
intuitive proposal: reasoning aims at forming correct attitudes. After criticizing that view 
and its solution to the problem of good reasoning, I will move on to defend the Reason 
view: reasoning is the process of attitudes-revision that aims at a conclusion supported by 
at least sufficient reasons. 
 
THE CORRECTNESS VIEW 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the correctness view: reasoning aims at 
forming correct attitudes and dropping incorrect ones. ‘Correctness’ here is a normative 
property of attitudes such that, roughly, they fit the world right given the type of attitude 
they are. Recently, McHugh and Way (2016a) have offered a new version of the 
correctness view by developing an account of good reasoning. They see correctness as 
the same as fittingness. As they put it, “[t]he core idea is that attitudes are associated with 
standards for their objects. An attitude is fitting when its object meets its standard.” 
(2016: 13) A belief is fitting if and only if true; an intention is fitting iff permissible. 
Based on this, they develop a view of good reasoning which can be roughly summarized 




further fitting attitudes, other things equal.” (2016: 13) They also make the point that 
good reasoning falls into patterns, and that we can understand what good reasoning is in 
terms of good patterns of reasoning, i.e. patterns that on their view are fitting-preserving.  
The Correctness view is highly intuitive. It does seem that when we reason we 
want to get at the world, and we want to get things right. And yet I have some worries 
about the correctness strategy in general, and McHugh and Way’s account of good 
reasoning, in particular.  First, let me expand on some of the worries I raised in the 
previous chapter. One worry is that the correctness-aim may not be necessary for 
reasoning since we use reasoning also to form attitudes that have no (clear) correctness 
conditions. I am thinking of suppositions, acceptances in context and even bits of 
imagination. Relatedly, many subscribe to the idea that the standard of correctness for 
belief is shared by other attitudes, such as guesses and conjectures (McHugh, 2011: 385). 
But it just seems false that in reasoning we aim at forming true guesses. If we did, we 
would do our best to ensure their correctness. But we don’t: we make guesses and 
conjectures for all sort of reasons that have little to do with their truth. So the aim of 
reasoning does not work for those attitudes either.  
Also, the correctness proposal does not clarify why reasoning would always aim 
at forming attitudes that are correct. As I mentioned before, it is in fact possible to 
imagine someone arguing that there is more to attitudes than correctness. Indeed, one 
may think that attitudes can be rational based on moral and practical values. This of 
course does not show that the aim of reasoning is not correctness, but it leaves open the 
question why we would always care about correctness when there may be other more 




One reply to this is to deny that there is anything beyond correctness: attitudes 
can’t be practically good or bad. This view may work for belief, but I think it would be a 
stretch to say that moral norms or values don’t apply to attitudes in general. A second 
reply is that in reasoning we can’t aim at those other values. Our psychology is such that 
we are never motivated by practical or moral considerations when forming (or dropping) 
an attitude through reasoning. And we can’t try to get something impossible to obtain. On 
this view, though, the aim of reasoning becomes a triviality as it is just the result of the 
fact that one can’t believe, intend, desire, or wish at will: correctness is the only game in 
town for us. Unfortunately, this seems to substitute one mystery for another: why can’t 
we form attitudes at will?  
A better strategy is to say that correctness is a constitutive norm for attitudes, and 
that when we try to form those attitudes we can’t but aim at satisfying that norm (Shah, 
2003). This point has been made about belief: the constitutive norm of belief is that it is 
correct to believe a proposition if and only if true. The proposal is that, when forming 
beliefs, we are necessarily bound by this norm. Note, however, that no other constitutive 
norm seems to work that way. The constitutive norm of assertion, for instance, says that 
one ought to assert if and only if one knows. But when deliberating about assertion, one 
can form an assertion even when one is well aware one lacks the required knowledge for 
it.124   
Finally, the correctness view could try to appeal to the idea that reasoning is an 
activity of attitude-revisions and - this is the key point - attitudes are functional kinds: 
their constitutive function is to be correct (McHugh and Way, 2016b).  In addition, one 
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may try to argue that one can’t try to build an object with a constitutive function unless 
one is trying to build an object that satisfies that function (Shah, 2003; Korsgaard, 2008: 
113). Here is an example. Good houses provide shelters. The aim of house-building is 
thus to provide a shelter, and one can’t build a house unless one is trying to build a 
shelter. But this strikes me as very controversial. It is true that when I build a house, I am 
not completely indifferent to the standards of good (shelter-) house-building. This is 
because, if the house I build is too shabby, then it will likely fail to be a house at all (e.g. 
it won’t have a roof, it will fall apart). But this is different from saying that, when I build 
a house, I can’t aim for a house that does not fulfill its function. It could well be that my 
only aim is to build a house that looks very nice from the outside to make my neighbor 
jealous, and that I care very little about whether it actually provides shelter or is a good 
house.  It is unclear why, because of that, mine would not count as an instance of house-
building.  
As a reply, one may point out that objects get their constitutive function only (or 
mainly) from their creator (be this natural selection or human intention). So a house built 
without the intention of building a shelter is an object which does not have the function of 
being a shelter. Since having that function is constitutive of being a house, an object does 
not belong to the kind ‘house’ unless produced with that goal in mind.  
I am skeptical this will work for mental attitudes, though. Even assuming that 
attitudes do have correctness as their constitutive function, this means that all the 
processes that lead to attitude-formation must have the function of forming correct 
attitudes. More specifically, any inferential process that leads to attitude revision should 




and reasoning? Indeed, it would seem that, on this view, any process of attitude revision 
with the aim or function of forming correct attitudes would count as reasoning. But that 
seems wrong. As argued above, reasoning is distinct from other processes of attitude 
revision. The correctness approach, in contrast, blurs this distinction.  
To block this worry, the correctness theorist will say that the aim of reasoning is a 
personal aim. When it comes to subpersonal mechanisms that form attitudes, they have 
an aim in the sense that they have a biological function, i.e. to create attitudes that are 
correct. But this is far from obviously correct. My mind can create attitudes, e.g. beliefs, 
through associative thinking or as a result of emotions, i.e. via processes that do not have 
the biological function of forming correct beliefs. Would they not count as beliefs simply 
because created through association? This is a quite strong claim to make, I believe, and a 
view that avoids such a strong commitment is to be preferred. So I am not sure the 
correctness view is as feasible as it originally appears to be. 
Things are also problematic when we consider how the correctness view deals 
with good reasoning. As mentioned above, McHugh and Way’s recent paper on good 
reasoning clearly spells out how good reasoning can be explained in terms of correctness 
or fittingness preservation.  As they put it, “The move from P1...Pn to C is a good pattern 
of reasoning iff, and because, other things equal, if P1. . .Pn are fitting, C is fitting too” 
(2016: 13). This is a very intuitive proposal. Take modus ponens: it is plausible that the 
reason why Modus Ponens constitutes, intuitively, a good pattern of reasoning is because 
it gets you from correct/fitting premises to a correct/fitting conclusion. Similarly for 
pragmatic reasoning: if it is correct to intend to A, then it is permissible to A. And if it is 




it is correct to intend to M. Thus the view can make sense why means-end reasoning is a 
good pattern (McHugh and Way, 2016: 13).  
Although I find their view of good reasoning quite intuitive, I have worries. My 
first worry emerges out of the point made earlier that guesses and conjectures’ standard 
of correctness are the same as belief’s. If this is right, on the correctness view of good 
reasoning the following would count as a good pattern of reasoning: 
(1) Guess (p), Guess (if p then q) > Belief (q) 
Recall that on their view a pattern of reasoning is good when other things equal it 
gets you from fitting premises to a fitting conclusion. Applied to the case above, it is true 
that if my guess that p is true, and my guess that if p then q is also true, my belief that q 
will be true too. In this case, that is, correct or fitting guesses get us correct or fitting 
beliefs, but the reasoning above is intuitively far from good. More generally, it seems 
that, at least for theoretical deductive reasoning, their view is unable to distinguish 
between valid logical transitions among well-formed formulas and good reasoning. This 
leads to problematic patterns such as (1).   
Relatedly, we have the following intuitively good pattern of reasoning: 
(1-A) Belief (q), Belief (if p then q) > Guess/Conjecture (p) 
There seems to be nothing wrong with (1-A), and yet it does not instantiate a 
fittingness-preserving pattern. Notoriously, affirming the consequent is not a valid logical 
inference, but this does not mean that (1-A) is not a good pattern of reasoning, contrary to 
what the Correctness view anticipates.125  
                                                      
125 McHugh and Way will point out that “good patterns of reasoning are not fittingness-preserving only in 
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Another source of concern I’d like to raise is that McHugh and Way’s 
understanding of good reasoning seems to categorize the following as good reasoning:  
(2) Belief (p), Belief (if p then q) > Belief (q) [However, I am aware I have good 
reasons to believe that one of the premises of my modus ponens is false.]  
On McHugh and Way’s view, in (2) I am reasoning well because I am 
instantiating a good pattern. But I think this is a mistake: we should keep good reasoning 
separate from good patterns. Good patterns have to do with inferential transitions among 
attitudes. Transitions can be unconscious and thus not be part of reasoning processes. In 
contrast, as I mentioned above, reasoning goes beyond inference, as it is an inferential 
process guided by an aim. In (2) above, it seems intuitive to say that I am making the 
right transitions: the inference is good. At the same time, though, in (2) I am not 
reasoning well, as I am not weighing all my reasons correctly. The view I am about to 
offer can make sense of the intuitive idea that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
good inferential transitions and good reasoning. And this is why I believe it should be 
ultimately preferred over the Correctness view.  
 
THE REASON VIEW126 
Reasoning, I claimed, is guided by a constitutive aim or goal. This aim is what 
makes reasoning a unique type of inferential thought process. The view I support says 
that the aim of reasoning is arriving at a conclusion supported by at least sufficient 
reasons. The conclusion of reasoning consists in dropping, reaffirming, forming or 
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suspending (avoiding forming) an attitude. Doing one of those things in a way that is 
supported at least by sufficient reasons is the constitutive aim of reasoning. 
By “reason” here I mean normative reasons. Normative reasons are things that 
count in favor of (or against) a certain response. By “response”, I mean the holding, 
withholding or dropping of an attitude. Also, I will assume a weighing approach 
according to which reasons support responses by contributing a kind of epistemic weight 
to them. 127  
Reasons have different strengths and speak in favor or against responses in 
different ways.  As a result, in deliberation they tend to be weighed against one another. 
Pro-tanto reasons are reasons that have genuine weigh in favor of some response. Pro-
tanto reasons may be outweighed by other opposing reasons, though128. I will assume that 
an agent S has sufficient pragmatic reason to φ only when S has a reason to φ, and no 
stronger reason not to φ. In contrast, I assume that having sufficient evidence to form a 
belief that p involves more than having stronger evidence for p than for not-p; it requires 
some high degree of credence that p is true. I will also assume that an agent S has 
decisive reason to φ only when her reasons to φ are stronger than her reasons not to φ.  129 
Finally, conclusive reasons are reasons that mandate a response. So typically it is said that 
if S has overall conclusive reason to φ, then her φing is normatively required. Also, 
typically it is said that if S has overall sufficient reason to φ, then her φing is justified, 
warranted or normatively permitted.  
                                                      
127 I assume that reasons are always reasons for someone and that they favor types of response-attitudes, not 
propositions.  
128 In contrast, prima facie reasons are considerations that appear to be reasons, but may actually not be 
reasons at all. 
129 This way of defining sufficient and decisive reasons is controversial. However, that does not matter for 




Now, I doubt that in reasoning we always aim at reaching conclusions supported 
by conclusive reasons. Deductive reasoning is definitively governed by that aim, but not 
all reasoning is that way: we can correctly form an intention to do something based on 
reasoning, even if that action is not mandated by conclusive reasons but only permitted 
by sufficient reasons. The aim of reasoning should thus account for those kinds of cases 
as well. I also doubt that the reasons at play in reasoning can be only pro-tanto, as I doubt 
that when we reason we usually aim at a conclusion that is supported by reasons that 
could be outweighed by other reasons we have. In contrast, what we aim for in reasoning 
is a conclusion supported at least by sufficient reasons.  
What kind of reasons my conclusion should be responsive to when reasoning? 
Any reason there is, or the reasons I have? I have already tackled this question in the 
previous chapter, but let’s expand on this more, as views differ on this issue.  
Many distinguish the following two things: the fact that there are reasons to do or 
believe something and the fact that I have those reasons or that those reasons are 
available to me. Those who endorse this distinction tend to hold that reasons are true 
propositions or facts, and that to have those reasons one needs to stand in some relations 
to those facts or true propositions, or at least that those reasons are available to me. (I will 
assume, somewhat vaguely, that a reason is available to me when it is a true proposition 
or fact perceptually within my reach and/or easily inferable given what I know130.)   
If we accept this view, then the aim of reasoning is to get to a conclusion that 
correctly responds to the reasons that are available to us. The reasons available to us, 
however, are potentially only a subset of the reasons that there are for us to reach a 
                                                      





certain conclusion. We may (wrongly) think that, when we reason about some issue, we 
want to reach a conclusion that is supported by the balance of all the reasons. 
Unfortunately, though, there are reasons we may never get to make ours and that are 
beyond our reach. In those cases, it is unclear that, when we reason, we can aim at 
anything else than being supported by the reasons we have. Why? Well, only available 
reasons can guide us in deliberation and reasoning, whereas reasons we have no access to 
can’t guide us at all. So it would be indeed odd to insist that, when reasoning, we aim at 
arriving at a conclusion that is supported (also) by reasons we don’t have, and that can’t 
function as our base when reasoning. 
If the reader is still not convinced that the aim of reasoning should be restricted to 
the reasons available to us, let me offer two examples in support of my claim. In the 
famous “Jill case” (Jackson, 1991: 462–463), Jill is a doctor who faces a difficult choice. 
She wants to cure a patient with a mild skin problem. She can choose among 3 different 
drugs: Drug A is very likely to relieve the patient’s symptoms but will not completely 
cure him. Either one of drugs B and C will completely cure the skin condition whereas 
the other will kill the patient, and there is no way that she can tell which of the two will 
kill him (unbeknownst to Jill, C is the cure for the patient). Were Jill to deliberate what to 
do, how can she go about doing that? She clearly can’t access all the reasons there are to 
make that choice, and she knows that. The only thing she can do is to use what she has, 
and aim at making the choice supported by the reasons available to her. Even if she 
knows the conclusion she will reach is only half-good because of the limited information 
she has, that’s the best she can do in that situation. There is no other way.  




front of me a few minutes ago has now been tossed. I know it came out either head or tail 
but I don’t know which. In this case, when reasoning about what to believe concerning 
the status of the coin tossed, I can’t aim at reaching a conclusion supported by reasons I 
have no access to. What I do in this case is to suspend judgment because, given the 
evidence I have, I am not allowed to form a belief at all.  Again, they only thing I can do 
is to go with the reasons available to me. So this example supports my claim that, if one 
wants to keep the distinction between the reasons one has and the reasons that there are 
for someone, the aim of reasoning can only concern the former and not the latter.  
Not everybody, however, is confortable with that distinction. In the literature on 
reasons, there is a position that is at times called ‘prospectivism’. Roughly, the idea is 
that normative reasons are only either factive psychological attitudes (e.g. true beliefs, 
knowledge, evidence) of the agent or facts or true propositions that the agent has easy 
access to. On this view, no reason is not-had by the agent, or not available to her. 131 This 
prospectivist position squares nicely with the cases in which our epistemic position 
prevents us from accessing information relevant to make a decision. Accordingly, on this 
view reasoning aims at arriving at a conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons, 
and reasons here are only those considerations already available to the agent.  
There is a third option: some theorists adopt a view that says that there are two 
reason-relations, i.e. the objective reason relation and the subjective reason relation. An 
objective reason is a reason there is for someone to do or believe something; a subjective 
reason is a reason someone has. Objective reasons are factive. Subjective reasons are 
mental states and may be non-factive (e.g. Parfit 2001, 2011; Schroeder, 2008; Way, 
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2009). For example, Derek Parfit (2011:35) claims that “when we have beliefs whose 
truth would give us a reason to act in some way, we have [...] an apparent reason to act in 
this way.” They key here is that proponents of the idea of subjective/apparent reasons 
seem to hold that claims about subjective/apparent reasons are genuinely normative 
claims. Parfit (2011) maintains that “normativity involves reasons or apparent reasons”. 
As in the following famous case:  the fact that the glass contains poison rather than gin is 
an objective normative reason for Bernard not to drink it, even if he is not aware of this 
fact. In contrast, his belief that the glass contains gin is a subjective reason he has to 
drink. The two types of reasons come apart.  
Subjective/ apparent normative reasons are reasons that appear to the agent to be 
objective reasons or that would be objective reasons were they true132. As a result, the 
introduction of subjective/apparent normative reasons is supposed to capture the idea that 
in the famous gin case there seem to be, as Schroeder puts it, all the “earmarks” that 
Bernard has a reason to drink. For starters, we expect Bernard to drink from the glass 
given his beliefs and his desire to drink gin. What’s more, we would reasonably criticize 
Bernard if he were not moved to drink from the glass: he doesn’t know that it contains 
gasoline, so why is he not drinking it? (Schroeder, 2008: 61).  So the non-factivists are 
holding on to the idea that Bernard has reasons to drink, even though there are reasons for 
him not to drink. 133  
                                                      
132 There are actually at least two different interpretations of what subjective/ apparent reasons are. The de 
dicto view maintains that R is an apparent normative reason for agent A to F iff it appears to agent A that R 
is an objective normative reason to F. This view is held mainly by Scanlon (1998) and Kolodny (2005).  
Others, such as Parfit (2001, 2011) and Way (2009), argue for a de re view: R is an apparent reason for A 
to F when  R’s truth would give A an objective reason to F, and it appears to A that R is true. 
133 This distinction is orthogonal to the distinction between normative and motivating reasons. The point of 




I won’t try to offer an assessment of the subjective/apparent reason view here. To 
me the most natural view about normative reasons is that they are facts or true 
propositions. So for simplicity here I will adopt the view that in reasoning we aim at 
forming a conclusion supported by facts or true propositions available to the agent. As a 
result, the Reason view I am defending here says that in reasoning we aim at a 
conclusion on balance sufficiently supported by the facts or true propositions 
available to us.  
 
GOOD REASONING AND GOOD INFERENTIAL PATTERNS  
Now that I have explained the main tenets of the Reason view, I will argue that it 
can perform better than the Correctness view on a number of important issues, especially 
concerning good reasoning and good patterns of reasoning.  
First, the Reason view is very plausible. That is, it is plausible that agents aim at 
reaching conclusions supported by sufficient reasons. If an agent were to reason from 
premise P to conclusion C while also saying that P offers no (sufficient) support to C, we 
would doubt this agent is reasoning at all. The point of reasoning seems indeed to offer 
support for a conclusion, and disavowing this aim is tantamount to stop reasoning.  
Second, the Reason view does better than the Correctness view in explaining why 
the conclusion of our reasoning is a conclusion we necessarily endorse. Arguably, not all 
the goals we have are goals we want to have (or that we endorse). We may be engaging 
in an activity (e.g. preparing a bomb) because forced to do so (e.g. by terrorists). This is 
not an aim we wish we had, so its conclusion is not obviously something we endorse. As 
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pointed out above, the Correctness View owes us a story for why, if the aim of reasoning 
is arriving at a correct attitude, this is an aim we necessarily endorse. Indeed, there may 
be situations in which we think we morally or prudentially should, e.g., believe 
something our evidence indicates to be false.  
In contrast, the Reason view has no problem with that. On the Reason view, the 
aim of reasoning is not just any old aim: it is the aim of reaching a conclusion supported 
by (at least) sufficient reasons. The reason why reasoning forms attitudes we endorse is 
because reasoning is the process aimed at forming attitudes supported by reasons - so 
arriving at the conclusion C of a reasoning process means endorsing C because one 
necessarily sees C as rational/supported by reasons. Thus, it is the fact that we reasoned 
to C that expresses our endorsement of C. 
Third, contrary to the Correctness view, the Reason view has no problem 
accommodating reasoning toward attitudes that have no correctness conditions (e.g. 
suppositions, acceptances), since these are attitudes held for reasons just as any other 
attitude. Similarly, the Reason view tells us why reasoning toward a belief requires more 
support than forming a guess: the amount of reasons needed to support a guess is 
different than the amount of reasons required by beliefs.  
Fourth, the view I am offering here fits nicely with the view that the notion of a 
‘reason’ is primitive or indefinable (Parfit 2011; Scanlon 1998). But it is also compatible 
with the idea that reasons are reducible to oughts. This means that the Reason View is not 
necessarily committed to a specific normative framework.   
Finally, the Reason view offers a plausible account of good reasoning. Roughly, 




weight of the available reasons. Thus, good reasoning is, in general, reasoning in which 
an agent is able to assign the appropriate weight to the reasons available to her, and 
produce the appropriate response on balance. The goodness of reasoning is defeasible: 
even if your calculation is right, you may believe something false.  To see what I mean 
take the gin case again. On the Reason view, Bernard’s reasoning is good; that is, he does 
not have sufficient reasons to drink from the glass because he falsely believes that the 
glass contains gin; however, given the evidence he has, he seems to be doing everything 
right in terms of calculating the weight of the information at his disposal. Or take the Jill 
case. Jill’s reasoning to give the patient drug A is good. In fact, Jill has sufficient reasons 
to prescribe drug A given the evidence available to her, even if drug C is what would in 
fact cure the patient’s illness.  
There is a further layer of assessment for reasoning: reasoning happens by means 
of inferential transitions among attitudes, from premises to a conclusion. So one 
important question is, when are these transitions good? 
Two clarifications before starting . First, reasoning’s premises are attitudes with a 
propositional content, but not just any propositional attitude works well as a premise: 
perception and belief can work as premises, guesses cannot. In addition, a premise can 
support a conclusion by being a reason one has for that conclusion, and that requires (at 
least) that the premise is an attitude of right kind (e.g. perception, belief), and that its 
content is true. 134 As I mentioned above, reasons are factive, so a premise supports a 
conclusion only if true. In the next chapter, I will say more about belief and its role in 
reasoning.  
                                                      
134  Some require that the attitude in question is sufficiently justified, or amounts to knowledge. For 




I believe that an inferential transition is good when it instantiates a good pattern. 
A good inferential pattern is a transition of attitudes that, other things been equal, goes 
from some premises to a conclusion and, if those are true, the conclusion is sufficiently 
supported by those premises.  
Importantly, instantiating a good pattern, making a good inference, is not the 
exact same as reasoning well or correctly. So, for instance, a transition among beliefs that 
instantiates a Modus Ponens is a good pattern of reasoning, but adopting it does not mean 
one is reasoning correctly. As mentioned above, if one has good reasons to believe that 
one of the premises of her reasoning is false, correct reasoning requires that she does not 
adopt those premises.  
Let see what that means in detail by offering a definition of good patterns. 
Good Pattern of deductive reasoning:  
The move from P1 … Pn to C is a good pattern of deductive reasoning iff the theoretical 
conclusion C is conclusively supported by P1… Pn, when P1… Pn are fit to be normative 
reasons we have (i.e. they are true beliefs).  
Intuitively, if reasoning has a constitutive point or aim, a good pattern of 
reasoning or transition is a pattern that can be used to achieve that aim. On the view I 
propose, deductive reasoning aims at a conclusion that is supported by conclusive 
reasons. Thus, a good pattern of deductive reasoning is any pattern of reasoning that will 
yield a conclusion that is supported by conclusive reasons, when one in fact has those 
reasons and uses them as premises in reasoning. Hence, good patters of deductive 
reasoning are those patterns which allow the formation of a conclusion that is actually 




Importantly, as Harman (1986: 5) has pointed out, logic principles do not equal 
good patterns of reasoning. So we cannot simply adopt rules of logic and assume that 
they constitute good deductive-reasoning patterns. So for instance, beliefs that are jointly 
inconsistent imply any proposition. But it is not good reasoning to infer any proposition 
whatsoever from those inconsistent beliefs. I believe my view accommodates Harman’s 
point. 135 Inconsistent beliefs (or propositions) do not support anything as they cannot be 
both reasons for believing. So reasoning from them is not good reasoning. In contrast, 
syllogisms constitute patterns of good reasoning: Clara believes that Socrates is a human 
being. She also believes that all humans are mortals. Those propositions can be on 
balance conclusive reasons for her to believe that Socrates was mortal. Now, this is a 
correct pattern of reasoning because, given the premises “Socrates is a human being” and 
“humans are mortals”, it produces a conclusion prima facie justified by those premises (It 
is only prima facie justified because the premises may be false, and thus not reasons for 
the conclusion.) Similarly, Modus Ponens is a good pattern because it is a transition that 
allows to produce attitudes conclusively supported by reasons, when the starting point is 
good. In contrast, affirming the consequent is a bad pattern of deductive reasoning 
because it does not transmit justification from the premises to the conclusion, even when 
those are fit to be reasons. 
Good pattern of inductive reasoning:  
The move from P1 … Pn to C is a good pattern of inductive reasoning iff theoretical 
conclusion C is other things being equal sufficiently supported by P1… Pn, when P1… 
Pn are fit to be normative reasons we have.  
                                                      
135 My proposal should in principle be attractive also to those who see material relations as material 





Thus, enumerative induction is a correct pattern of reasoning when it produces 
conclusions sufficiently supported by the premises, if other things are equal and the 
starting point is good. Alternatively, we incur in fallacies like hasty generalization: the 
conclusion is poorly supported by the premises because – even if true – these are not 
sufficient reasons for the conclusion. This is because basing one’s belief (e.g. all students 
in this college are nice) on a too small of a sample (e.g. the students in my class are nice) 
is a pattern of reasoning that yields a conclusion poorly supported by the premises. 
Indeed, here the pattern that connects premises and conclusion does not establish 
sufficient support for the conclusion. In contrast, basing one’s conclusion off of a large 
randomized sample of cases makes that conclusion defeasibly well supported. So 
enumerative induction with a large randomized sample of cases usually leads to good 
reasoning because it is a pattern that yields conclusions that are defeasibly well 
supported, if the premises are fit to be reasons. 
It is worth drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that my view is compatible 
with the claim that patterns of good inductive reasoning are defeasible. It can be a good 
pattern of inductive reasoning to move from some premise to a conclusion even if it is not 
good inductive reasoning to make that move considering some further premise-responses. 
For instance, it might be a good transition in inductive reasoning to move from the belief 
that someone said that it will rain tomorrow to the belief that it will rain tomorrow, even 
if it is not good inductive reasoning to make this move given the additional belief that the 





Good pattern of practical reasoning:  
The move from P1 … Pn to C is a good pattern of practical reasoning iff practical 
conclusion C is other things being equal sufficiently supported by P1… Pn, when P1… 
Pn are fit to be normative reasons we have.  
 
Patterns of reasoning such as means-ends reasoning are then good patterns of 
practical reasoning because – when premises are true or well supported – they produce a 
response which is (defeasibly) supported by reasons. Indeed, if you intend to make some 
tea and boiling the cattle is a means to achieving that end, you have reasons to boil the 
cattle. By adopting means-end reasoning one is then able to reach a conclusion supported 
by reasons. Now, of course, if it turns out that drinking tea makes you sick, it appears 
your intention to boil the cattle is not well supported after all. But, as mentioned above, 
the goodness of the pattern of reasoning is independent of the goodness of the input 
provided: one can conform to a good pattern of reasoning while starting from bad (i.e. 
false, defeated, undercut) premises. As a result, my proposal is also compatible with 
Bernard Williams’ (1979) famous example that I already mentioned above:  you intend to 
drink gin and believe that there is gin in your glass. It is a good pattern of reasoning to 
move from these attitudes to intending to take a sip from your glass, even if in fact there 
is petrol in your glass. My proposal can make sense of this intuition: the transition from 
premises to conclusion instantiates a good pattern of reasoning because, if the premises 
were reasons he had, the conclusion would have been well supported. The fact that this 







Reasoning with Wrong Kinds of Reasons: For the Reason view to be able to 
explain good vs. bad reasoning, it has to commit to the controversial distinction between 
right and wrong kind of reasons. The reason for this is that, if it does not do so, such a 
view would be forced to say that, for instance, I desire to believe that p, therefore I 
believe that p is good reasoning. And this is intuitively unacceptable (McHugh and Way, 
2016: 11). 
Contrary to this objection, I don’t think that the Reason view is forced to accept 
the distinction between right vs. wrong reasons. Indeed, I believe it can happily stay 
neutral on this issue. Why? The short answer is that “I desire to believe that p, therefore I 
believe it” is not good reasoning because it is not a transition we can actually bring about 
in reasoning. Admittedly, justifying this claim requires a long argument; but here is a 
sketch of it: in reasoning we can’t aim at forming a belief with disregard for its being an 
appropriate default premise to be used in further reasoning. This is because belief’s 
functional role is to be a default premise in reasoning, and in reasoning we can’t try to 
form a belief with disregard of its role. And to be able to be appropriately used as a 
default premise, a belief needs to be epistemically sufficiently supported.  So in reasoning 
we must aim at forming a belief epistemically sufficiently supported. This is why “I 
desire to believe that p, therefore I believe it” is not reasoning at all: it is simply not a 
transition that constitutes reasoning. 
Admittedly, this is all very quick, but let me try to explain the rational for this 




fundamental aim we have when forming attitudes in general, namely that those attitudes 
need to be supported by sufficient reasons. Now, belief has a special role vis-à-vis 
reasoning: it functions as a default premise. As a result, to use a belief appropriately in 
reasoning one needs sufficient evidence for it, evidence that indicates that the belief is 
true, and that it can be a reason one has. This is why the way we can form beliefs in 
reasoning is constrained by the more general aim of reasoning and thus limited to the 
support offered by epistemic reasons. 136  
 
The Reason view says that means-end reasoning is a good inferential pattern 
because, if the premises are fit to be reasons, it will produce attitudes supported by 
sufficient reasons, other things being equal. This seems to rest on the assumption that 
intentions can be reasons. This view, however, is quite controversial (Broome, 2001: 99–
100).  
Contrary to what it may seem, I am not committed to that view, at least not 
directly. I am willing to adopt a form of normative cognitivism about intentions: 
intending to F means believing you ought to F or that you have sufficient reason to F. So, 
for instance, Schroeder (2009: 237) says that “intending entails believing that you ought”, 
Scanlon (2007: 87–88) maintains that “insofar as a subject has [...] intentions, it must see 
these as responsive to its assessment of the reasons for these states”, and Korsgaard 
(1997: 245–246), “you must take the act of your own will to be normative for you”. 
When applied to means-ends reasoning we have that, e.g., if I intend to have eggs for 
breakfast I see myself as having sufficient reasons for that. If it is true that I have 
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sufficient reasons to have eggs for breakfast and that I won’t have eggs for breakfast 
unless I go to the supermarket, then I also have sufficient reasons to intend to go to the 
supermarket. 
Gilbert Harman, Kieran Setiya, and David Velleman defend a view that goes in a 
similar direction: intending to F means believing one will F. At the heart of this, there is 
Anscombe’s point that we characteristically express our intention to F by asserting “I am 
going to F” (1957: 1). So the fact that I am going to have eggs for breakfast and that I 
won’t have eggs for breakfast unless I go to the supermarket, gives me reasons to believe 
that I will go to the supermarket. Believing that I will go the supermarket is intending to 
go there, so the fact that I am going to have eggs for breakfast and that I won’t have eggs 
for breakfast unless I go to the supermarket, supports that intention. This move de facto 
transforms means-end relations into a modus ponens transition, which explains why 
means-end transitions are good. 137 
  
                                                      
137  Although these views have raised concerns, it is worth keeping in mind that they have been 
independently and forcefully argued for in the literature, so my adopting either of them would not 





  WHAT GUIDES BELIEF  
Chapter 5  
“I do not think it adds anything to say that truth is a goal, of science or anything else. We 
do not aim at truth, but at honest justification” (Davidson 1999:461). 
 
 
Truth is what guides us when forming beliefs, and this is the result of the very 
nature of belief. Or so many believe. In this final chapter, I raise concerns for both of 
these claims, and propose a different view: when forming beliefs we try to form beliefs 
supported by sufficient epistemic reasons, and this is the result of the general aim we 
have when reasoning toward attitudes and the unique role belief has in securing that goal.  
 
Bernard Williams famously said that “belief aims at truth” (1973: 136). On a 
common teleologist reading of this expression, the aim of truth is constitutive of belief. 
That means that belief’s truth-directedness is part of the nature of belief and it is a feature 
that distinguishes beliefs from other kinds of attitudes. 138  Also belief aims at truth 
because belief is an attitude necessarily regulated by some truth directed mechanism. 139  
One key argument in support of the teleologist view is that it promises to explain 
a puzzling phenomenon about belief (hereafter the Explanandum): the fact, as it is often 
put, that we can’t believe at will, or that we have limited power over our beliefs. In this 
chapter, I first show that at least one recent prominent teleologist’s attempt to explain the 
limited control we have over beliefs fails, and this calls for a better explanation of the 
Explanandum. Then I offer my own view: what guides belief-formation is the goal of 
                                                      
138 Lynch, (2009), Railton (1994), Sosa (2008), Velleman (2000) all subscribe to this claim. Please see the 
Introduction for an explanation of the teleologist approach to the nature of belief.  
139 On the norm-based reading of belief’s truth-directedness, belief aims at truth because it is the attitude 
governed by the truth norm. On this view, the expression “belief aims at truth” does not mean that believers 
literally aim at having true beliefs or that belief itself has the goal of truth, but rather that truth is a norm 
that beliefs are necessarily governed by (Wedgwood 2002: 267). Usually, this view is coupled with 
attempts to ground epistemic normativity into the constitutive norm of belief. I will put this aside here, but 




having a belief only if it is sufficiently supported by evidence.  This aim of belief derives 
from a more general aim we have when forming attitudes through reasoning (as I argued 
in chapter 3 and 4) and from the role of belief in reasoning (the topic of chapter 1 and 2).   
 
WHAT WE ARE AFTER 
Imagine a demon offers you eternal happiness, if you believe something you have 
absolutely no evidence for but only evidence to the contrary. Such a belief is nothing 
really important and has very little value for you. And you are fully aware of that. 
Unfortunately, no matter how much you’d like to, it seems you really can’t form that 
belief just because you want to. This is, in a nutshell, the Explanandum, the phenomenon 
I will try to make sense of in this chapter.  
We will get a clearer understanding of this phenomenon later, but before doing 
that let me first point out a few things. First, a number of different and competing 
definitions have been offered to try to capture this puzzling mental phenomenon. In fact, I 
am calling it “the Explanandum” to try to remain neutral vis-à-vis all the different ways 
people have labeled it (e.g. doxastic involuntarism, transparency, weak/strong 
exclusivity). In addition, it is worth keeping in mind that the discussion surrounding the 
Explanandum is mostly based on intuitions of what we seem able or not able to do when 
it comes to forming beliefs. So the reader should be aware that, as people’s intuitions 
may differ, some disagreement on the phenomenon we are trying to pin down here is to 
be expected. Finally, one may think that the issue at stake is somewhat outlandish. The 
example of the demon may reinforce this idea: why should we care about the fact that we 




be better off having a false belief. For instance, we may be better off believing we will 
survive a terrible illness because this may increase our chances of survival. If our ability 
to influence our beliefs is limited, as I believe it is, then this has important consequences 
for our lives. What’s more, the issue here has some important philosophical upshots. For 
instance, the Explanandum seems to point to something deep about belief’s primary 
relation with truth, namely that truth appears to be our strongest and perhaps only 
concern when we deliberate and reason toward a belief. Some philosophers have gone as 
far as to say that this supports the view that truth is the only normative standard for 
correct belief.  
Here I will simply focus on the phenomenon at hand and ask, what is the 
Explanandum, and what is it that we can’t do when it comes to belief? Luckily, a 
proposal recently offered will help us get a better sense of the phenomenon we are 
investigating. A number of philosophers seem to subscribe to the following: 
Strong Explanandum 140 : in deliberation/reasoning 141  non-epistemic considerations 
cannot motivate us, qua reasons, to directly form or withhold a belief.  
                                                      
140 See, in particular, Kelly (2002), and Steglich-Petersen (2006). The formulation I am employing here is 
largely taken from McHugh’s (2013) formulation of (strong) exclusivity. Also, in a series of papers, Shah 
(2001; 2003; 2006; and Shah and Velleman, 2005) has investigated a phenomenon that he calls 
transparency (see Introduction for more). Transparency takes place in doxastic deliberation, namely when 
we ask ourselves what to believe. Initially, Shah (2003) presents the phenomenon of transparency as a 
phenomenological fact about how we doxastically deliberate. He points out that in doxastic deliberation the 
question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p is true. However, in his papers 
Shah points also to a weaker, slightly different notion of transparency. He refers to it as the “psychological 
phenomenon of transparency” (2006: 483), i.e. the “psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-
evidential reasons” (2006: 481). That means that, “only truth-regarding considerations move an agent in 
such [doxastic] deliberation” (2003: 468). This is the phenomenon I am focusing here. Finally, Parfit 
(2001) and others make the distinction between object/state reasons. Roughly, a reason for an attitude is 
object-given if it is a consideration that bears on the attitude’s object, while it is state-given if it is a 
consideration that bears on having the attitude itself. On this view, considerations that bear on the attitude’s 






At times, we come to form or drop a belief as a direct result of reasoning, i.e. as 
the last step of our reasoning process (Harman, 1986:2), and many seem to believe that in 
those cases non-epistemic considerations can’t move us. More specifically, if the Strong 
Explanandum is true, all considerations that have nothing to do with the truth of p cannot 
motivate us in deliberation or reasoning about whether to believe that p. And that includes 
considerations regarding the possible epistemic benefit of having some false beliefs. 
First, it is, of course, possible that non-epistemic considerations (e.g. “it would be 
pragmatically beneficial to believe that …”) may cause the formation of a belief in non-
deliberative contexts. What is special about the motivational role of epistemic 
considerations, though, is that in deliberation they can function as the reasons for which 
one forms a belief. It is notoriously hard to define “reasons for which”. Let’s say that R is 
a reason for which X φs only if R is capable of consciously and directly motivating R to φ 
when X deliberates on whether to φ and uses R as a premise in such deliberation (as 
explained by Shah, 2006: 485). Thus, the view here is that pragmatic considerations can 
play a role in motivating you to form an intention to engage in all the necessary actions 
that could make it the case that you end up forming a belief; but in deliberation there is 
no direct motivational link between consciously entertaining a pragmatic consideration as 
a premise and the formation of a belief. 
In addition, doxastic deliberation doesn’t always result in forming an actual belief 
but can, at times, conclude in suspension of judgment (or withholding of belief). I take 
                                                                                                                                                              
141 Deliberation seems to be a fairly high-level form of reasoning, usually sprung by the explicit questions: 
“What should I believe?”, “Is this right for me to accept?”. I’d claim that we don’t often deliberate about 
beliefs; we mostly simply reasons with and toward our beliefs. In (non-deliberative) reasoning we don’t 
pose any question, but go from belief to belief without explicitly attending to the relation between those 




withholding of belief (or suspension of judgment) that p to be the absence of the belief 
that p and the belief that not-p. Non-epistemic considerations, according to the 
formulation above, are not able to motivate us even to withhold beliefs as a result of 
deliberation. That means that, when you ask yourself whether to believe that p, and you 
reach the conclusion that you have strong evidence that p is true, non-epistemic 
considerations cannot make it the case that you suspend judgment about p.  
Theorists usually refer to intuitions which, they claim, strongly indicate that any 
consideration that appears to us as having nothing to do with the truth of a given 
proposition ‘p’ is incapable of playing the role of motivating us to form/withhold the 
belief that p as a result of deliberation. It is vital to stress that it is not simply that non-
epistemic considerations don’t motivate us in doxastic deliberation. The point is that non-
epistemic considerations cannot motivate us in doxastic deliberation. Here is an example 
often invoked. We generally believe that having optimistic expectations about one’s 
abilities and the future in general can, for the most part, boost people’s performance in 
various fields. An athlete, for instance, may realize that if she believes she will win the 
next game, she is more likely to be successful than if she holds realistic expectations. We 
usually agree that such practical considerations, however, are motivationally impotent 
with respect to her deliberating about whether to have that belief. Coming to the 
conclusion that it would be beneficial to have optimistic beliefs cannot motivate her to 
form those beliefs as a result of deliberation. Another classical example of this 
phenomenon is the Pascal’s Wager. The Pascal’s Wager has arguably demonstrated that 
it is prudentially advisable to believe in God. However, it seems that prudential 




Indeed, noticing that it is prudentially advisable to believe that God exists will not 
directly motivate you to form the belief that God exists. At best, it is able to motivate you 
to form an intention to do what could bring about the belief that God exists. More 
specifically, it could motivate you to trick yourself into believing that God exists. And 
similar examples and intuitions are invoked to argue that suspension of judgments cannot 
be motivated by non-epistemic reasons.  
Notwithstanding the fairly strong support these examples seem to have, some 
theorists find this analysis too strong. They claim that at times sufficient evidence does 
not compel us, and thus non-epistemic considerations are able to motivate us to refrain 
from forming a belief, even when one thinks one already has sufficient reasons for 
believing it. So, for instance, a judge on a death penalty case may be motivated to 
suspend judgment, even after reviewing evidence that he deems sufficient to judge the 
suspect to be guilty. The reason for doing so may be based on the consideration that other 
evidence may be coming in before he has to make the final decision, and so it is more 
prudent to keep an open mind vis-à-vis any new incoming proof. As a result, he suspends 
judgment on that.   
Similarly, based on pragmatic considerations, we may decide to suspend 
judgment on the truth of some proposition p and – as a result – keep inquiring on whether 
p is true, even when faced with sufficient evidence for the truth of p. Thus one may use 
pragmatic considerations (e.g. if I believe my husband is guilty that will ruin my life) to 
motivate oneself to keep inquiring on some important issue (e.g. did he really commit 




What’s more, some have worried that Exclusivity is too strong because it rules out 
cases like the following: “You are playing tennis. You are much stronger than your 
opponent, so you regard the possibility of defeat as far-fetched. If you believed that you 
would win, your confidence would make victory even more likely” (McHugh, 2012: 17). 
The suggestion here is that you can form a belief in reasoning based on the non-epistemic 
consideration that doing so will raise your chances of winning the match. In this case, it 
seems that non-epistemic considerations can influence your belief, qua reasons and in 
reasoning, because you already take yourself to have sufficient evidence for believing 
that you will win in the first place.142 Similarly, take two competing scientific theories 
which enjoy almost identical explanatory power and are well supported by the evidence. 
You have no clear epistemic reason to favor one over the other. However, whereas the 
first theory is very simple and elegant, the other one is extremely complicated and 
involves a good deal of cumbersome calculations. We might say that, in this case, we 
ground our belief in the first theory on non-epistemic reasons (e.g. avoiding complicated 
calculations). If right, this would show that pragmatic (non epistemic) considerations can 
motivate us in reasoning.  
Anyway, the jury is still out on who is right on this issue, and I suspect opposing 
intuitions will keep clashing. Luckily, though, we don’t need a verdict to continue our 
investigation. For simplicity, I will assume there is some minimal explanatory level any 
view offered has to meet to be considered feasible. We can call it ‘Weak Explanandum’ 
as it leaves open the possibility that pragmatic considerations may have some 
motivational force when it comes to suspending judgment. It also allows pragmatic 
                                                      




considerations to play a motivating role in forming the belief that p when one already has 
sufficient evidence that p is true: 
Weak Explanandum: in reasoning considerations not concerning the truth of p cannot 
motivate, qua reasons, to directly believe that p if an agent takes herself 143  to lack 
sufficient evidence that p is true. 144 In contrast, in reasoning epistemic considerations 
concerning p can motivate, qua reasons, an agent to directly believe that p based on those 
considerations, unless she takes those to provide insufficient evidence that p is true. 
The gist of this is that epistemic considerations (concerning the truth of 
proposition p) are sufficient to motivate an agent to believe as a result of reasoning, 
unless she has worries that those considerations do not provide enough evidence that p is 
in fact true. In contrast, in reasoning considerations that have nothing to do with the truth 
of p are themselves never sufficient to motivate one to believe that p. 145  Weak 
Explanandum is thus what we are after, the phenomenon we will try to make sense of in 
the rest of the chapter.  
 
THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW: BELIEVERS WANT THE TRUTH! 
Here is a very popular way to explain the Explanandum: believers aim at having 
true beliefs and avoid false beliefs, and this is why they are predominantly motivated by 
epistemic considerations when reasoning. It is not that believers aim at truth in all cases 
of belief-formation; indeed, they don’t aim at truth when unconscious processes produce 
                                                      
143 Merely having or lacking evidence that p is false/true is insufficient to prevent pragmatic considerations 
from motivating. It seems that more is required, i.e. the recognition that one lacks that evidence. 
144 This is taken from McHugh (2013). Below I will explain what ‘sufficient’ stands for here. 
145 For possible counterexamples to even this weak version of the Explanandum see, for instance, James 




their beliefs. However, they cannot but aim at true beliefs when engaging in the practice 
of reasoning.  
Indeed, the idea that believers want to have beliefs that are true has struck many 
as very intuitive to the point that this is often taken to be a truism. In addition, such a  
proposal seems to be theoretically quite fruitful:  ascribing an aim to belief may help to 
explain the source and authority of epistemic norms. Aims (at least when obtainable) 
determine rules conducive to achieving them. If the aim of belief is truth, then epistemic 
norms are what will get us there. Since this aim is allegedly constitutive of belief, all 
beliefs and believers are subject to these norms as well.  
Although intuitive, this view collides with another powerful intuition: sometimes 
believers think they would be better off believing something totally false. Indeed, if 
facing the choice between having a trivial false belief and saving humanity from 
destruction, I am quite sure it would be extremely callous on our part to choose the latter 
over the former! So we need more to explain why, contrary to our inclinations, we don’t 
seem to have much of a choice when it comes to forming beliefs.  
There are two strategies to address this.  One is to say that believers want true and 
only true beliefs because truth is the sole constitutive normative standard for belief. When 
forming beliefs we are necessarily bound by this truth norm. 146 Note, however, that to 
explain the Explanandum this view requires subscribing to a strong form of motivational 
internalism in which accepting the truth norm means being necessarily motivated by it. 
And this seems quite a commitment to take, which has turned many away from this 
proposal (McHugh, 2013). 
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The second, more promising view is that by nature belief is truth-
directed/regulated, and that constrains believers’ goals in forming beliefs as well. This is 
the teleological view of belief.  
As already mentioned in chapter 2, this view has David Velleman (2000) among 
its strongest proponents. Velleman’s view starts off by noticing that belief is part of a 
large group of attitudes – called acceptances (i.e. belief, supposition, imagining) – that all 
present their content as true. However, they do it for different reasons. Belief regards its 
content as true with the aim of it really being true. In contrast, imagining presents its 
content as true with the aim of, e.g., having fun. And supposing presents its content as 
true with the goal of, e.g., showing that it is false.  
So what sets belief apart is that it aims at truth, which, for Velleman, means that 
belief is a truth-regulated acceptance: believing that p means accepting that p is true, and 
such a state is either produced by an intention to accept only the truth of p or it is de facto 
regulated by a cognitive mechanism with the function of tracking the truth.  
As a theory of the nature of belief, we should expect that the teleological account 
will be able to make sense of the Explanandum (either weak or strong). Unfortunately, 
this is where Velleman’s proposal fails. Here is why. There are two possible readings of 
belief’s truth-directedness: one is that for an acceptance to count as a belief it needs to be 
entirely/mostly truth-regulated (strong reading). Alternatively, we may say that for an 
acceptance to count as a belief it needs to be only minimally truth-regulated: it is possible 
that non-epistemic factors may predominantly influence the formation of a belief (weak 
reading). This, however, raises the following dilemma (taken from Shah, 2003). If we 




we desire to believe, for instance, simply cannot (strongly) influence our beliefs, and this 
explains why in reasoning non-epistemic considerations cannot be – at least not 
predominantly – reasons for which we form a belief (assuming that ‘reasons for which’ 
are causes). Unfortunately, however, if we embrace this strong view, we end up with the 
very unintuitive proposal that our attitudes are never subliminally influenced by our 
desires and emotions. But this is too strong: we know that some of people’s beliefs are 
predominantly influenced by non-epistemic factors, but we still want to call them beliefs. 
If, on the other hand, we adopt the weak reading, then we allow for the possibility that 
our beliefs may be  predominantly influenced by non-epistemic factors; but then we lose 
sight of the Explanandum. Although our beliefs are at times strongly influenced by our 
desires, in reasoning these cannot motivate us, qua reasons, to form a belief for which we 
do not have sufficient evidence. They cannot be predominant, at least. The (weak) aim of 
belief does not seem able to explain why this is the case.  
But there is hope for the teleologist: Steglich-Petersen (2006) has recently offered 
a way to diffuse this objection. The teleologist’s dilemma is avoidable, he says. Steglich-
Petersen is in agreement with Velleman that belief is an acceptance that aims at truth. 
First, belief aims1 [subpersonally] at truth in the sense that if belief is at least weakly 
truth-regulated, it is influenced, formed, caused by some truth-tracking mechanism. 
Second, belief aims2 at truth in the sense that, in forming a belief, the believer has the 
goal to form an acceptance that is strongly regulated for truth. This second sense of 
belief’s truth-directedness is what can explain the Explanandum. 
But why should we think that belief aims2 at truth in that way? Let me explain the 




weakly regulated for truth. So to form an attitude that aims1 at truth it is enough to aim at 
forming an attitude that is weakly regulated for truth. But to be weakly regulated for truth 
it is enough that one’s belief is minimally influenced by some truth-tracking mechanism. 
But if to form a belief through reasoning, one can simply aim at forming a belief weakly 
regulated for truth, it is possible that one is motivated by non-epistemic considerations to 
form a belief for which one has insufficient evidence.  
How can Steglich-Petersen solve this? To explain why belief aims2 at truth 
Steglich-Petersen invokes the “common-sense concept of belief” which, on his view, is 
different from the empirical concept of belief as only the latter is open to the idea that 
belief is weakly regulated for truth. As he (2006: 511) explains this,  
[A]lthough there is a sense in which all it takes for something to be a 
belief is that it involves weak truth-regulation, the common-sense concept 
of belief involved when intending to form a belief […] involves strong 
truth-regulation simply because in that context, what one normally means 
by ‘intending to form a belief’ is intending to accept a proposition if and 
only if that proposition is true.  
 
That is: In any intentional or personal-level belief-formation process – which by 
and large encompasses doxastic deliberation and reasoning – we apply the concept of 
belief and this contains the idea of strong truth-regulation and making sure one’s belief is 
true.  
 This point becomes clearer once we turn our attention to Steglich-Petersen’s 
parallel between the concepts “believing” and “concealing”. He points out that these 
concepts both refer to aimed-directed activities: belief’s point is to get to truth and 
concealing aims at making sure something is not found. Now, Steglich-Petersen 




of “concealing”. Whereas in our intention to conceal some chocolate we are guided by 
the idea that our action will count as concealing only if it is carried out very well and it is 
likely to succeed, in reality “not all the instances of what we would be willing to call 
‘concealings’ are particularly well carried out” (Steglich-Petersen. 2006: 512). If I intend 
to hide some chocolate, put it in the cupboard and then unwillingly leave the doors of the 
cupboard open, my action seems to count as an instance of ‘concealing the chocolate’, 
regardless of the fact that it clearly fails at that. That is, Steglich-Petersen’s point is that it 
seems that when we describe the act of intentionally concealing something, we use some 
strong notion of what counts as concealment; when we describe an act of concealment 
per se, we are less strict.  
Steglich-Petersen takes this true of belief as well, but the parallel fails. Here is 
why. Steglich-Petersen (2006: 512) says, “all it takes for a bit of behaviour to count as 
‘concealment of x from Y’ is that it is weakly regulated for ensuring that Y will not find 
x.” But is that always so? Again imagine I move the chocolate from the kitchen table to 
the cupboard, but then leave the doors of the cupboard open; absent any intention to hide 
the chocolate in the first place, does my action really count as concealment? I doubt it: 
unless one is trying to hide the chocolate and fails, weak concealment is no concealment; 
it is just moving the chocolate from one place to another. That means that an action is an 
instance of concealing only if it has some strong regulation toward fulfilling the aim of 
concealing, namely a regulation either coming from my intention to hide the chocolate or 
from an action that in fact results in hiding the chocolate. So the intention to conceal must 
be an intention to successfully conceal because, if the concealing is poorly conducted, it is 




That is not true of belief. Recall, the teleologist wants to say that a weakly 
regulated belief is a belief nonetheless, even absent any intention to make it a successful 
belief. That means: belief can aim at truth in a weak sense, whereas concealing aims at 
hiding only in a strong sense. Here is the problem for the teleologist: when we intend to 
form a belief, we aim at bringing a new belief into existence. If the only thing required 
for belief is weak truth-regulation, I should be able to intentionally bring about a belief 
that is only weakly truth-regulated. Contrary to what Steglich-Petersen claims, the 
analogy with concealing is unhelpful because, in the case of concealing, if I intend to 
bring about a weakly regulated concealment I am not concealing at all, because there is 
no such thing.  
Steglich-Petersen’s strategy was to claim that, as for the concept of concealment, 
the concept of belief just entails that beliefs strongly aim at truth. But as I showed, 
whereas there is an explanation for why this is so in the case of concealment (i.e. there is 
no such thing as weakly regulated concealment), we are left with no explanation for why 
this happens with belief (given that belief can be weakly regulated). The teleologist can’t 
explain the Explanandum, and so we need a better view.  
 
REASONING’S CONSTITUTIVE AIM  
Since the teleologist has no clear way to account for the Explanandum, the 
teleologist’s claim that something in the nature of belief determines its special relation 
with truth seems to lose ground. The view I am about to propose is in clear opposition to 
the teleologist’s narrative about truth and belief. In chapter 2, I defended a definition of 




argument here, and then argue that the Explanandum is the result of the goal we have 
when forming beliefs through reasoning. This aim is the result of the more general aim 
we have when reasoning and of the unique role belief has in reasoning. The reader should 
keep in mind, though, that nothing I am about to say is meant to inform the debate on 
whether there is a truth norm of belief or not. That normative issue is simply beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
Let me start by rehearsing the view of reasoning presented in chapter 3 and 4. 
Reasoning, I claim, is a special kind of inference. It is an inference guided by a 
constitutive aim or goal. 147 More specifically, reasoning is the inferential process guided 
by the aim of arriving at a conclusion supported by at least sufficient reasons.  
The conclusion of all reasoning consists in dropping, reaffirming, forming or 
suspending (avoiding forming) an attitude. Doing one of those things in a way that is 
supported by sufficient reasons is the constitutive and fundamental aim of reasoning. 
Insofar as the reader accepts the idea that correctly responding to reasons is tantamount to 
being rational, my claim here is that reasoning aims at rationality, or at least at this sense 
of rationality.148 On my view, the aim of reasoning is an aim of the agent, a goal the agent 
necessarily has when reasoning. An aim is a desire to obtain a certain result (Sosa, 2010). 
The aim one has is mostly shown in the dispositions one has. In this sense, having an aim 
or goal means being motivated by certain considerations and not others, and disposed to 
prevent certain occurrences to happen, and change things around if the aim is not 
                                                      
147 For other views of reasoning see Broome, 2013; Boghossian, 2014; McHugh and Way (2016); Neta, 
2013; Pettit, 1993; Wedgewood, 2006. 
148 We are rational, Joseph Raz has suggested, insofar as we exercise the capacities that enable us, in 
general, to respond correctly to reason. So when reasoning, I claim, we aim at fulfilling that capacity, at 





satisfied. Also, the aim of reasoning does not have to be necessarily consciously 
entertained by the reasoner; however, a normally competent reasoner will not explicitly 
(and sincerely) deny that this is her aim when reasoning. Finally, note that it is possible 
that there are multiple aims in reasoning. However, the constitutive aim is the one aim 
that is always present.  
Normative reasons are things that count in favor of (or against) 149  a certain 
response. By “response”, I mean the holding, withholding or dropping of an attitude. 
Sufficient normative reasons are considerations that ‘sufficiently’ count in favor of a 
given response given all the information one possesses and that are available to her. (I 
will assume, somewhat vaguely, that a reason is available when it is a true proposition or 
fact perceptually within my reach and/or easily inferable given what I know). And, an 
agent S has sufficient reason to φ only when S has a reason to φ, and no stronger reason 
not to φ; but I will have more to say about sufficient reasons later.  
As already pointed out at length above, there is a lively discussion in philosophy 
on the nature of normative reasons. In particular, people debate on whether or not reasons 
are factive (facts, true propositions, true mental states). Although many find the factive 
view to be quite reasonable, some have questioned it arguing that rationality consists in 
responding correctly to one’s subjective reasons (e.g. Parfit 2001, 2011; Schroeder, 2008; 
Way, 2009). That is, some theorists maintain that there are two reason-relations, i.e. the 
objective reason relation and the subjective reason relation. An objective reason is a 
reason there is for someone to do or believe something; a subjective reason is a reason 
                                                      
149 I assume that reasons against A are reasons in favour of not-A. However, in the case of attitudes this 
may be a little more complicated. So a reason against the belief that p, may be a reason in favor either 
suspending judgment or believing that not-p. I will leave this issue aside here as it does not have any 




someone has. Objective reasons are factive. Subjective reasons are mental states and may 
be non-factive. As mentioned previously, when it comes to my view of reasoning, 
though, it would be odd to say that, when reasoning, we aim at reaching a conclusion 
supported by reasons regardless of their truth. Subjective normative reasons are reasons 
that that would be objective reasons were they true. Thus the notion of subjective reason 
itself depends on the idea of objective reasons which is, if you will, the normative 
relation (whereas subjective reasons are derivative in this sense). Hence, it seems 
reasonable to claim that, if reasoning aims at rationality, then the notion of reason at play 
must be factive. That is, we don’t want to reach a conclusion that is responsive to all the 
reasons there are in favor of it, as many of those reasons may be beyond our reach. At the 
same time, it seems natural to say that, for our subjective reasons, we want out conclusion 
to be responsive only to those that are factive. I will thus adopt this view in what follows, 
and assume that normative reasons must be factive. 
Why think reasoning is guided by the aim of reaching conclusions supported by 
sufficient normative reasons? In reasoning, we don’t just wonder from one premise to 
another while ending up with some conclusion in mind at the end. In reasoning, we have 
a focus, something we want to reach. And the claim that reasoning has a constitutive aim 
makes sense of the fact that, intuitively, reasoning is an activity (Broome, 2013). I made 
this point related to gardening before: there is no gardening if you stop aiming at making 
your plants grow. You can decide to stop watering or trimming them, and prefer to let 
them grow as they want. However, the moment you do that, you are not gardening your 
plants anymore. Hence, the activity of gardening itself has a constitutive aim. Similarly, 




may have, if one still counts as reasoning. Its aim-directedness thus puts reasoning very 
close to other activities and makes sense of the idea that reasoning is itself an activity. 150 
In reasoning we want a conclusion that is well supported. Boghossian (2014:5) 
presented roughly the same idea in the following way: “no causal process counts as 
[reasoning], unless it consists in an attempt to arrive at a belief by figuring out what, in 
some suitably broad sense, is supported by other things one believes. In the relevant 
sense, reasoning is […] something that we do with an aim—that of figuring out what 
follows or is supported by other things one believes.” Indeed, if an agent were to reason 
from premise P to conclusion C while also saying that P offers no (sufficient) support to 
C, we would doubt this agent is reasoning at all. That is, denying that our premises offer 
support for the conclusion we just reached through reasoning undermines the very 
process of reasoning.  
Finally, the idea of reasoning being guided by an aim seems helpful to make sense 
of the claim that reasoning is a kind of thought process in which the conclusion we arrive 
at is a conclusion we endorse. This will be key in this chapter: the attitudes we endorse 
are the attitudes we are ready to use in further reasoning. In contrast, the attitudes we 
have but do not take responsibility for are the attitudes we will likely refrain from using 
in any future deliberation. On a first pass, the idea that reasoning has an aim – any aim – 
seems to be able to make sense of all that: the attitudes we reach through reasoning are 
attitudes that (seem to us to) fulfill the aim we have when reasoning; they fulfill our goal 
and thus we endorse them.  Although quite intuitive, this proposal raises the worry that 
not all the goals we have are goals we want to have (or that we endorse). I claim, in 
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contrast, that the aim of reasoning is not just any aim: it is the aim of reaching a rational 
conclusion, i.e. a conclusion supported by (at least) sufficient reasons. Now, taking 
something to be rational seems tantamount to endorsing it. Rationality is what is 
intelligible and makes sense to us, 151  thus reaching what we take to be a rational 
conclusion is reaching a conclusion that we can stand behind, identify with and take 
responsibility for. The reason why reasoning forms attitudes we endorse is because 
reasoning is the process aimed at forming attitudes supported by reasons - so arriving at 
the conclusion of reasoning means endorsing it because one necessarily sees it as 
rational/supported by reasons. That does not mean one needs to believe that the reached 
conclusion is rational: it is the fact that we reasoned to it that expresses our 
endorsement.152 As a result, the aim of reaching a rational (i.e. sufficiently supported by 
reasons) conclusion easily explains why in reasoning we reach attitudes we necessarily 
endorse.  
 
BELIEFS AS DEFAULT PREMISES  
It often considered a truism in philosophy that believing that p means being 
disposed to use ‘p’ as a premise in one’s reasoning. For instance, Williamson claims that 
“one believes p outright when one is prepared to use p as a premise in practical 
reasoning.” (2000: 99). Accordingly, “[…] if a person consistently refused to rely on p as 
a premise, and rejected arguments relying on it, then it would be plausible to say that he 
did not really believe that p” (Scanlon, 2007: 91). Indeed, it seems that if one is not 
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intelligible both to the agent and to others”. 
152 Thus, my proposal explains why reasoning to an attitude is tantamount to endorsing it without any need 





prepared to use the content of one’s belief as premise in one’s reasoning and to be guided 
and motivated by it, one does not really believe it. If you believe that smoking causes 
cancer but then fail to apply this proposition in any of your reasonings (e.g. smoking 
causes cancer so I shouldn’t smoke), then there are good chances that you don’t really 
believe it. 
At the same time, though, that does not mean that what I believe de facto 
influences all my reasoning. Indeed, it is compatible with this view of belief that, at 
times, when reasoning, we don’t let ourselves be guided by what we believe. Let me 
mention some relevant cases (see also chapter 1 and 2).  
As in chapter 1, take Scott, a surgeon at the local hospital. He is ready to perform 
a kidney surgery on one of his patients. Scott has high credence that the kidney that needs 
to be removed is the left one. He also fully believes that, although he is not certain. Given 
the stakes, Scott is quick to recognize that, were he to be mistaken, the consequences 
would be terrible. So he decides to stop by his office and check his patient’s dossier 
before preforming the surgery. That is, when stakes are very high, we do not reason with 
our beliefs as premises – we use other attitudes. But belief is still our default premise in 
reasoning, namely it is what we would normally use to reason (Ross and Schroeder, 
2014). Similarly, it is hard to deny that at times we reason with assumptions and 
hypothesis. These, however, are attitudes adopted as premises usually only in limited 
contexts. That means, believing equals being disposed to use a proposition as default 
premise, i.e. as a premise we use in day-to-day situations. Other attitudes may enter our 





To be clear, that does not mean that in normal contexts we always reason based 
on what we believe, though. Take this: I believe my boss is an incompetent man, but I 
refrain from using this in my day-to-day reasoning, as I fear the consequences this may 
have. I do believe it, but I am wise enough to voluntarily limit its influence. The idea here 
is that I am disposed to reason with that belief, but I decide not to do so. A similar 
phenomenon takes place when beliefs get compartmentalized because of some failure of 
our cognitive systems. Here is an example discussed above and offered by Lewis (1982). 
A resident of Princeton has the following three inconsistent beliefs: she believes that 
Nassau St. runs North-South; he believes that the railroad tracks run East-West: and 
finally she believes that Nassau Street and the railroad tracks run parallel to one another. 
What’s going on here is, according to Lewis, that the agent can harbor contradictory 
beliefs: one is that the street and the tracks run North-South, and the other is that the 
street and the tracks run East-West. How is that possible? The idea is that the agent fails 
to bring those beliefs to bear, she simply does not see that they are in contradiction 
because she does not activate them at the same time, in the same contexts. Her beliefs 
are, that is, compartmentalized (Stalnaker, 1984; Egan, 2008). As a result they both get to 
be activated and used in reasoning, albeit in different situations.  It is important to notice 
that compartmentalization is not a feature of belief itself (as it is for attitudes such 
assumptions and hypothesis), but the result of an abnormal situation that limits the range 
of influence of a particular belief. Absent or lifted these external influences, belief gets 
back to its job of being a default premise. 153  
                                                      
153 I argued at length for this view of belief in the second chapter of the dissertation. There the reader will 




Given the role belief has in reasoning, it is to be expected that belief has a part to 
play in reaching reasoning’s constitutive goal. I argued that reasoning aims at arriving at 
a conclusion supported by normative reasons, so it seems natural to see belief as 
providing those reasons. Since belief is a default disposition to use a proposition as 
premise, then it means that it is a default disposition to use a proposition p as a reason in 
reasoning. 154  To illustrate, since I believed that Trump would be an incompetent 
President, I was disposed to use this a reason not to vote for him in the 2016 Presidential 
Elections. And now that he has been elected President of the United States, my belief 
about his abilities is used as a reason for me to believe that the economy is probably not 
going to substantially improve over the next years. And so on. So now let’s see what that 
means for the Explanandum.  
 
BELIEVING THROUGH REASONING  
At last, here is my explanation for the Explanandum. Above I sketched an account 
of reasoning as a thought process guided by an aim. This is a constitutive aim, in the 
sense that it is necessarily present in all instances of reasoning. But it is also a 
fundamental or basic aim, in the sense that it should be able to explain other key goals we 
may have when reasoning. Thus, it should not come as a surprise if the aim of reasoning 
is able to account for the specific, constitutive goal we have when reasoning toward 
beliefs (vs. the goal we have when we reason toward different attitudes).  
                                                      
154 A similar view has been expressed by Scanlon who maintains that believing that p “involves recognizing 
[p] as having the status of something that is to be relied on in further theoretical reasoning by providing 





Now, the aim of reasoning is in general to have one’s conclusion sufficiently 
supported by (factive) normative reasons. So a good premise is a premise that is (at least) 
true because it is a premise that does what it is supposed to do: it supports the conclusion 
of reasoning. Imagine then a situation in which I want to form a belief that I can use in 
future reasoning. Clearly, I am going to strive to form a good premise. Since the goal of 
reasoning is reaching a conclusion supported by reasons, I will not treat a proposition as a 
reason or adopt it as premise if I doubt its truth.  That would go against the aim of 
reasoning.  
At the same time, though, when we strive to form a good premise, a premise that 
can be a reason, we can’t literally strive for truth, as that would require that we aimed at 
being certain of each proposition we treat as a reason. But we can’t aim at being certain 
that our premises are true, otherwise we would have basically no premises, given that 
probability 1 is really hard to obtain. In fact, when we treat a proposition as a reason we 
are most of the time not certain that it is a reason and thus true. We use it as if we were 
certain of it155. We said belief is a default disposition to use a proposition as a reason in 
reasoning. It is what we use as a reason in normal cases. That means that, since I want to 
use the believed proposition p as default premise, I want that p is supported enough to 
give me some reliability when treating it as true in reasoning. So when forming a belief 
that we want to use as default in further reasoning, we need to strive to form a belief that 
is – by our own lights – supported by sufficient reasons for its truth. To be used by 
default, a premise must be a proposition that appears/ is not doubted to be supported by 
sufficient epistemic reasons, reasons that by and large can guarantee its truth.  
                                                      
155 As pointed out by Ross and Schroeder, this seems to be a heuristic method of reasoning that requires a 




How much is sufficient evidence for a proposition to be treated as a default 
premise? A proposition can be treated as a default premise in reasoning only if an agent 
can feel epistemically confortable relying on in further reasoning in normal contexts, i.e. 
context in which the stakes are not too high. A plausible view is that sufficient evidence 
for an agent’s belief that p is evidence that is strong enough to rule out that the belief that 
p is easily false given the evidence she has, but not so strong that it requires that she is 
actually certain of it. And, plausibly, ‘easily’ here is the degree of support in the 
proposition p that rules out we have knowledge that p is true.156 So let me make the 
reasonable stipulation that I have sufficient evidence in a believed proposition for it to be 
used as a default premise in reasoning if and only if I would also count as knowing it, if 
that proposition were true. And additional reason for this assumption is that there is now 
considerable support for the claim that one appropriately treats a proposition as premise if 
and only if one knows it (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). Following the host of intuitions 
on which this view is based, it seems that people deem that the necessary support to 
appropriately use a proposition as a premise in reasoning is whatever support that would 
ensure knowledge. At least, this seems to be true for the normal cases, i.e. situations in 
which the stakes are not too high. The result of this is the plausible claim that, when 
forming a belief that we want to use by default in further reasoning, we need to strive to 
form a belief that is supported enough to count as knowledge, if true. 
When forming a belief that we want to use in further reasoning, we need to strive 
to form a belief that is supported enough to count as knowledge if true. That’s my claim 
so far. But why should we necessarily care about using a belief in future reasoning?   
                                                      





Why can’t I form a belief through reasoning with disregard for its truth? I mean, it seems 
I should be able to do that, at least while promising to myself that I will limit its 
influence.  
I believe the answer is in the phenomenon of reasoning itself. When I reason 
toward an attitude I must aim at forming an attitude I subscribe to. When one engages in 
reasoning one is trying to arrive at a conclusion one endorses, a reasonable conclusion by 
one’s light. That was one of the elements of reasoning I mentioned above.  
Naturally, a belief I endorse is also a default premise I endorse, i.e. a default 
premise I see as legitimate. How could I endorse a belief, but then not rely on it? 
Presumably, if I see belief B as an expression of my rational agency, it seems that I can’t, 
at the same time, refuse to use belief B as a guide in my deliberation.  
As a result, one cannot both engage in reasoning and try to form a belief that one 
believes one would not be able to use as a default premise. Aiming at forming a belief 
with disregard for its sufficient epistemic support means trying to form a belief that we 
endorse, but that we know we would not be able to use as a legitimate default premise. 
But this is contradictory. So we can’t have that aim. The aim of having an epistemically 
supported belief is a constitutive aim of reasoning, and it is an aim that trumps any other 
aim we have. 
And this explains the weak Explanandum: when reasoning toward a belief we aim 
at forming a belief at least sufficiently supported by epistemic reasons. As a result, we 
can be motivated to form a belief that p by evidential considerations pertaining to the 
truth of p (unless we suspect that these considerations are not sufficient reasons that p is 




suspect that we don’t have enough evidence that p is true. This is why non-epistemic 
considerations have limited direct impact on the formation of beliefs; in contrast, 
epistemic considerations are enough to motivate us to directly form a belief, unless 
deemed to be insufficient to guarantee that that belief can be used as a default premise in 
reasoning.157  
In conclusion, since we can’t but want to have true premises and thus true beliefs 
when reasoning in general, when trying to form a default premise, i.e. a belief, we can’t 
but try to form a belief for which we can’t be easily mistaken. Aiming at having 
epistemically sufficiently supported belief is the necessary aim we have when reasoning 
towards beliefs. The source of that aim is reasoning’s fundamental goal of rationality, the 
role belief plays in it and the fact that, when we try to form a belief in reasoning, we can’t 
but aim at forming a belief we can use as a default premise in future reasoning.  
 
OBJECTIONS 
OBJECTION The analysis above aims to explain why we can’t form a belief 
disregarding its epistemic support. However, such a proposal does not seem applicable 
to suspension of judgment. More specifically, it seems that, in most cases at least, 
epistemic considerations dominate deliberation that ends with suspending judgment as 
well. To illustrate: in most cases, even if we believe that it would be for us beneficial to 
not have a certain belief (e.g. I have high probabilities to lose the next match, I have an 
incurable illness), it seems that it is almost impossible to come to suspend judgment if we 
                                                      
157 The fact that I necessarily do care about having beliefs that are sufficiently justified does not close, for 
me, the question of whether I ought to care. So nothing I am saying here bears on the normative question 




also have strong evidence that that belief is true. It is unclear how the view proposed 
above can explain that, since suspension of judgment does not have a role in reasoning.  
To address this objection first let me point out that the aim of reasoning applies 
even when, in reasoning, we end up suspending an attitude or withholding it. It is true 
that talking about sufficient reasons may sound problematic when referred to suspension 
of judgment and withholding of attitudes. The idea, though, is that when reasoning we 
want our conclusion to correctly respond to the reasons we have. If intended broadly 
enough, that means we can respond to the lack of sufficient reasons for an attitude by 
dropping it. So, for instance, if I lack sufficient reasons to hold a belief that p, while 
lacking sufficient reasons to disbelief that p, I respond correctly to my (lacking of) 
sufficient reason only if I suspend judgment on p. Similarly, if I drop the belief that p 
even though I have enough evidence to support it, in most cases it means that I miss the 
goal of reasoning by issuing an unjustified or irrational conclusion. 
In addition, the reason why we can’t just decide to suspend judgment whenever 
we want is also related to belief’s role in reasoning. If one has sufficient epistemic 
reasons to believe that p, suspending judgment may compromise future reasoning.  
Attitudes such as belief are systematically linked to a host of other attitudes. Holding or 
withholding any such attitude is bound to have effects on the attitudes we have and use in 
our reasoning. So deciding to withhold a belief that is likely to be true will have an effect 
on the other attitudes and beliefs we have or might have. The risk of compromising future 
reasoning is thus very high, and this explains why – even in accordance with Weak 
Explanandum – the direct influence of pragmatic considerations over suspension of 





OBJECTION: The view proposed here is that in reasoning we are motivated by 
the goal of forming a belief only if epistemically supported. This idea seems to fall short 
of the intuitive claim that we want true beliefs (assuming that sufficiently supported 
beliefs may be false). If we discover that we reasoned toward a false belief, we usually 
deem this to be a failure even if the belief was itself sufficiently supported.  
It really does seem that we regard false but sufficiently justified beliefs as a 
failure or a missed target. And my view does explain why false beliefs are problematic, 
and why reasoning toward a false belief is a failure. Beliefs are our default dispositions to 
use propositions as our premises. This means that, since the goal of reasoning is to have 
conclusions supported by true premises, a false belief fails in what it is supposed to do 
qua premise. And reasoning toward a belief that turns out to be false is a failure insofar as 
the goal of belief-formation through reasoning is to form premises for future reasoning.  
If we use a false belief as premise in reasoning, there is a failing in our reasoning.158 The 
practice of reasoning itself – as I depicted – entails that reasoning toward a false belief is 
a misstep. Hence, what distinguishes my position from the widely-popular, alethic-
teleological view is that on my view the value of truth is not intrinsic to the attitude of 
belief but emerges out of the practice of reasoning.  
But why not saying that truth is the goal we have in reasoning towards belief? 
That has struck many as a plausible position. I find this proposal problematic and 
generally less convincing than the view I am putting forward. On one version of such a 
                                                      
158  In a recent paper, Huw Price (2003) tackles a somewhat similar issue and offers an analogous 
conclusion. He calls truth a “convenient friction” and argues that we take ourselves to be bound by a norm 
of truth not because there is necessarily such a norm, but because this is a necessary condition for human 
discourse. In conversational practice “speakers take themselves and their fellows to be governed by a norm 




proposal, the goal reasoners have is to form a belief only if that belief is true. Reasoners 
could satisfy the goal, though, of only truth by simply avoiding any belief. That is, 
suspending judgment on any subject matter would just do for them. But of course this is 
not what reasoners do, and the goal of reasoning is hardly met by simply avoiding 
forming beliefs all together.  Relatedly, saying that we aim only at truth in theoretical 
reasoning is either too strong or uninformative.  If we are really after only truth, 
excluding any other goal, why do we accept to believe anything short of what has 
subjective probability 1? That would be in fact the best way to achieve the goal to avoid 
false beliefs. But if certainty were the goal here, we would form basically no belief via 
reasoning, given that probability 1 is really hard to get. So saying that believers are 
motivated by the goal of having only true beliefs is ascribing to believers an almost 
impossible aim: the aim of certainty. Alternatively, what we mean is that we want the 
truth but only to some degree. But how much do we want that? That becomes the real 
question.   
A final, more promising, move is to say that, for some proposition p they are 
considering in reasoning, reasoners aim at believing p if and only if p is true. That would 
deliver the Explanandum, while avoiding the pitfalls of the first formulation of the truth-
aim. Indeed we now seem able to explain why we want beliefs that are epistemically 
justified but not necessarily certain: we want to avoid false beliefs, but also make sure 
that, if the proposition we are considering is likely to be true, we do end up believing it.  
Still, I worry that this formulation of the aim of truth is too strong. I worry about 
cases in which, unbeknownst to us, we are precluded from reaching the truth. In 




prospective may be limited and the reasons we have access to, even when sufficient, may 
constitute only a small subset of the reasons we could potentially get access to were we in 
a better epistemic position. In those cases, truth may be outside our reach as there may be 
pieces of evidence we will never be able to obtain. And it seems intuitive to say that we 
can’t aim at having a goal that is unobtainable. Based on the truth aim, in those cases we 
would not be able to form a belief through reasoning – which seems quite unintuitive. As 
a result, the aim of truth seems too strong to capture that kind of reasoning.159  
In addition, there is not clear explanation for why in reasoning we would aim at 
truth and only at truth. This formulation of the aim of truth completely rules out cases in 
which, based on pragmatic considerations, we may decide to avoid forming a belief for 
which we have enough epistemic support. As I mentioned above, given the aim of 
reasoning, we know why the direct influence of pragmatic considerations over suspension 
of judgment is also severely limited. But from what I said, we have no reasons to believe 
that pragmatic considerations have no influence over suspension of judgment. So the 
view that we aim at truth and only at truth cannot be vindicated within the theoretical 
frame I argued for in this chapter. This is why I reject it. 160  
                                                      
159 There are also cases in which truth is not our goal, and overtly so.  In particular, scientific reasoning 
hardly aims at truth. It is widely held, even by scientific realists, that even our best scientific theories are 
likely false. Although over time our inquiry may be approximating truth, as they are working through the 
construction of a scientific theory, the goal of truth is likely not what scientists are aiming for. Empirical 
adequacy may just do it for them. However, there are good reasons to suspect that the attitude scientists 
have and form through reasoning may not often be belief, but a form of acceptance. Similarly, van Fraassen 
(1980) has proposed a distinction between acceptance of an empirical theory and believing it to be true, 
arguing that evidence of a theory’s empirical adequacy justifies one only accepting rather than believing. 
160 Whiting (2014) also uses the aim of (pragmatic) reasoning and the role belief has in reasoning to make 
sense of the ‘aim of belief’ which, however, he sees as the thesis that subjects are committed to 
evidentialism (whereas I make no such claim here).  His argument is that we aim to act only on the basis of 
practical reasons, and thus when we aim to form an action through reasoning we must aim to form it as 
based on reasons. Belief plays the role in premise in reasoning and so belief must be true. This proposal, 





OBJECTION There is now considerable support for the claim that one 
appropriately treats a proposition as premise only if one knows it (Hawthorne and 
Stanley 2008). As a result, one would expect that, when forming a belief that p through 
reasoning one aims at putting oneself in a position to correctly treat p as a reason. That 
also means that when forming the belief that p through reasoning, since we are 
committed to using it as a premise for future reasoning, we must necessarily aim at 
actually knowing that p. That is, when it comes to formation of belief, reasoning aims at 
forming a belief only if one knows its content.  
My proposal is compatible with the intuition that something goes wrong if I treat 
a proposition as a reason in reasoning but fail to have knowledge of its truth. On my 
view, this is a combination of two things. First, to correctly treat p as a reason we need 
enough guarantee that p is true. That means that I have sufficient evidence in a believed 
proposition to use it as a reason only in case that, if that proposition is true, I would also 
count as knowing it. Second, it follows from my account of reasoning that a piece of 
reasoning is good when we get to a conclusion supported by reasons. Thus, if in 
reasoning we treat p as a reason, our reasoning fails if p turns out to be false. So if I have 
enough evidence that p is true, but p is still false, what is wrong is that my use of p as a 
                                                                                                                                                              
if p is a reason (and thus true). But this is compatible with the fact that (1) they may be completely 
motivated by pragmatic considerations for suspension of judgment, and (2) they may be motivated by 
pragmatic considerations along with epistemic considerations in forming a belief. However, both (1) and 
(2) contradict what Whiting is seeking to explain, i.e. that agents are committed to evidence being the only 
reason for believing. Second, his account of reasoning is that in reasoning one aims to be guided by the 
facts and, more specifically, by reasons. In addition, the aim of belief is to provide premises for reasoning. 
As a result, he claims, the aim of belief is to be a reason. But there are certainly premises in reasoning that 
do not provide guidance: reduction ad absurdum is an example of reasoning where the premises do not 
provide guidance. Thus, claim that in reasoning we aim at being guided by facts strikes me as false. My 
claim is, in contrast, that in reasoning we aim at conclusions supported by facts. Finally, as I explained 




reason failed to deliver a conclusion supported by actual reasons. Putting these two things 
together we see some support for the idea that knowledge is required for using a premise 
in reasoning.  
The view I favor is that in reasoning we aim at forming a belief that we can use as 
premise in future reasoning. Whereas, of course, we prefer to have premises we can 
appropriately use in future reasoning, arguing for the aim of knowledge incurs in some of 
the problems I raised above for the aim of truth. More specifically, the claim that we aim 
only at forming beliefs that would amount to knowledge raises the worry that forming no 
beliefs whatsoever may be enough to fulfill that aim. And adding that we aim at forming 
a belief if and only if that belief would constitute knowledge raises concerns about cases 
in which we are precluded from reaching the truth and so we can’t aim at knowledge. For 
those reasons, I believe it is better to say that our aim in reasoning is to form a conclusion 
with sufficient support. If that conclusion is a belief, then we aim to form it only if it is 
sufficiently epistemically supported to guarantee that we can use it as premise in further 






More often than not, having beliefs that are true is definitively a good thing. Nobody will 
deny that. However, this is a far cry from saying that belief, by its very nature, aims at 
truth. In fact, in this dissertation, I raised worries for the almost universally accepted view 
that there is a constitutive, normative and/or teleological, relation between belief and 
truth, and that epistemic normativity follows from that. I did argue that belief has a 
necessary aim, but I am not sure it counts as ‘constitutive’ of belief. I did say that truth is 
important for belief, but I also added that truth is not what believers necessarily aim at 
when deliberating about what to believe. I did not exclude that norms may govern beliefs, 
and necessarily so. But I also offered reasons to be skeptical of the idea that these are part 
of the ‘essence’ of belief which, I claim, is really about the role belief has in reasoning. I 
tackled all this while trying to explain why we have limited power over our beliefs so that 
we can’t believe what we want. First, I defended the claim that believing means being 
disposed to use a proposition as a default premise in reasoning. Second, I focused on 
reasoning and defined reasoning as the inferential process guided by the constitutive aim 
of coming to a conclusion supported by sufficient normative reasons. Because it plays the 
role of a default premise in reasoning, belief is also generally expected to be a normative 
reason. Arguably, normative reasons are either true or at least epistemically supported 
propositions/attitudes. Hence, as a result of the constitutive aim we have when reasoning 
in general and the unique role belief has in reasoning, when deliberating about what to 
believe we are forced to (try to) form epistemically supported i.e. beliefs that we are 
willing to use in further reasoning. And this is why, through reasoning, we can’t come to 
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